tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-115432242024-02-21T10:16:06.561-05:00Baheyya: Egypt Analysis and Whimsy بهيّةCommentary on Egyptian Politics and Culture by an Egyptian Citizen with a Room of Her OwnBaheyyahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10880400752452388877noreply@blogger.comBlogger217125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11543224.post-29960485235307340672016-06-07T00:01:00.000-04:002016-06-07T00:03:25.862-04:00Public Audit<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;">He didn’t know it, we didn’t know it, and they
didn’t know it, but Mohamed Morsi planted a time bomb on September 6, 2012,
when he appointed Hisham Geneina as chief auditor. Geneina had plenty of name
recognition and public esteem as a leader of the judicial independence movement
of 2005-2006, but unlike his fellow judges in that movement, he is not thought
to have Islamist sympathies. When the revolution broke out, he did not delve
into its politics, as did Zakariyya Abdel Aziz, who gave rousing speeches in
Tahrir Square, or Mahmoud al-Khodeiry, who was elected to the first and only real
parliament after Mubarak’s ouster. And he was not discredited in office as was Ahmad
Mekky, who frustrated many people as Morsi’s Justice Minister and then, frustrated
himself, huffily resigned in April 2013.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Morsi was fairly easily removed by the longtime
hoarders of state power, but ironically they’re finding it much harder to
eliminate his most fateful appointment. This March, Sisi dismissed Geneina from
his post, but the story is far from over. Today is Geneina’s first trial session,
where he stands accused of “disseminating false news that disturbs the public
peace.” But the coup makers had to take a tortuous path to get to this stage,
and the trial portends the beginning of a second and possibly more embarrassing
phase. Geneina’s shrewd tactics and unassailable reputation have made this a very
costly mess for Sisi and his confederates.</span></div>
<a name='more'></a><o:p></o:p><br />
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<b style="line-height: 17.6pt;"><span style="color: #0070c0; font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">A Dormant Creature</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><a href="http://www.asa.gov.eg/page.aspx?id=1">The
Central Auditing Agency (CAA)</a> that Geneina directed is an intriguing
organization. Created by a parliamentary act in 1942 as the “Accountancy Diwan,”
it was designed as an internal watchdog to monitor all government revenues and
outlays. The prime minister appointed the agency’s head with parliament’s
approval, but only the latter had the power to dimiss him. In the Nasser years,
the Agency was given its current name and logo of a wide-open eye atop a scale.
But with the shift from parliament to the presidency as the locus of power within
the state, the CAA was brought under presidential control; now only the
president could appoint its director for four-year terms, and no director could
be dismissed. In 1988, a new organizing law expanded the CAA’s auditing powers
beyond the bureaucracy, enabling it to inspect the finances of political
parties, trade unions, and professional associations. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjSA2v5vYKEz5DC-eC5srMwW7i-QGsh7mcMnyduNY_WPZa4boIV-fEZL1cD-PqmPGvsyAczHNdxfVf6Vq_yvpRodOUAi6tK8oeFnVl-DUHb1a4z-Tk8i8MgTxo245p8JjF-kgMC/s1600/10523731_665885503499211_153084738892325579_n.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="200" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjSA2v5vYKEz5DC-eC5srMwW7i-QGsh7mcMnyduNY_WPZa4boIV-fEZL1cD-PqmPGvsyAczHNdxfVf6Vq_yvpRodOUAi6tK8oeFnVl-DUHb1a4z-Tk8i8MgTxo245p8JjF-kgMC/s200/10523731_665885503499211_153084738892325579_n.png" width="191" /></a></div>
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">As long as the president was an unelected
insider and corruptionist-in-chief, the CAA was a tool unleashed on peons in
the bureaucracy and critics in civil society. But mostly it was inactivated. Judge
Gawdat al-Malt, the director of the CAA for the last 12 years of Mubarak’s
rule, repeatedly came in for criticism from opposition parliamentarians and journalists
for sanitizing CAA reports before sending them to the president. When the
unthinkable happened in 2012 and the president was an outsider who appointed
another outsider as chief auditor, many cushy nests were liable to be disturbed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Geneina did something deceptively simple: his
job. The CAA is one among several Egyptian state institutions that can actually
work well, given enabling conditions. One of Geneina’s first acts was to hold
essentially a <a href="https://youtu.be/p2zPz556cmA">public information session</a>
about the CAA, beginning to activate the organization’s fine-sounding role on
paper and inform the public about what it does. After the military coup,
Geneina intensified his media strategy, making it impossible for the coup-makers
to do away with him in the dark after Morsi was ousted. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Realizing what Morsi and the Ikhwan never
appreciated, Geneina systematically and directly courted public opinion as his survival
strategy. He held bold conferences at CAA headquarters and took reporters’ stunned
questions; he gave endless interviews, simplifying complex issues in precise
yet accessible language. And when the government’s smear campaign against him
extended to his wife and in-laws, he invited a Sisi shill to his home for a
two-hour <a href="https://youtu.be/BaJivhD6CKQ">televised interview</a> with
his wife and three daughters. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Geneina did all this well before he revealed in
December 2015 the figure of $76 billion lost to corruption, the ostensible
reason he was dismissed from his post and is being tried. But the government’s campaign
against him started in 2014 and peaked in mid-2015. The reason Sisi and company
couldn’t just wait till Geneina’s term was up in September 2016 is that he made
visible the one government bureau that all of Egypt’s unelected presidents want
to keep unknown and inconsequential. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="color: #0070c0; font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Entering the Hornets’ Nest<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Geneina walked a very fine line between deference
to the military-general-turned-president and airing high-level corruption in
the Interior and Justice Ministries. Carefully working within <a href="http://www.aca.gov.eg/arabic/AntiCorruption/Pages/nationalstrategy.aspx">official
initiatives</a> and the 2014 constitution’s explicit commitment to combating
corruption (Art. 218), he nevertheless shrewdly exploited the constitution’s
ambiguity about publicizing CAA reports by simply taking his facts and figures
directly to the public. Geneina’s first major overture after the coup was a <a href="http://www.pogar.org/publications/ac/Newspiece/ACIAC%20-%20News%20Piece%20on%20Egypt%20CAO%20Arousing%20Controversy.pdf">February
2014 press conference</a> that <a href="https://youtu.be/ZL3N33LJmW4">described
high-level corruption</a> between 2011-2013, including financial misdeeds
during <a href="http://www.madamasr.com/news/corruption-watchdog-presidency-state-security-guilty-squandering">Morsi’s
brief tenure</a> to deflect the charge that he was an Ikhwan mole, as the
lunatic fringe alleged. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Forms of corruption long known to Egyptians were
now being publicly certified by the one government official who could do so, at
a time of the coup regime’s maximum power. Three particularly egregious modes
of corruption were highlighted: the astronomical bonuses and allowances
funneled to Ministers for meetings they did not attend and boards they
contributed nothing to; off-budget funds in untouchable Ministries,
particularly Interior; and land sales to top officials and crony businessmen,
the chief perk of high office. From February 2014 to this day, Geneina pursued
a regimen of pretty much constant media exposure, to control the narrative,
frame the issues, and brand himself a bold public advocate on a matter everyone
cared deeply about . “I’ve put my hands into the hornets’ nest but I’m ready to
take the sting,” he said in a <a href="http://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=18032014&id=3936bc2e-186e-4ec7-9a3a-0a79a06f1083">long
interview</a> shortly after the press conference, saying that he had turned
down repeated advice to not confront the issues.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">A key part of Geneina’s strategy was to address
and cultivate supportive constituencies, especially human rights activists and
journalists, signaling through his language that they could all frame the
common cause as the public’s right to information. “We have to change the
culture of concealment and media blackouts, hiding won’t lead the country <a href="http://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=18032014&id=3936bc2e-186e-4ec7-9a3a-0a79a06f1083">to
progress</a>,” said Geneina. Rights lawyer Negad al-Borai <a href="http://today.almasryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=418175">messaged
back</a>, “Hisham Geneina, we’re with you.” <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Knowing full well the government’s age-old
stratagem of imploding organizations from within, Geneina spent his first year
in office cultivating a positive, team-building ethos within the CAA. He messaged
a morale-boosting professionalism to the CAA’s 12,00 staff members, calling
them “arbiters of public funds” in <a href="http://www.asa.gov.eg/Attach/19_197-198.pdf">internal publications</a>
while being careful never to rubbish his predecessor, Gawdat al-Malt. He acted
not as a crusader come to sweep out all that came before, but a can-do,
collegial manager intent on professional development and non-divisive
leadership. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">In language that nods to the criticisms of
Morsi during his time in office, Geneina <a href="http://www.asa.gov.eg/Attach/19_197-198.pdf">wrote to his</a> colleagues,
“Our goal is reform and inclusion, not division…to make the Agency a renowned institution
built on enlightened thought.” To my knowledge, the government has not been
able to find disgruntled employees or opportunists within the CAA to agitate
against Geneina and make his ouster look like a popular demand. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="color: #0070c0; font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="color: #0070c0; font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">The Hornets Sting <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Geneina made a beeline for the the police and
judicial sectors as two of the most graft-ridden enclaves in the state, and
that dredged up an old conflict with Ahmad al-Zind, the bulldog head of the
Judges’ Club, former Justice Minister, and a frontline figure in the campaign
to oust Morsi. Back in 2009, Geneina and Zind faced off in internal elections
to the Club; Geneina represented the dissident judges who linked up with
activists for clean elections and judicial independence in 2005-2006, and Zind
represented judges who conciliated the government and received ample material
rewards. Zind defeated Geneina and his slate in a close election, and that
history now resurfaced, with Zind all-too-happily <a href="http://today.almasryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=431629">slandering</a>
his nemesis while <a href="http://today.almasryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=417665">filing
complaints</a> against him for noting financial misdeeds in Zind’s management
of the Club.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Geneina was not intimidated, easily deflecting
the attempts to portray his work as score-settling with Zind or revenge on
behalf of the Ikhwan. When he showed no inclination to back down or scale back
his media strategy, a fierce campaign using <a href="http://today.almasryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=445368">the courts</a>
and <a href="http://today.almasryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=435790">newspapers</a>
targeted his integrity and motivations. He did not flinch from using the
government’s anti-terrorism rhetoric, spinning it to say <a href="http://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=12082015&id=45356e3a-57ee-44d4-84de-0e7c5d984008">terrorism
flourishes</a> in the de-development spawned by corruption. When that didn’t
work, the government dipped into its reservoir of dirty tricks. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">At the peak of the anti-Geneina offensive in
summer 2015, the military’s minions in the media disseminated that he had
accompanied his half-Palestinian wife to Gaza to visit his Hamas in-laws. Rather
than buckle, Geneina granted more <a href="http://www.madamasr.com/sections/politics/top-auditor-hesham-geneina-talks-mada-masr-about-quest-oust-him">interviews</a>
in which he warned of an <a href="http://today.almasryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=472873">espionage
case</a> being concocted against him, and invited a top pro-Sisi television anchor
to his home, where Geneina’s wife unapologetically <a href="https://youtu.be/BaJivhD6CKQ">informed the presenter</a> that she had
returned to Gaza after an 18-year absence to grant her deceased father’s last
wish to be buried among his ancestors. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">It was at this juncture that Sisi issued a terse
<a href="http://www.madamasr.com/sections/politics/new-law-further-shields-government-accountability">decree-law</a>
on July 9 granting the president the right to dismiss the directors of
independent regulatory agencies, including the Central Bank. A model of elastic
language, the law enables the president to remove directors if they “affect the
security of the state,” “fail to carry out their duties in a manner that harms
the high interests of the land” “lose confidence,” or “lose any of the
qualifications for office for non-medical reasons.” The law was inked a full
five months before the rapid chain of events culminating in Geneina’s sacking
and trial. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="color: #0070c0; font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Encirclement<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">On December 7, Sisi issued a <a href="http://asa.gov.eg/Attach/547_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%89%20%D8%B1%D9%82%D9%85%20451%20%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%A9%202015.pdf">decree</a>
appointing two deputies to Geneina, the first of whom is leading State Security
prosecutor Hisham Badawi, who prosecuted the most politically-sensitive cases
during the Mubarak era. On December 23, 2015, Geneina gave an interview to <i>al-Yawm
al-Sabe’</i>, a broadsheet with deep ties to security agencies. The <a href="http://www.youm7.com/story/2015/12/23/%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%B2%D9%89-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%89-%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%84%D9%80%25D">journalist
quoted Geneina</a> saying the cost of corruption was $76 billion in 2015. In fact,
the figure covers the years 2012-2015 and is drawn from a CAA report
(still-unpublished) commissioned by the Minister of Planning to coincide with
the UN’s International Anti-Corruption Day (December 9). Facts mattered little,
however. The ideal pretext to sack Geneina had just revealed itself, and the
machinery was set in swift motion.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">On December 26, Sisi formed a fact-finding
commission to investigate not corruption, but Geneina’s contention, placing
Badawi on the commission. Two weeks later on January 12, it issued its <a href="http://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=12012016&id=dcdc359c-c57a-4a72-947d-91760966e059">findings</a>
that Geneina inflated the cost of corruption, “lost credibility,” manipulated
figures to put positive developments in a negative light, and misused the word “corruption.”
The commission concluded with the line, “One's word is a responsibility,
accountability is a necessity, and knowledge is a right of the people.” Sisi
issued his decree dismissing Geneina on March 28, the state security prosecution
began questioning him in May, and in early June referred him to trial for disseminating
false information that “disturbs the public peace,” a misdemeanor that carries
up to a year in prison and/or fines.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Till the end, Geneina sought to make his case as costly
as possible for the government. He refused to post bail and legitimize the
bogus charges, and was taken into custody with a suitcase of clothes and medication
until today’s first trial session. Only when his youngest daughter ended up in
hospital from shock did he allow his lawyers to pay the money so he could go
see her.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">* * *<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">As a chapter in the story of the Egyptian
revolution, the saga of Hisham Geneina and the institution he briefly steered is
not just about creative leadership under unbearable constraints. I don’t doubt
that Geneina’s acumen and even heroism will become clearer as time passes and
more details emerge. There’s another dimension further below the surface. Beneath
entrenched powerholders’ fury at Geneina’s audacity is the fear commanding
every power-grabbing clique, the fear of open, protracted controversies before
all eyes, away from the closed rooms and scripted settings where they prefer to
do business. The counter-revolution is dedicated to refurbishing ideas and
practices of political guardianship, convincing some and crushing others to accept that open conflict, loud fights, accountable public officials, and
other ways and means of doing politics are not the ‘appropriate’, ‘efficient’
or <i>muhtaram</i> way of doing things. Above all, that holders of state power
are an insulated caste who can’t be subject to the impertinent meddling of
ignorant commoners. Hisham Geneina’s conduct was a particularly dramatic challenge
to the idea that the public has no business concerning itself with public
affairs. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
Baheyyahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10880400752452388877noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11543224.post-61772405773868382962016-01-24T16:06:00.000-05:002016-01-24T16:08:04.124-05:00The Specter of January 25th <div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><img src="http://ideasandaction.info/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Egypt-Protests.jpg" height="400" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;" width="640" /></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Protesters in Suez attempt to enter hospital to retrieve body of dead protester, January 26, 2011<br />
<br />
Reuters/Mohamed Abd El-Ghany</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "georgia" , serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;">There is nothing surprising in the Sisi
government’s </span><a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/egypt-moves-to-head-off-popular-unrest-1453424005" style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;">anticipatory
prep work</a><span style="font-family: "georgia" , serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;"> for the five-year anniversary of the revolution. For weeks now,
media shills have disseminated a message of terror, assuring viewers of the
state’s violence if they dare go out on the streets. More subtle though no less
vicious, Hamdeen Sabahy, once an </span><a href="http://baheyya.blogspot.com/2010/12/day-in-life-of-egyptian-electoral.html" style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;">opposition
maverick</a><span style="font-family: "georgia" , serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;"> and now one of Sisi’s civilian stooges, was trotted out in an </span><a href="https://youtu.be/VkydpSyqomc" style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;">interminable interview</a><span style="font-family: "georgia" , serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;"> to deliver the
same warnings. Sisi himself is trying to reclaim the date as a police
commemoration, surrounding himself with the families of killed police officers
like </span><a href="http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/185675.aspx" style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;">so many props</a><span style="font-family: "georgia" , serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;">. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "georgia" , serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "georgia" , serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;">The only surprise is the transparency of the
fear gripping Egypt’s rulers. For a military clique hyper-concerned about
projecting an image of effortless control, the package of anticipatory measures
virtually screams panic and insecurity. This is odd, since Sisi’s government
has already updated a law criminalizing public demonstrations; filled prisons
with both critics and supporters of the Muslim Brothers; imprisoned the elected
president, Dr. Mohamed Morsi, on outlandish charges, with no international
censure to speak of; turned the civilian political class into adjuncts of
military rule; and shows no compunction about arresting and/or killing peaceful
demonstrators and passersby. So why the fear?</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">It seems to me that the most lasting legacy of
Egypt’s revolution is not that it banished fear within the population, or
somehow imbued Egyptians with a new consciousness that they didn’t have before.
The majority of Egyptians have always been and are acutely aware of the
workings of oppression in their lives. Like other subjugated people, they have
no illusions about how arbitrarily and violently they’re ruled, they just lack
the means to change it. For a brief, wondrous interlude in 2011-2013, a
breathtaking historic accident, they outflanked their rulers and made
themselves sovereign. One day, they went out to protest police brutality, and
in short order, toppled a thirty-year autocrat, threw out some governors and
other mini-dictators, bitterly fought over a new constitution, freely elected a
parliament and president, and practiced other forms of politics with a gusto
and sense of purpose unseen even during Egypt’s other great revolt in spring
1919.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">The wonderfully subversive happening that was the 2011
revolution put fears in the hearts of Egypt’s privileged castes: the military
generals who basked in unearned assets and a false mystique of professionalism;
the business clique that grew out of the illegitimate union between public
power and private wealth; and a pathetic, parasitic cultural elite animated by
nothing more than hatred for the general population and its ‘primitive,’ ‘traditional’
ways.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Even though they’ve decisively recaptured the summits
of state and economy, I don’t think that this generation of military generals, big
bureaucrats, crony capitalists, and cultural hacks will ever forget the humiliation
and displacement that January 25<sup>th</sup> meant to them. I think they more
than any of us will always remember the concrete, daily details of living through
a popular uprising, when ordinary people with no connections and no education
(oh the horror!) acted like masters, insolently demanding a full public
accounting for every decision, every ordinance, every utterance, every public
office from base to summit.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Egypt’s revolution was defeated, its extraordinary
details willfully forgotten, its magnitude belittled, its meanings reduced to
dumb clichés. But in the traumatized memories of a grasping ruling class, it
remains evergreen, a terrifying interlude of mass emancipation. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
Baheyyahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10880400752452388877noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11543224.post-48211115122505872032015-06-17T16:01:00.001-04:002015-06-17T16:02:27.950-04:00The Rhetoric of Egyptian Reaction<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiK-iUN94jzzZUtFTKE3Q7OxYW1aCYlxv08Y0Bwcwgflq0fs5GLW3MaPuCRHjNttWprg1m68v3dqeLbmIr36sX3HoyrKKu2SKSXHVjgC_D7OmA882KZfjKWTehXDQppvJ3BGo5n/s1600/AP260036574178.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiK-iUN94jzzZUtFTKE3Q7OxYW1aCYlxv08Y0Bwcwgflq0fs5GLW3MaPuCRHjNttWprg1m68v3dqeLbmIr36sX3HoyrKKu2SKSXHVjgC_D7OmA882KZfjKWTehXDQppvJ3BGo5n/s1600/AP260036574178.jpg" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">June 16, 2015. AP Photo</span></b></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;">This upsetting photo of Ikhwan members sentenced
to death by hanging dredged up a memory of another courtroom cage many years
ago. In December 1999, on the Haikstep military base, 20 Ikhwan professionals
were being tried in a military tribunal on charges of <a href="http://archive.aawsat.com/details.asp?article=12165&issueno=8014#.VYHR5PlViko" target="_blank">“infiltrating professional associations.”</a> It was the first courtroom I’d ever been in, and what
a strange one it was. A cage took up the entire left length of the room; all 20 men in it were dressed in spotless white gallabiyas. I remember Khaled Badawi, a
loquacious lawyer and bar association activist, now a member of Dr. Mohamed
Morsi’s legal team. Next to him was Mokhtar Nouh, a big personality who loved
the limelight, now a rabid anti-Ikhwan propagandist. Mohamed Ali Bishr was
there, the engineer who later became a governor then a minister during Morsi’s
presidency and is now in prison. And usually sitting quietly deep inside the cage
was Mohamed Badie, the veterinarian who became the Brothers’ General Guide in
2010 and who is now among those sentenced to death.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;"><br /></span>
<a name='more'></a><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;">Family members and lawyers packed into uncomfortable
wooden pews, made even more punishing by the December chill, and military
policemen in red berets stood languidly in the aisles. On a dais sat the three
military officers-cum-judges, headed by Gen. Ahmad al-Anwar, a ruddy-faced man who
used to close his eyes in listening rapture when Khaled Badawi chanted a
heartrending adhan from inside the cage. Once the proceedings were over for the day we would spill outdoors
into the fading daylight, waiting for the military buses to transport us back to
the base entrance. Standing somewhat apart from the crowd in his lawyerly black
robes was the great Wafdist and true liberal Atef al-Banna, who was there to
defend the 20 professionals on principle. On the bus we shared a seat and a
somber silence, as everyone else jabbered on as if we were heading back from a
day trip.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">That military trial was my first up-close encounter
with the Egyptian state’s rhetoric. Up to that point I’d only read official
speeches and pronouncements, but never seen what those ideas looked like in
action. The entire set-up of a military tribunal to try civilian activists was
simply political repression by legal means. The Mubarak regime started sending
Muslim Brothers to military tribunals in 1995, to prevent them from making the
gains in national polls that they had achieved in professional association
elections. That was what the 1999 trial was about; the 20 defendants were
sentenced to 3-5 years in prison, to cripple the Ikhwan from planning an
effective election strategy in the 2000 general elections. In the event, 17 second-tier,
mostly unknown Ikhwan members secured seats. The leader of this tiny parliamentary
bloc was an obscure engineering professor from Sharqiyya named Mohamed Morsi. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Judging from Judge Shaaban al-Shamy’s <a href="http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/752354" target="_blank">statement</a>
yesterday before delivering his death sentences, the Egyptian state’s rhetoric
doesn’t seem to have changed all that much from 1999, or 1954 for that matter.
Shamy mouthed the tropes in use for decades by the police state to criminalize citizen
political engagement. Since their founding in 1928, Shamy <a href="http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/752354" target="_blank">declaimed</a>, the Ikhwan
organization “had in its veins a mixture of religion and politics, outwardly
professing religion but inwardly seeking politics.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">As usual, he cast the Muslim Brothers as a
feral, conspiratorial force, forever seeking to “pounce on power even at the
expense of the nation and people, encouraging bloodletting and conspiring with
foreign organizations to realize its diabolic goals under the cloak of
religion.” <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">What is new in Shamy’s <a href="http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/752354" target="_blank">little speech</a> is
accounting for the post-2011 novelty of mass mobilization. Here the commanders
of the Egyptian state have simply appropriated the popular risings, passing over
January 25<sup>th</sup> as if it didn’t happen and casting June 30<sup>th</sup>
as a patriotic pro-state insurrection against the evil dividers of the organically
unified nation. “On that day droves of this proud people poured forth all over
the country to demand a strong, coherent society that does not exclude any of
its sons, and ends the state of conflict and division.” <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Egyptian reactionary thought has always been
around, of course, but it took the 2011 revolution to gather it up into a
semi-coherent doctrine. Egyptian reactionaries within the state, the crony business
class, and segments of the middle and even working classes are constructing a
worldview that equates political pluralism with chaos, defines power rotation
as “bringing down the state,” and is offended, no, <i>terrified</i> by the
political agency of the lower orders, especially when they dare to vote for parliamentary Islamists.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">To historians, it’s old news that revolutions
often end up crystallizing and formalizing reactionary orders. But for the rest
of us who so hoped never again to see political activists in a courtroom, it’s an
enduring source of grief.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
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<i><span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<i><span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">*The title of this post is inspired by Albert
Hirschman’s <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=NjMIu-vQheYC&dq=rhetoric+of+reaction&source=gbs_navlinks_s" target="_blank">luminous book </a>dissecting centuries of conservative thought. </span></i><span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
Baheyyahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10880400752452388877noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11543224.post-36567781873760363572015-02-09T17:30:00.001-05:002015-02-09T17:34:56.293-05:00The Tasreebat<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjBs0azJ1ZZfoEPL4UpeiDVsrHvIzVLesuXE9fyVV2VNIQ2tkBV3Y_Yzi7w1l5Jy15p4L_iB5UejoUojSNGakMst5LCwx-TObb4fRKnUnYXGklwdfC5cZ7pvBph-PkWnA9G2FLL/s1600/_78563728_78563727.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjBs0azJ1ZZfoEPL4UpeiDVsrHvIzVLesuXE9fyVV2VNIQ2tkBV3Y_Yzi7w1l5Jy15p4L_iB5UejoUojSNGakMst5LCwx-TObb4fRKnUnYXGklwdfC5cZ7pvBph-PkWnA9G2FLL/s1600/_78563728_78563727.jpg" height="221" width="400" /></a></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">The <a href="http://youtu.be/xqijGwausV0">latest
leaked</a> recording of Egypt’s generals conferring in Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s
office is the most damaging one yet. Earlier leaks were interesting, but not
exactly shocking. The generals <a href="http://youtu.be/evx4BUqeeOw">scrambled to
legalize</a> Mohamed Morsi’s detention after July 3<sup> </sup>2013; dictated
talking points to their <a href="http://youtu.be/7QLiAKyNc0s">media shills</a>;
and gave the Prosecutor-General instructions about high-profile cases. This
surprised neither the coup’s friends nor foes, since everyone knows that the
generals control every government official and micro-manage propaganda.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">The <a href="http://youtu.be/xqijGwausV0">recent
leaks</a>, however, take things to a new level. The generals don’t just rubbish
their Gulf backers; scorn Egyptians as a starving, miserable mass; and
generally ooze contempt for anyone outside their ranks. The recordings reveal
how, in private, Egypt’s peak military officers see themselves. In frank,
relaxed banter, they discuss how to <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/09/us-egypt-gulf-idUSKBN0LD1H720150209">milk
the Gulf monarchs</a> for more billions; rue the Nasser military’s non-profiteering
mindset; and generally come off as money-grubbing hirelings ready to deploy military
force anywhere in exchange for cash. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Thus in a five-minute conversation, the generals
unmask their own elaborate self-mythologizing as nationalist, selfless public
servants who have rescued Egypt and the region from an Islamist cabal. They reinforce
critics’ longstanding claims that the Mubarakist Egyptian military defends not
the national interest but its <a href="http://www.merip.org/mer/mer262/egypts-generals-transnational-capital?ip_login_no_cache=f86ab204b6c4923d521265eedef2d4ee">own
sectional concerns</a>.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
<a name='more'></a><o:p></o:p><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;">The main thrust of the military’s mythmaking is
that it stands above the partisan fray, ably steering the sacred ship of state.
Endlessly producing and reproducing this ideology is a matter of survival for
Egypt’s profit-minded generals in times of revolutionary upheaval, when a restless
public opinion shifted from welcoming them in the early days of 2011 to denouncing
their violence and venality by mid-year.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">After the coup, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and his SCAF
fellows amped up their self-sanctification. Using the hapless Islamists as a
foil, they cast the military as above politics and uniquely qualified to lead
the nation. During his transition from general to president, Abdel Fattah
al-Sisi lectured Ibrahim Eissa that all of Egypt should aspire to the military’s
<a href="http://youtu.be/U6aVCEnhYVM">all-around perfection</a>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Now come the tasreebat that cut through the spin
and get down to the essentials. Here is Sisi’s office manager general Abbas
Kamel articulating a pay-for-service deployment doctrine, in contrast to Gamal
Abdel Nasser’s 1960s intervention in Yemen. “What we’re in now is because of
our previous mistakes. Look sir, regardless of patriotism and Arab nationalism and
all that talk, we had to from the very beginning be like Syria and say you give
me and I’ll give you. Otherwise we’re repeating the Yemen experience. No, it
has to be you give me and I’ll give you. Let ‘em pay!” <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Shortly before announcing his presidential bid, Sisi
dictates to Kamel how to approach the Saudis for more money, making a clear
distinction between the military’s own funds and the public treasury. “Look,
you tell him we need 10 [billion] to be deposited in the military’s account.
You tell him, that when God willing I win [the election], that 10 will then work
for the state. And we want another 10 from the Emirates and another 10 from
Kuwait. That’s in addition to a handful to be put in the Central Bank to
balance the 2014 budget.” <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">When Kamel chuckles heartily and says that the Saudi
head of the royal court Khalid al-Tuwaijri will faint on hearing of such huge sums,
Sisi says, “Man, their money is like rice, man! Come on, ya Abbas ya Kamel!”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">No one expects the junta to say the same things in
public and private. But when Abdel Fattah al-Sisi constantly hectors Egyptians about
belt-tightening, hard work, and obeying the state while brainstorming with his
generals about feathering SCAF’s nest with Gulf cash, something more significant
than hypocrisy is at work. In their own words, the generals’ core myth of
unassailability is exposed as the shoddy, pathetic construction that it is. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
Baheyyahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10880400752452388877noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11543224.post-27436336228421727272014-08-12T16:28:00.002-04:002014-08-12T16:28:55.022-04:00A Grand Entente<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEizI42RTBK7um3qoj2dmo6xJcaI1z9rFAEChgJOimSOQDfj-UZCwPT9LL-0h1Nxbkdxjr3G9qBb9CGXRYCn0FdBn8P2kh8GHJdbhsrVmGTC9ZTkCa5LUS6s-uyYv9vLxy3zryzr/s1600/Latuff+Mubarak+Gaza.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEizI42RTBK7um3qoj2dmo6xJcaI1z9rFAEChgJOimSOQDfj-UZCwPT9LL-0h1Nxbkdxjr3G9qBb9CGXRYCn0FdBn8P2kh8GHJdbhsrVmGTC9ZTkCa5LUS6s-uyYv9vLxy3zryzr/s1600/Latuff+Mubarak+Gaza.jpg" height="267" width="400" /></a></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">In the old days, when the Israeli military
bombed and shelled Palestinians and sought to destroy their society, Hosni
Mubarak used a well-worn formula, fully abetting Israeli actions while uttering
pro-Palestine platitudes. Occasionally, when huge protests rocked the streets,
he green-lighted theatrical gestures such as his <a href="http://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/opt-egypts-first-lady-heads-humanitarian-convoy-gaza-border">wife
heading a relief convoy</a> to Gaza in 2002, and his son fronting a <a href="http://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06CAIRO4939_a.html">delegation
to Beirut</a> when Israel bombed Lebanon in 2006. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Today, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has not only steered
clear of a single expression of token solidarity with Palestinians. He and his
media creatures have actually ventriloquized Israeli talking points: <a href="http://youtu.be/qI3IBywRwfY">Hamas is responsible</a> for the staggering
civilian death toll; Hamas is a <a href="http://youtu.be/WRn4VqMwagk">terrorist
organization</a>; Hamas ought to be tried for <a href="http://youtu.be/J2dK6TJXkU8?list=UUfiwzLy-8yKzIbsmZTzxDgw">war crimes</a>.
One of <a href="http://youtu.be/KawFlN1C4vs">Sisi’s shills</a> even instigated
a diplomatic crisis with Morocco when she attacked King Mohammed VI for
allowing Islamists to form the government, prompting an official apology by the
Egyptian ambassador to Morocco.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">What accounts for this baffling state of
affairs? Mubarak’s and Sisi’s are both dictatorial regimes, and Sisi is seen as
the logical heir to Mubarak (albeit rudely interrupted by the evanescent
Egyptian revolution). But why is Sisi going out of his way to advertise his
identity of interest with Israel? Surely it’s better for him to be circumspect
and keep up appearances?</span></div>
<a name='more'></a> <o:p></o:p><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;">But Sisi is not Mubarak. For the old dictator,
parliamentary Islamism in both its Egyptian and Palestinian versions was a
troublesome popular movement to be contained. For the new dictator, it’s an
existential threat to be crushed. Mubarak and his intelligence chief mediated
unfairly but serviceably between Israel and Hamas. Sisi and his </span><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/30/world/middleeast/ousted-general-in-egypt-is-back-as-islamists-foe.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&" style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;">intelligence
chief</a><span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;"> have given up any pretense of mediation, ferrying Israeli ultimatums
to Hamas and openly expressing intense dislike not just for the Islamists but
for any </span><a href="http://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/af925913-b0ac-478b-8d20-0a4105371af3" style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;">pro-resistance
Palestinia</a><span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;">n.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Sisi’s foreign policy is of a piece with his belligerent
domestic modus operandi, built on the same three pillars: an exterminationist
stance toward any bottom-up political mobilization, Islamist or otherwise; an
alliance with anti-change social forces; and a crude, over-the-top <a href="http://electronicintifada.net/content/egypts-propagandists-and-gaza-massacre/13662">propaganda
machine</a> specifically designed to overturn Egyptians’ sound beliefs, be it
their aversion to state violence to eliminate political opponents or their
enduring affinity with Palestinians. Sisi’s Palestine-Israel policy is but a grotesque
manifestation of the ascendant counter-revolutionary regional order.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt;"><span style="color: blue;">Gaza in the Time of
Counter-Revolution</span><span style="color: #1f497d;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">On one level, Israel’s war on Gaza this year is
only the <a href="http://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n15/mouin-rabbani/israel-mows-the-lawn">latest
round</a> in Israel’s ongoing punishment of Palestinians for electing Hamas in
2006. But this time, Israeli aggression enables and is enabled by a regionwide
anti-democratic surge, an effort born to counter the uprisings in 2011 that has
now grown from an implicit constellation into an open alliance.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">The millions who led and championed the Arab
uprisings wanted to create representative governments answerable to their
citizens, not least on foreign affairs, especially the just treatment of
Palestinians. But what they ultimately got was a brazen, super-motivated,
anti-change regional coalition that now counts Israel as its proud newest
member. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">The fact that a rightwing Israeli ruling
establishment and a gaggle of new and old Arab dictators have jettisoned the
old decorum and are openly making common cause is an unintended outcome of the
2011 uprisings, brought about by the intense struggle between pro-change forces
in the Arab world and the powerful guardians of the status quo.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Sisi’s military coup last year was the crowning
achievement of the regional counter-revolutionary entente. Finally the spark of
Egyptian democratization was extinguished once and for all. After maintaining a
studied reticence about the Arab uprisings in 2011-2012, Israeli officials began
to openly laud Arab monarchs and military dictators as a strong “<a href="http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131014/DEFREG04/310140009/In-Israel-Surprise-Anger-Over-US-Aid-Cuts-Egypt">Sunni
axis</a>.” Hawkish Israeli powerbroker Amos Gilad even <a href="http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131014/DEFREG04/310140009/In-Israel-Surprise-Anger-Over-US-Aid-Cuts-Egypt">triumphantly
proclaimed</a> that Arab democracy is “four or five” decades away. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">By openly declaring which side it’s on in the
epic battle for Arab democratization, Israel unwittingly accelerates yet
another unintended outcome: the merger of the two great popular strivings of the
modern Middle East, the struggle for popular sovereignty within each state and
the struggle for Palestinian sovereignty within an independent state.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Arab democratization and Palestinian
self-determination have always been linked in practice, both in the sentiments
and political activism of populations and in the stratagems of rulers. But in
journalistic writings, academic tomes, and rulers’ speeches, they’re carefully compartmentalized
as two separate stories, one a domestic affair between rulers and populations,
the other an international great game involving superpowers, non-state actors, aspiring
regional hegemons, and transnational civil society.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Among its many other long-term consequences,
Israel’s latest bombing and shelling of Gaza makes it much harder to pretend
that Arab democratization is one track and the Arab-Israeli conflict another.
They’ve always been nested within and <a href="http://hammonda.net/?p=2178">feed
off each other</a>. Israel’s brutal control over Palestinians deepens anti-government
popular mobilization in Arab countries. And Arab rulers’ methods of repression
drive them closer and closer to Israeli interests, Israeli rhetoric, and the
abiding Israeli fear of unsubjugated Arab citizens.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt;"><span style="color: blue;">Egypt’s Regime Changes</span><span style="color: #1f497d;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">It’s no news that Arab presidents and monarchs
are rabid anti-democrats. Neither is it news that Israeli generals and prime
ministers (and a hefty portion of the Israeli public) are allergic to Arab
democratization. What is new is how openly and enthusiastically they’re seizing
the moment to together crush the experience of Arab self-rule in both its
Palestinian and wider regional variants.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Egypt’s trajectory since 2011 is crucial to
understanding the development of the new Israel-inclusive anti-democratic
regional caucus. Days into Egypt’s 2011 uprising, Netanyahu instructed his
officials to <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/31/world/middleeast/31israel.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Aw%2C%7B%222%22%3A%22RI%3A17%22%7D&_r=1&">keep
mum</a> about it until events play out. Naturally, the Israeli establishment
was terrified at the prospect of “losing Egypt.” <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">When that prospect was on the cusp of becoming
reality, then-defense minister Ehud Barak articulated the longstanding Israeli
equation of political change in Egypt with a “takeover” by the Muslim Brothers.
“The real winners of any short-term election, let’s say within 90 days, will be
the Muslim Brotherhood, because they are already ready to jump,” <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/exclusive-israeli-def-min-ehud-barak-egypts-revolution/story?id=12905130">Barak
told Christiane Amanpour</a>, elaborating, “Usually in revolutions, if they’re
violent, there is an eruption of idealist sentiment at the first moment and
then later on, sooner than later, the only group which is coherent, focused,
ready to kill and be killed if necessary, takes power.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">A year and a half later, when the Muslim
Brothers won the presidency, not by “jumping” on anything or killing anybody
but in fair-and-square elections, Israeli expectations were that Mohamed Morsi
would greet Hamas with open arms and establish an Egypt-Turkey-Hamas-Qatar-Tunisia
axis that would stand up to Israel. Amos Gilad <a href="http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Amos-Gilad-Strong-Arab-Sunni-bloc-doesnt-see-Israel-as-enemy-325553">claimed</a>
that Hamas’s “self-confidence was huge when Morsi was in power.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">In fact, as Nicolas Pelham <a href="http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/oct/26/gaza-isolation-way-out/">details</a>,
Morsi was severely constrained by the military in his dealings with Hamas,
especially after the August 2012 killing of Egyptian border guards that the
military blamed on Hamas. The military asserted its primacy in scripting
foreign policy, and in short order “Egyptian bulldozers began digging up
tunnels with a tenacity Morsi’s predecessor, Hosni Mubarak, had <a href="http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/oct/26/gaza-isolation-way-out/">rarely
shown</a>.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjeNLuwm7mCy65X2h5SkICn2QweCbOxT6_3GUooObDTGtAmvXgoK1PlzWPrKhKp4-B_hPyEzlHIEv5TcyPbTJbwxa9h9QtTR_oAmox-zHUcW2Xv8vkLulu1wKRNMtCcXnPZHTt2/s1600/Latuff+netanyahu-morsi-gaza.gif" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjeNLuwm7mCy65X2h5SkICn2QweCbOxT6_3GUooObDTGtAmvXgoK1PlzWPrKhKp4-B_hPyEzlHIEv5TcyPbTJbwxa9h9QtTR_oAmox-zHUcW2Xv8vkLulu1wKRNMtCcXnPZHTt2/s1600/Latuff+netanyahu-morsi-gaza.gif" height="252" width="400" /></a></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">When Israel bombed Gaza in November 2012, Morsi
engaged in a pragmatic balancing act. He addressed outraged public opinion by
dispatching his prime minister to Gaza, recalling Egypt’s ambassador from Tel
Aviv, and opening the Rafah crossing to the Gaza injured, while working all
channels with Israel to negotiate a ceasefire. Morsi earned plaudits from Obama
for his effective mediation (“<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/22/world/middleeast/egypt-leader-and-obama-forge-link-in-gaza-deal.html?pagewanted=all">he
sensed an engineer’s precision with surprisingly little ideology”</a>), but to
many Egyptians and Palestinians his approach was <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/15/mohamad-morsi-gaza-israel-egypt">disappointingly
tepid</a>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">It was Morsi and the Muslim Brothers’ repeatedly
demonstrated pragmatism that was troubling to the region’s anti-change
coalition. Israeli and Saudi officials <a href="http://mobile.nytimes.com/2014/07/31/world/middleeast/fighting-political-islam-arab-states-find-themselves-allied-with-israel.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&_r=2&referrer=">love
to tar</a> the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, Hamas and other parliamentary
Islamists as “extremists” and “terrorists,” but they would say the same thing if
the Islamists were communists. Israel did say the same thing about the
Palestinian national movement when it was dominated by the secular nationalists
of the PLO.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">What the region’s anti-democrats really fear are
representative leaders with broad popular constituencies to whom they’re answerable
in periodic elections. When these alternative elites are in power, and not the
likes of Mubarak, Ben Ali, and Ali Abdullah Saleh, life is unbearably hard for
Israel and Saudi Arabia, because they have to actually deal with the
preferences of populations and modify their policies, and that’s unacceptable.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt;"><span style="color: blue;">The Regional Anti-democratic Caucus</span><span style="color: #1f497d;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">For Israel, no less than for Saudi Arabia and
the junior members of the anti-democratic caucus (Jordan and the UAE), Sis’s
coup was a blessing, promising to reverse the dangerous consequences of Egyptian
democratization. Those consequences had literally landed on their doorsteps, as
Egyptian crowds encircled the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/10/egyptian-protesters-israeli-embassy-cairo">Israeli</a>
and <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-recalls-envoy-to-egypt.html">Saudi</a>
embassies in 2011 and 2012 to protest the two countries’ arrogant,
unaccountable policies.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">No one can accuse Israeli and Saudi rulers of
not understanding the implications of a democratic Egypt. A representative
government, even if led by the <a href="http://electronicintifada.net/content/egypts-muslim-brotherhood-has-reneged-promises-palestine/12301">tame
Muslim Brothers</a> and hamstrung by the Egyptian military, would be
susceptible to popular clamor for democratic control over foreign policy.
Translation: the end of Israeli and Saudi impunity. Israel would have to stop
killing Palestinians every few months and start accepting Hamas as an integral
part of the Palestinian national movement. And Saudi Arabia would have to end
its perennial abuse of non-Saudi nationals and face unprecedented scrutiny of
its treatment of citizens.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">No surprise then that the Sisi
counter-revolution is a cherished Saudi-Israeli investment. Saudi Arabia sends
him <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/20/us-egypt-sisi-saudi-idUSKBN0EV16E20140620">ample
funds</a> and Israel sends him abiding love and <a href="http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131014/DEFREG04/310140009/In-Israel-Surprise-Anger-Over-US-Aid-Cuts-Egypt">support</a>.
“I think that the whole world should support Sisi…Sisi and the liberals,
ElBaradei and others, they deserve the support of the free world,” <a href="http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/08/16/barak-world-should-back-new-egypt-government/">gushed</a>
former Israeli defense minister Ehud Barak in August 2013. Leave it to an
Israeli politician to seriously call on the free world to back an Arab military
dictator. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Breaking with their usual reticence about their “moderate”
Arab friends, Israeli officials have echoed Barak, advertising the emergent alignment.
Israeli defense official Amos Gilad heralded the “heavyweight axis” of Arab
states which doesn’t view Israel as an enemy. “This has huge importance…and
gives us many opportunities,” he <a href="http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Amos-Gilad-Strong-Arab-Sunni-bloc-doesnt-see-Israel-as-enemy-325553">enthused</a>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">In the middle of Israel’s 2014 assault on Gaza
and in light of the Sisi regime’s crucial collusion, a former Israeli military
intelligence chief was well pleased with Israel’s admission into the Arab
dictators’ club. “For perhaps the first time, there is a true convergence of
interest among Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Palestinian Authority and Israel in
limiting the spread of Islamist <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/26/opinion/to-save-gaza-destroy-hamas.html">extremism</a>.”
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">In his recent press conference, Netanyahu echoed
Gilad’s words, <a href="http://www.jpost.com/Operation-Protective-Edge/ANALYSIS-Israel-and-Sunni-powers-finally-display-convergent-interests-369957">hailing</a>
“the unique link which has been forged with the states of the region. This as
well is a very important asset for the State of Israel. With the cessation of
the fighting and the conclusion of the campaign, this will open new
possibilities for us.” <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEindVW68zZX_By34PIfUQmMwLImGMn258zEnF-TGzCNJc6DFwJIcpNvg1l-OcoygM1x_sW7SKCzisILfPQ8DANg7pQ81RDR5Lsu0cZYmudb0QpP5t_bomCWANKyd7uLdhuOCcrG/s1600/Latuff+Sisi+Gaza.gif" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEindVW68zZX_By34PIfUQmMwLImGMn258zEnF-TGzCNJc6DFwJIcpNvg1l-OcoygM1x_sW7SKCzisILfPQ8DANg7pQ81RDR5Lsu0cZYmudb0QpP5t_bomCWANKyd7uLdhuOCcrG/s1600/Latuff+Sisi+Gaza.gif" height="246" width="400" /></a></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Thanks to persistent journalists, the
Sisi-Israel link has moved from the closed-door world of military officialdom
to a matter of public knowledge. Last year, Sisi <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/world/middleeast/pressure-by-us-failed-to-sway-egypts-leaders.html?pagewanted=all">was
in</a> “heavy communication with Israeli colleagues” throughout the coup and
its aftermath, namely security forces’ repeated <a href="http://youtu.be/AUtFM9L6ago">mass killings of Morsi supporters</a>. In
turn, Israeli officials closely coordinated with Sisi first their strangling
and then their bombardment of Gaza, <a href="http://online.wsj.com/articles/unlikely-alliance-between-israel-and-egypt-stoked-gaza-tension-1407379093">checking
his</a> “temperature” every day during the war to make sure he was comfortable
with the military operation as it intensified.” <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">When Egyptian generals are in close contact with
Israeli counterparts as they unleash state violence on dissenting citizens, and
when Israeli officials check in every day with Egypt’s military rulers to gauge
their tolerance for the merciless bombing of Gazans, it won’t do to euphemize
this as anything other than the lethal partnership it is.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt;"><span style="color: blue;">The Regional Quest for
Self-Determination</span><span style="color: #1f497d;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">The Arab uprisings did not succeed in setting up
durable representative governments or just economic systems. The threat of such
momentous democratic changes led regional power-holders to band closer together
and reveal their lethal collaboration, quelling for now the massive movements
from below for political and economic emancipation.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">But the more that Israel and its Arab
monarchical and military partners pool their efforts to crush popular strivings
in Gaza, the West Bank, Cairo, Manama, and Amman, the more that they
unintentionally crystallize the manifold struggles against them. We already
know that nothing brings together ideological adversaries and divided classes
in the Arab world like the Palestinian cause. Now, instead of merely
sympathizing with Palestinians, other Arabs may see themselves and Palestinians
as part of a common fellowship of the oppressed, especially those Syrians and Egyptians
who have suffered overwhelming state violence.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;">At this juncture, it would be wishful thinking
to say that the counter-revolutionary alliance will give rise to a reconstituted
regional revolutionary bloc, with the Palestinians at its core. Arab
populations are too battered and dispersed right now, and considerably
war-weary. And pro-change leaders and activists have been killed, are in prison,
or retreated into private life. Still, it’s too early to proclaim the triumph of
the anti-democratic alliance as the new regional status quo. We’re still in the
middle of the grand realignments set in motion by the Arab uprisings, not the end.</span></div>
</div>
Baheyyahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10880400752452388877noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11543224.post-47402083086288219212014-07-02T19:45:00.002-04:002014-07-04T13:05:18.272-04:00State Prestige Redux<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjejFlcTljvhcLAI_vlEGoV5il8JkxHDh-egiQ_pRWHivZHCGIcYw1MUP-DYSC2WdWf2dxVgC4lN3StVLiKL-A13s_GEzw4PYe8lmx_6BFC-W2Bpb4LGuxOWbwAxGFfcb2TH81k/s1600/State+Prestige+Redux.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjejFlcTljvhcLAI_vlEGoV5il8JkxHDh-egiQ_pRWHivZHCGIcYw1MUP-DYSC2WdWf2dxVgC4lN3StVLiKL-A13s_GEzw4PYe8lmx_6BFC-W2Bpb4LGuxOWbwAxGFfcb2TH81k/s1600/State+Prestige+Redux.jpg" height="271" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">(Anadolu Agency)</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">When historians review this first year of Sisi’s
rule, they will note that the military regime’s core priority was to crush
popular mobilization. Under the doctrine of restoring “<a href="http://baheyya.blogspot.com/2013/08/fetishizing-state.html" target="_blank">state prestige</a>,” the
entire state machinery went into <a href="http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/06/30/one-year-crackdowns/" target="_blank">avenger mode</a>, brutalizing both supporters of
the ousted president Mohamed Morsi and his diehard opponents. For despite their
myopic hatred for each other, the Muslim Brothers and their critics espouse the
same dangerous belief, the conviction that they should be able to control the
state, not the other way round. This revolutionary idea and its shortlived
practice is what Sisi is out to destroy. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Some like to pretend that the scale of state
violence since July 3 2013 is a sign of a government that’s out of control or
somehow getting off track. In a stunning abuse of language even by the forgiving
standards of diplomatspeak, the American State Department continues to
<a href="https://blogs.state.gov/stories/2014/06/26/egypt-s-chilling-detour-path-democracy" target="_blank">proclaim</a> that Egypt is on “a path to democracy” but unfortunately experiencing
a “chilling detour.” In reality, the mass killings, mass jailings, mass death
sentences, mass hysteria-mongering, and mass leader worship perpetrated by
Egypt’s government are not some unfortunate aberration. They are what <a href="https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/evidence99/pinochet/HistoryGeneralArticle.htm" target="_blank">putschist generals</a> do after they overthrow <a href="http://fsrn.org/2014/04/impunity-still-an-issue-in-brazil-50-years-after-military-coup/" target="_blank">elected governments</a>.</span><br />
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<a name='more'></a><o:p></o:p><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;">Egypt’s new military regime fits the </span><a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/topsecret-files-shed-new-light-on-argentinas-dirty-war-8923307.html" style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;" target="_blank">grim pattern</a><span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;">.
The zeal with which it’s using state power to kill, incarcerate, and cow
citizens aims to extinguish the practices and memories of a revolution. In 2011
and 2012, every government official at every level was on the back foot,
quivering at the surge of collective empowerment that coursed through the
citizenry. Egyptians didn’t just experience a change in consciousness with
their revolution, they saw a qantum shift in political practices.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Think back to the sustained occupation of public
squares, the repeated encircling and ransacking of fortified official
buildings, the popular ejection of corrupt bureaucrats and local bosses, the
near-daily filling of streets to demand government action and accountability, and
the cleanest parliamentary and presidential elections we’ve ever had. For the
first time in a very long time, maybe the first time ever, Egyptian officialdom
truly feared the people. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">This is <b><i>the</i></b> nightmare scenario for
every statist and counter-revolutionary, and every conservative who loathes
commoners and becomes incensed when they demand a say in how they’re governed.
In the Egypt of 2011 and 2012, “state prestige” was being smashed and state
accountability was on the horizon, and that’s precisely what Sisi is here to
reverse. The military <a href="http://baheyya.blogspot.com/2013/07/a-litany-of-state-violence.html" target="_blank">repeatedly killed</a> citizens in 2011 and 2012, but saw its
own <a href="http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/19/egypt-security-forces-used-excessive-lethal-force" target="_blank">quantum shift</a> after the coup. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">So it’s not surprising that after the military killed and jailed members of the Muslim Brothers, repression moved to the Brothers’
political adversaries. Did anyone seriously believe that a junta that suspends
the constitution, arrests and imprisons the elected president, and massacres
his supporters in the streets would show any scruples toward self-described
revolutionary activists? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Because the revolution augured an era where the
state had to be accountable to citizens, the Sisi counter-revolution is
obsessed with re-sanctifying the state and re-enfeebling citizens. A raft of
laws now criminalizes or cancels out hardwon practices of association,
assembly, expression, election, and information. Banning the Muslim Brothers is
not the only attack on association; the military gutting of the political arena
means goodbye to any real political parties. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Assembly, that foundational tool of people power
and the origin of the revolution, is now kaput. No one can set foot in Tahrir
Square unless they’re participating in a military-sanctioned spectacle. The new
Protest Law reactivates the colonial-era requirement of advance permission from
the police for any demonstration. Every day, activists are <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/01/world/middleeast/pretrial-detention-extended-for-egyptians-who-protested-ban-on-protests.html?src=recg">arrested
for months or sentenced to years in prison</a> for daring to hold permit-less peaceful
protests, most recently <a href="http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/105283.aspx">seven
high school students</a>. For the Muslim Brothers, their evening protest processions
and Friday demonstrations are met with brute force, including live fire.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Expression is also criminalized. A new decree
brings all mosques and preachers under direct government control. After the
August 14 <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/14/world/middleeast/memory-egypt-mass-killing.html?pagewanted=all">mass
killings in Rabaa</a> and Nahda, anyone brandishing the four-finger symbol is
subject to arrest and imprisonment, the tragic instance of <a href="https://www.facebook.com/aidaseif/posts/10154295114540497">Sara Khaled</a>
being only one among untold others. The 20-year-old dental student is serving a
two-year sentence for allegedly assaulting a police officer, but her real crime
is possessing a Rabaa pin. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Sisi has personally tried to silence the meaningful, stinging term "askar" (military), in his self-defined, self-appointed role as chief arbitrator of public discourse.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhe0fpcPH2xZlYqMODvtD2vfRnXCJG37W8stqOWkcANY9X-Wx-KMudYPQ26PDlpwRvjoeOaelh_Hh_Q9cjW31qZGMpbEf3DKsA-OMZSK8FWH1y8qr5epbCozMdaOa-4lsuI2CRY/s1600/Latuff+Jazeera.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhe0fpcPH2xZlYqMODvtD2vfRnXCJG37W8stqOWkcANY9X-Wx-KMudYPQ26PDlpwRvjoeOaelh_Hh_Q9cjW31qZGMpbEf3DKsA-OMZSK8FWH1y8qr5epbCozMdaOa-4lsuI2CRY/s1600/Latuff+Jazeera.png" height="371" width="400" /></a></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">For the journalists imprisoned by the
military regime, their confinement is not only about limiting freedom of expression. It's just as much about the government flaunting its impunity. As Peter Greste, one of
the three imprisoned Al Jazeera English journalists observes in a <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/25/peter-greste-letters-prison-egypt" target="_blank">letter from prison</a>, “Our
arrest doesn’t seem to be about our work at all. It seems to be about staking
out what the government here considers to be normal and acceptable. Anyone who
applauds the state is seen as safe and deserving of liberty. Anyone else is a
threat that needs to be crushed.” <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Elections are anathema to state supremacy, since
they give citizens the opportunity to choose who runs the state. The Egyptian military and its adjunct civilian bureaucrats consider running the state to be their birthright, an inheritance that can never be left to commoners and outsiders. Sisi’s takeover of the
presidency at the national level is only the beginning. Cancelling free and
fair elections in every institution will follow, starting with presidential
appointment of university deans and presidents in lieu of faculty
self-governance. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Finally, the public right to information, always
fragile even in democracies, has been decisively rolled back with two new legal
provisions, one <a href="http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/18010/egyptian-investment-law-axing-proxy-litigation-har" target="_blank">denying concerned citizens</a> the legal standing to contest
government sale of public assets, the other granting ministers and governors
even greater leeway to <a href="http://www.madamasr.com/content/window-opportunity" target="_blank">award direct contracts</a>. The legal framework for crony
capitalism is thus back in place, undisturbed by legislative oversight or
public deliberation.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">When the historians begin to write this period
of Egypt’s history, they will rely on the painstaking work of a heroic
constellation of human rights organizations, lawyers, and journalists, people
who patiently and <a href="https://ar-ar.facebook.com/Al7oriallgd3an" target="_blank">courageously</a> <a href="https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B1zsNnmPuiMvWk80TmVrV2NPQ1k/edit?pli=1" target="_blank">document</a> the <a href="http://eipr.org/en/report/2014/06/18/2124">human toll</a> of a post-revolutionary
military dictatorship. They will be able to reconstruct how the state’s police,
judicial, and <a href="http://eipr.org/en/pressrelease/2014/06/23/2132" target="_blank">penal</a> apparatus vengefully controlled the fates of tens of
thousands of <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/egypt-american-on-hunger-strike-in-cairo-prison/2014/05/03/d20fc373-22e2-4186-a30e-b5a614d74a1e_story.html" target="_blank">Morsi </a><a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/egypt-american-on-hunger-strike-in-cairo-prison/2014/05/03/d20fc373-22e2-4186-a30e-b5a614d74a1e_story.html">supporters</a>,
and not a few Morsi <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/egypt-court-upholds-jailing-leading-pro-democracy-activists-134921525.html">critics</a>,
journalists, and innocent bystanders. Perhaps they will shudder at the more
than <a href="http://wikithawra.wordpress.com/">41,000 detained citizens</a>,
the <a href="http://www.albedaiah.com/node/53102">conditions of their
confinement</a>, the <a href="https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B1zsNnmPuiMvNzFreEtqRWwzWjg/edit">details
of their torture</a>, and the terrifying underworld of <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/22/disappeared-egyptians-torture-secret-military-prison">unaccountable
military prisons</a> brought to light by an <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/profile/patrick-kingsley">outstanding forensic
journalist</a>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">They will also come across this <a href="http://www.madamasr.com/content/lysenkos-time">prison letter</a> from
activist and prisoner of conscience Alaa Abd El Fattah, meditating on the
ideologies governments use to perpetuate their oppression and concealment of the
truth. Alaa captures the perennial dialectic in Egyptian political thought and
practice, between those who make it their “mission to repair the reputation of
the institutions and patch up respect for the state” and those whose “mission
is to reform the heart of the state and the reality of its institutions.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
Baheyyahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10880400752452388877noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11543224.post-91448179096965204082014-05-30T23:23:00.000-04:002014-05-30T23:23:03.528-04:00Sisi's Challenge<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiVlyBzbw6D5UW25rPj6h7EBIl3xBaW5Vg1EOsRxbVDflJzMucAiQbU3Qmo00-8hxTU8nzuX0rRieRHl5MAxYaLRYwCr-0wI5HDxNZN9NvR2Z4-rRkifStLQUJms8uhfK2yXdX6/s1600/Latuff+Sisi.gif" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiVlyBzbw6D5UW25rPj6h7EBIl3xBaW5Vg1EOsRxbVDflJzMucAiQbU3Qmo00-8hxTU8nzuX0rRieRHl5MAxYaLRYwCr-0wI5HDxNZN9NvR2Z4-rRkifStLQUJms8uhfK2yXdX6/s1600/Latuff+Sisi.gif" height="400" width="240" /></a></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Abdel Fattah El-Sisi has certified his seizure
of power with an electoral pantomime, and looks set to preside over a reconstructed
Mubarakist system. The revolution appears as a blip in the stubborn tradition of
one military dictator transferring power to another. But try as he might, the new leader
of Egypt can’t rule the way Mubarak did. Sisi faces an entirely different
set-up than the relatively tame country Mubarak inherited, and will have to
devise a ruling formula from scratch to deal with a country in a protracted
political transformation.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">It’s strange to me how so <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/03/general-sisis-greatest-enemy-the-egyptian-economy/359723/" target="_blank">many</a> <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/29/us-egypt-election-idUSKBN0E70D720140529" target="_blank">commentators</a> are
unanimously declaring the economy to be the make-or-break test of the new
autocrat’s rule, as if the survival of any of Egypt’s military rulers depended on
economic performance. Inequality, immiseration, and corruption accelerated
under Sadat and flourished under Mubarak, but neither was brought down by those
conditions. Their fates hinged on the tools of political control they designed
to channel and contain economic discontent and political ambition.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Sisi’s survival depends on how he’ll pacify and
roll back the mass politicization that erupted post-revolution, a feat that no
other modern Egyptian ruler has had to attempt. From January 25 2011 to June 30
2013, in a spectacle unseen in the modern history of this country, crowds filling
streets determined the fate of powerholders. On July 3, <a href="http://baheyya.blogspot.com/2013/07/fashioning-coup.html" target="_blank">Sisi terminated</a> that
dangerous pattern, co-opting popular mobilization into state-sanctioned folk festivals
and using overwhelming state violence against oppositional protests and sit-ins.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">But to build an enduring authoritarian order, Sisi
will have to go beyond his crude strategy of crushing real mass mobilization
while staging medieval pageants of mass acclamation. The limits of this
approach couldn’t be clearer in the election debacle. Apparently, Sisi and his machinery
didn’t anticipate that claiming a popular mandate is far easier with protests
than through elections. Hence the hilarious government panic and desperate
eleventh-hour measures to compel people to take part in a choreographed election,
an exercise more idiotic than herding cats.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><b><span style="color: blue;">Managing Opposition</span></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Simply put, Sisi has to construct a
sophisticated new system for handling opposition. The state terror he’s unleashed
on opponents since July 3<sup>rd</sup> may work in the short term, but begins
to signal state weakness in the face of unabated acts of resistance. Similarly,
the spectacles of popular acclamation à la Syria’s Asads quickly become
liabilities, showcasing a ruler’s mendacity and megalomania rather than his
invincibility.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Mubarak’s rule lasted because it managed
different kinds of opposition. There was a parliamentary space inherited from
Sadat, for channeling the political energies of the reformist Muslim Brothers
and a dozen maverick non-Islamist politicians. When a <a href="http://baheyya.blogspot.com/2008/05/four-myths-about-protest.html" target="_blank">protest culture</a> began to
emerge in the 2000s, Mubarak’s police didn’t crush it but instead worked to ensure
that workers’ protests never merged with pro-democracy demonstrations. Mubarak
even kept Sadat’s <a href="http://baheyya.blogspot.com/2007/01/party-politics.html" target="_blank">risible state-created opposition</a>, the neo-Wafd, Tagammu, and
Nasserist outfits that were useful when he needed a stooge to stand against him
in sham elections.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">This system chugged along for 30 years and would
have lasted longer, had an internal and external shock not overturned everything.
Mubarak’s son and his friends over-managed the 2010 parliamentary elections and
hogged all the seats, radicalizing the tamed parliamentary opposition. A month
later, on January 14, 2011, the Arab authoritarian order was changed forever
when one of its architects ran away in the face of massive street opposition,
electrifying crowds all over the Arab world. The stage was set for the separate
worlds of opposition under Mubarak to converge and terminate his storied
longevity.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="color: blue; font-family: Georgia, serif;"><b>Revolutionary Creation, Military Destruction</b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">The uprising inaugurated an era of mass
politicization, breaking down the barriers between people and politics Mubarak
had maintained so well. It seems like a different country now, but recall the heady
<a href="http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/1082/sc24.htm" target="_blank">year of 2011</a>, when every part of Egypt was alive with boundary-breaking political
action: protests against <a href="http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703300904576178431941090282" target="_blank">mini-Mubaraks</a> in the state bureaucracy; protests
<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/25/us-egypt-protest-idUSTRE73754M20110425" target="_blank">against governors</a>; evolution of <a href="http://www.egyptindependent.com/opinion/popular-committees-continue-revolution" target="_blank">neighborhood</a> popular <a href="http://www.egyptindependent.com//news/popular-committees-bring-true-spirit-democracy-streets" target="_blank">committees</a>; <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/07/us-egypt-christians-idUSTRE7266C520110307" target="_blank">protests</a>
against church <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15235212" target="_blank">burnings</a>; the first free <a href="http://www.egyptindependent.com//news/cairo-universitys-faculty-arts-names-first-elected-dean" target="_blank">internal university</a> elections; <a href="http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=368937&#.U4jS7fldUv4" target="_blank">freetrade unions</a>; the first sustained <a href="http://www.demotix.com/news/754495/eighth-july-sit-revolution-continue-tahrir-square#media-751211" target="_blank">Tahrir sit-in</a> <a href="http://www.tahrirdocuments.org/2011/08/why-a-sit-in-on-friday-july-8/" target="_blank">after</a> Mubarak’s ouster; and
crowds’ storming of two of the most fortified symbols of power in Cairo:
the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12657464" target="_blank">State Security headquarters</a> and the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14862159" target="_blank">Israeli embassy</a>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">At the same time as Egyptians were actively
remaking politics in their neighborhoods, streets and workplaces, a new
national political tradition was born: the Friday mass protest or <i>melyoneyya</i>,
radiating out from Tahrir in Cairo to the central squares in provincial
capitals. I don’t think it’s an exaggeration to claim that this was the first
time since 1919 that crowds steered national policies, via a weekly outdoor
mass parliament more potent than any legislative body. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">When that body was seated in January 2012, it
was peremptorily dissolved less than six months later, part of the military’s
long game of torpedoing every popular achievement both at the ballot box and in
the streets. In short order, the first elected president was overthrown; the
first popularly-authored constitution suspended; Tahrir Square was closed off
with barbed wire and army tanks; protest encampments at <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/14/world/middleeast/memory-egypt-mass-killing.html?_r=0" target="_blank">Rabaa</a> and Nahda <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23705246" target="_blank">burned</a>
and thousands of protestors killed; an anti-protest law promulgated; and <a href="http://wikithawra.wordpress.com/2014/01/09/sisi-mansour-detainees/" target="_blank">thousands </a>of students, activists and non-political citizens arrested, jailed or sentenced to death.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Writing of the 1851 coup d’état that arrested
the 1848 revolution in France, <a href="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch01.htm" target="_blank">Marx’s words</a> illuminate equally well the
Egyptian drama of revolutionary creation and military destruction: “Instead of
society conquering a new content for itself, it only seems that the state has
returned to its most ancient form, the unashamedly simple rule of the military
sabre and the clerical cowl.” <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Sisi has yet to go beyond the primitive Bonapartist
impulses of using the state’s brute force and crude propaganda. But to recoup the
investment in him by his Gulf, US, and Israeli friends and backers, he will
have to build a viable authoritarian political order that can calibrate and not
just indiscriminately crush opposition.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;"><b><span style="color: blue;">Sisi's Gamble</span></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">If Mubarak inherited a country with tame levels
of conflict, Sisi seized power in a scarcely recognizable Egypt, a place that in
three remarkable years has undergone three political upheavals: a popular uprising;
an intensely competitive, hard fought presidential election; and a military
coup cheered by half the population and resisted by the other half. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;">Residues of these conflicts have made deep grooves:
the </span><a href="http://mubasher-misr.aljazeera.net/news/2014530195914608810.htm" style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;" target="_blank">nightly</a><span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;"> anti-coup processions and </span><a href="http://mubasher-misr.aljazeera.net/news/2014530161121471892.htm" style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;" target="_blank">Friday demonstrations </a><span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;">in Greater Cairo and
several other cities; </span><a href="https://www.youtube.com/user/SACCairo/videos" style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;" target="_blank">student protests</a><span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;"> of stunning bravery and heroism; an
armed insurgency in Sinai; workers’ protests that are likely to increase in
frequency and magnitude; and a </span><a href="https://www.youtube.com/user/JoeTubeVid/videos" style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;" target="_blank">thriving</a><span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;"> </span><a href="http://youtu.be/BkVK1slzMw4" style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;" target="_blank">satirical</a><span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;"> </span><a href="http://youtu.be/M1SjojH9vg8" style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;" target="_blank">subculture</a><span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;"> dedicated solely
to ridiculing Sisi’s </span><a href="http://youtu.be/6lHCki_THW0" style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;" target="_blank">every gesture</a><span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;"> and </span><a href="http://youtu.be/bxk1IkHxm_Y" style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;" target="_blank">utterance</a><span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 17.6pt;">.</span></div>
<br />
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Sisi’s gamble requires that he figure out a
workable formula for ruling Egypt without the participation of Egyptians,
at a historical juncture when Egyptians have become much harder to rule.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
Baheyyahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10880400752452388877noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11543224.post-55211811424809883802014-01-10T15:59:00.000-05:002014-01-10T16:07:03.323-05:00A Military Constitution<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<iframe allowfullscreen='allowfullscreen' webkitallowfullscreen='webkitallowfullscreen' mozallowfullscreen='mozallowfullscreen' width='320' height='266' src='https://www.youtube.com/embed/yxKLRPiFdBM?feature=player_embedded' frameborder='0'></iframe></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Now that the Egyptian military has ousted the
first elected president, installed a government of civilian executors,
massacred the former president’s supporters and sympathizers, and declared his
organization a terrorist group, it is set to produce a document it calls a
constitution that codifies military superiority over state and society. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">Not content to delegate the task of selling the
document to the 50 people it appointed to write it, the military is doing its
own sales pitch. It has issued <a href="http://youtu.be/yxKLRPiFdBM" target="_blank">this video</a> laying out how all three branches of
the armed forces, as well as special forces, border guards and military police,
will deploy 160,000 men to assist the Interior Ministry in “securing” the
referendum on the document.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">The video is an endless parade of military
prowess: rolling tanks and armored personnel carriers; formations of ramrod-straight
troops bearing huge rifles; and of course the military’s treasured helicopters,
this time not to draw hearts in the sky but “to monitor any obstructions to the
electoral operation.” At the end of the video the voice-over narrator avers, “This
comes at a time when the armed forces are undertaking vigilance and
preparedness procedures to execute their principal duties on all the strategic fronts
of the state.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">One could be forgiven for thinking that Egypt is
on the cusp of war, not an impending plebiscite. But war is what militaries do,
and when countries are blighted by politicized militaries that control their
politics, the guns are turned inward. This isn’t a figure of speech. Since July
3<sup>rd</sup>, the military and its junior partner the police have repeatedly
killed opponents of the coup, not content with “just” arrests and jail terms. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">The once unfathomable is now routine, with at
least one killing at every protest, and a stunning 17 people killed just last Friday.
The general public’s manufactured indifference and silence is the biggest kick
in the gut, a testament to the military’s lethal power to mold reality and cow
citizens.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">In frighteningly methodical fashion, every
hard-won gain of the January 25<sup>th</sup> revolution is reversed and trampled
upon. The collective emancipation of the revolutionary crowds is turned into
fear and conformist state worship. The once-revolutionary act of burning police
cars, a time-honored Egyptian resistance tactic, is now rubbished because only
the Muslim Brothers are daring it. The greatest and most brittle achievement of
the revolution, the possibility and practice of ruling ourselves, is defeated
by the armed enforcers of elite rule.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 11.5pt;">In these times of daily state violence, a law
criminalizing protest, a government decree declaring the largest political
group in Egypt a “terrorist organization,” and a state-sponsored silencing and
fear-mongering campaign, Egyptians are being badgered to go out and endorse a
document that spells out the terms of their subjugation. Such is the military’s
constitution.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
Baheyyahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10880400752452388877noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11543224.post-5505133442740434122013-08-08T15:12:00.002-04:002013-08-08T16:23:04.055-04:00Fetishizing the State<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjFBLefVFHVqOoOshUR0sBY6uLbi47-mjHTWYof4-4XRDMlZz2ea9S36JdYmT42w9AHkUg6fHD_6-IlqByBUQwdTV2nIFD4yT42vg83jVEne_4M0fFR9pkQH1i2am327Bo4Fb-j/s1600/Army+&+Police.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="266" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjFBLefVFHVqOoOshUR0sBY6uLbi47-mjHTWYof4-4XRDMlZz2ea9S36JdYmT42w9AHkUg6fHD_6-IlqByBUQwdTV2nIFD4yT42vg83jVEne_4M0fFR9pkQH1i2am327Bo4Fb-j/s400/Army+&+Police.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;">An old and pernicious idea is back in
circulation since the July 3 coup. It was a running theme in the <a href="http://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=24072013&id=b94ce861-eefe-4d34-aa02-66dde3ee63c1" target="_blank">military ruler’s speech</a> on July 24 where he demanded a popular mandate to “confront
terrorism.” Right on cue, government officials parroted it repeatedly in their
stern warnings to dissenters. Pro-military activists, politicians, and
intellectuals happily invoked it in their jihad against the Ikhwan. The idea is
<i>haybat al-dawla</i>, or the state’s standing and prestige, a central plank
of the Arab authoritarian order that’s making a big comeback. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;"></span></div>
<a name='more'></a><span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; line-height: 17.6pt;">It’s unsurprising that in his July 24 speech,
General Abdel Fattah El-Sisi would portray himself as a wise and honest mentor
to the errant Mohamed Morsi. The twist is that he says Morsi didn’t understand
the concept of the state because he’s an Islamist, not a nationalist (a claim
Sisi repeats in his </span><a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/rare-interview-with-egyptian-gen-abdel-fatah-al-sissi/2013/08/03/a77eb37c-fbc4-11e2-a369-d1954abcb7e3_story.html" style="font-family: Georgia, serif; line-height: 17.6pt;" target="_blank"><i>Washington Post</i> interview</a><span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; line-height: 17.6pt;">). Sisi says he gave up on instructing
Morsi and decided to </span><a href="http://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=24072013&id=b94ce861-eefe-4d34-aa02-66dde3ee63c1" style="font-family: Georgia, serif; line-height: 17.6pt;" target="_blank">“emphasize the idea of the state”</a><span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; line-height: 17.6pt;"> to the judiciary,
al-Azhar, the Coptic Church, the media, and public opinion, that is, all the
institutions that supported the coup.</span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;">Right after the speech, the statist line was on
everyone’s lips. The political adviser to the figurehead presidency <a href="http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/1977351" target="_blank">asserted</a>
that the state is mandated to confront terrorism at any time, that the state
and the people are in one camp, and that challenging haybat al-dawla in the
streets is unacceptable.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;">The president’s media adviser added that
El-Sisi’s call on citizens to demonstrate “<a href="http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/1977891" target="_blank">is to protect the state and revolution.</a>”
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;">Abdel Latif al-Menawi, head of state TV under
Mubarak, croaked that he’s been <a href="http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/1977271" target="_blank">warning about the loss of state prestige</a> since
January 28, 2011. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;">Not to be outdone, civilian enthusiasts of
military rule hopped on the bandwagon. Former presidential candidate <a href="https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=541704959199397&set=a.398028120233749.78301.397975316905696&type=1&relevant_count=1" target="_blank">Hamdeen Sabahy’s group</a> called for more proactive measures to recover the state’s
prestige. Activist <a href="https://www.facebook.com/ahmeddouma4/posts/225497384270830" target="_blank">Ahmed Douma</a> said that he was heeding Sisi’s call to
demonstrate “to support state institutions and get rid of all forms of
terrorism.” The National Salvation Front <a href="http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/1998311" target="_blank">practically begged</a> the Interior
Minister to disband the Ikhwan’s sit-ins, “to reinforce the principle of a
state of laws and to preserve state prestige.” <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;">Whether voiced out of conviction or rank
opportunism, defending the state is the favorite ideological vehicle of Egyptian
conservatives and counter-revolutionaries. Portraying the state as a sacred entity
whose standing is forever under threat rules out any talk of state reform. But
the really nefarious thing about haybat al-dawla is that it short-circuits any
attempt to democratize the state, to open up its commanding heights to popular election
and access. The implication is that the state can never change hands. It must
always remain under the auspices of permanent custodians.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<b><span style="color: #0070c0; font-family: Georgia, serif;"><br /></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<b style="line-height: 17.6pt;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;"><span style="color: blue;">Superstitious Reverence</span></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; line-height: 17.6pt;">I don’t know when the term originated, but Arab
state managers and their minions are obsessed with haybat al-dawla. <a href="http://www.akhbar-alkhaleej.com/12589/article/48818.html" target="_blank">Newspapers</a>
periodically run <a href="http://www.alquds.co.uk/?p=55781" target="_blank">hand-wringing articles</a> fretting about the <a href="http://www.al-seyassah.com/AtricleView/tabid/59/smid/438/ArticleID/238884/reftab/92/Default.aspx" target="_blank">decline of state prestige</a>, especially after the 2011 uprisings. The term is a perfect
mystification, casting an aura of mystery and gravitas on the reality of total
political control: control over society by the state, and control of the state
by an exclusive ruling caste.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj26fa_OeVZRsu8QWTlovvTNIdvphrmwFFB5ULz2hZSX5oMKAq3ouyUFlpNiCxRWUsybR9ZLmruys_4nSHFtQ_u7fMwgYaOCJY4H73_Rar03FdxJlFPGznMjeTio6d1P-QJOlZc/s1600/Army+&+Police+3.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="293" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj26fa_OeVZRsu8QWTlovvTNIdvphrmwFFB5ULz2hZSX5oMKAq3ouyUFlpNiCxRWUsybR9ZLmruys_4nSHFtQ_u7fMwgYaOCJY4H73_Rar03FdxJlFPGznMjeTio6d1P-QJOlZc/s400/Army+&+Police+3.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;">The word <i>hayba</i> holds layers of meaning: fear,
dread, reverence, esteem, standing. Applied to the state, it creates an image of
a larger-than-life force demanding veneration and radiating intimidation. The
state becomes this mythical thing standing above a society of loyal supplicants
and disloyal outlaws.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;">Fetishizing the state is not an Arab
authoritarian invention. In 1891, <a href="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1871/civil-war-france/postscript.htm" target="_blank">Frederick Engels</a> noted Germans’
“superstitious reverence for the state and everything connected with it.” Barely
concealing his contempt, Engels captured the generic ideology of state
veneration: “People from their childhood are accustomed to imagine that the
affairs and interests common to the whole of society could not be looked after
otherwise than as they have been looked after in the past, that is, through the
state and its well-paid officials.” <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<b><span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;"><span style="color: blue;">Masking Hereditary Rule</span><span style="color: #0070c0;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;">Books could be written about how Egyptians have
never succumbed to the ideology of state worship (and in fact, such <a href="http://baheyya.blogspot.com/2005/06/debunking-myth-that-wont-die.html" target="_blank">books</a> <a href="http://baheyya.blogspot.com/2005/05/despotism-historicised.html" target="_blank">exist</a>). Maybe
because of that, the project of state reverence refuses to die, peaking during
moments of widespread social protest.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;">Before the 2011 revolution, every time Egyptians
demonstrated to demand their rights from the state, haybat al-dawla was invoked
like a talisman to restore the status quo. In 2007 when protest fever spread to
many groups after the spectacular 2006 Mahalla workers’ strike, <a href="http://today.almasryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=79243" target="_blank">commentators fretted </a>about how state standing was being undermined, while others <a href="http://today.almasryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=79243" target="_blank">rightly pointed out</a> that haybat al-dawla reflected the anxieties of a police state.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;">After the revolution, the challenge to state
managers became existential. Not only had Egyptians broken the police backbone
of the state, they even wanted to democratize this state and put some of their
own people in top positions. They wanted free presidential elections, and
parliamentary elections, and a new constitution. They demanded an end to state
corruption, organized theft, and police rule. They wanted a state that works
for its people, not a predatory machine that fleeces and kills them.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;">This is all sacrilege for the exclusive class of
Egyptians who have come to see state office as their birthright. Whole chunks
of the state are hereditary fiefdoms. If you’re a foreign service officer, then
it’s probably because your father was. Same with the judiciary, the police,
public universities, and the state-funded culture industry, to say nothing of
cabinet portfolios. Hosni Mubarak merely wanted to extend the hereditary nature
of state office to the presidency, but the revolution ended that dream. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;">If family members of state elites are not in the
same line of government work, they’re in another. Former SCAF chief Mohamed Hussein
Tantawi’s wife drew a salary from a public electricity company well past
retirement age. The government <a href="http://shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=29092012&id=cbb72320-b343-4229-8d27-1e01b418abba" target="_blank">terminated her contract</a> only after her husband
was himself retired by former president Morsi. Similarly, General Sami Anan’s
wife continued to hold the No. 2 post in the Taxation Authority past retirement
age. Her subordinates <a href="http://www.shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?cdate=01042012&id=726f516f-4069-432a-a31d-2e800c2d4ae4" target="_blank">protested vigorously</a> against her, but she was only
<a href="http://shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=04092012&id=151eef13-d66c-4a1c-924c-fbd2b0ab0020" target="_blank">retired when her husband</a> was retired along with Tantawi.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;">The point is that over time, the Egyptian state
has come to be controlled by a privileged caste that’s not about to sit idly
and watch a popular revolution snatch its incredible perks. Of course the
ruling elite don’t come out and openly say this, though they say it privately
at their gaudy weddings and other tacky gatherings. They have to devise a
smokescreen for why ordinary citizens and counter-elites like the Muslim
Brothers can’t be let into the state sanctum. They call that smokescreen haybat
al-dawla. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<b><span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;"><span style="color: blue;">State Prestige under Mohamed Morsi</span><span style="color: #0070c0;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;">Not surprisingly given his conservative, elitist
worldview, Mohamed Morsi tried to <a href="http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/1422101" target="_blank">rehabilitate</a>, not transform haybat al-dawla.
The Muslim Brothers have never looked kindly upon grassroots popular protests that
they don’t organize. One of the first things Morsi did as president was to
appoint a Mubarakist police chief to <a href="http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=759247&" target="_blank">crack down</a> on street protests. When protesters
lobbed Molotov cocktails at Ittehadeyya Palace in February, Ikhwan leaders
<a href="http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/1457246" target="_blank">huffed and puffed</a> about how this hurts state prestige. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;">The Muslim Brothers’ biggest miscalculation was
to assume that they could join the ruling caste and begin to wield the doctrine
of state prestige. Morsi worked very hard to court and appease the Mubarakist
security state and its business cronies, but he realized far too late that
these pillars of the old elite would never accept him and his confreres into
the ruling coalition. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;">And it wasn’t just the Mubarakist elite that rejected
Morsi. What’s remarkable is how the statist idea took hold among commentators on
the left, right and center. Here’s leftist journalist Khaled al-Sirgany, sounding
<a href="http://today.almasryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=375795" target="_blank">downright martial</a> as he warns of state collapse and says angrily that Morsi and
the Muslim Brothers “don’t realize the meaning of the state and lack basic
skills to lead the first centralized state in history.” <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;">And here’s centrist and former Islamist Mustafa
al-Naggar <a href="http://today.almasryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=382999" target="_blank">fulminating against</a> Morsi for pursuing negotiations to release six
policemen and a soldier abducted in Sinai in May, instead of armed
confrontation with the captors. “What is happening? Has state standing fallen so
precipitously in everyone’s eyes to a point never imagined in our worst
nightmares?” Naggar then appeals to the military to “get angry,” to go ahead
and attack the hijackers and release the captives.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;">And then of course there’s the conservative Amr al-Shobaki,
dean of Egyptian statists. After Morsi’s ouster, he <a href="http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/1997181" target="_blank">opined</a> that the reason Morsi
failed is that the Muslim Brothers “have a deep hatred of the state and all its
institutions because throughout their history, the Brothers have had their own
organization and perhaps their own “parallel state.” So it’s not incumbent
state elites that have consistently excluded the Ikhwan, it’s the Ikhwan who’ve
excluded themselves.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;">Given the depth of the statist conviction among ostensible
independents, it’s hard to escape the conclusion that Morsi was maligned not so
much for what he did, but for who he is. Defenders of order and lovers of the
state cannot abide an outsider president, even a conservative one like Morsi
who did everything he could to <a href="http://baheyya.blogspot.com/2013/07/the-middling-muslim-brothers.html" target="_blank">join, not replace, the ruling caste</a>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<b><span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;"><span style="color: blue;">A Militarized Restoration</span><span style="color: #0070c0;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;">In the end, haybat al-dawla is a fancy term to
dress up and mystify minority control of the state. Stripped of its grandiose
aura, “state prestige” is a byword for exclusion, for walling off the state
from regular citizens and their revolutionary demands for state accountability,
protection, and public services. Like an exclusive club on well-tended grounds,
the Egyptian state and its military controllers do not allow public access. If
the Muslim Brothers were so violently cast out, despite their polite deference
to the ruling elite, then the message is: the state is off limits to everyone.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgxDPdEvxfAwPk7UpG7nxM841fxNdzsjDYZG9wMME5SaPThZJYStXTfyL10xQmwbpmhfnOfrRjouGY4G5GkD8jA3BxUXZjTY5BLFOFRPvFE1Nz7liEZed8aGO6oVuh-zpEdzb4V/s1600/Army+&+Police+2.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="265" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgxDPdEvxfAwPk7UpG7nxM841fxNdzsjDYZG9wMME5SaPThZJYStXTfyL10xQmwbpmhfnOfrRjouGY4G5GkD8jA3BxUXZjTY5BLFOFRPvFE1Nz7liEZed8aGO6oVuh-zpEdzb4V/s400/Army+&+Police+2.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;">To me this is one of the most sobering lessons
of the aborted Morsi presidency. The popularly-supported coup is quite a
triumph for the Mubarakist ruling caste and the doctrine that the state is
theirs to run. They can lay on thick the rhetoric of haybat al-dawla and
restoring state standing, but what’s really been restored and re-legitimated is
their complete control of the state.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;">Since the military leads the ruling caste, and
sets the agenda and talking points for their civilian subordinates, political conflict
is now cast as military conflict. Look no further than the military ruler’s
discourse portraying resistance to his putsch as a battle between patriots and
enemies. Oppositional sit-ins are threats to national security. Participants in
the sit-ins are duped simpletons or paid agents. Their leaders are terrorists
and killers. And any opposition to the military’s road map is a threat to state
standing. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.6pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; line-height: 17.6pt;">The challenges confronting the revolutionary
project couldn’t be more daunting. It not only faces a reconstituted,
militarized anti-revolutionary order, but a wicked ideology that naturalizes
that order as a matter of state standing. State standing boils down to the
prestige of the state’s hard core, military and police. And the revolution’s great
promise of endowing citizens with full political standing is in abeyance.</span></div>
</div>
Baheyyahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10880400752452388877noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11543224.post-41423256091778278942013-07-28T15:51:00.001-04:002013-08-02T00:08:38.662-04:00Public Service Announcement<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<div style="text-align: center;">
<iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="270" src="//www.youtube.com/embed/sWv3zp257sY" width="480"></iframe></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; line-height: 150%;">On the same day that Egyptian
police shot dead at least <a href="http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/28/egypt-many-protesters-shot-head-or-chest" target="_blank">74 Muslim Brother demonstrators</a><span style="font-size: small;"> and wounded scores,
the <a href="https://www.facebook.com/MoiEgy/posts/576786452365022" target="_blank">Interior Ministry</a> released what it called its first animated short for
children. A little boy and his grandfather (a retired police officer) sit on a
couch in a spare living room, watching television footage of an earthquake in
Turkey. The boy asks his grandfather, “Geddo geddo, what’s an earthquake?” The
grandfather recites the geological definition of an earthquake and sagely
schools the child in the proper safety procedures in such an event. To the awe
of his grandson, he highlights the heroic role of the civil defense forces, “who
will sacrifice their lives for us.” The video ends with the message, “We seek to
upgrade the thinking of the Ministry of Interior and to provide excellent
services, so please cooperate with us.”</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; line-height: 150%;"><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></span></div>
<a name='more'></a><span style="font-size: small;"><o:p></o:p></span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; line-height: 150%;">Today, at the police cadet
graduation ceremony attended by Gen. Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and Interior Minister
Mohamed Ibrahim, </span><a href="http://youtu.be/njaHn1zkbJk" style="font-family: Georgia, serif; line-height: 150%;" target="_blank">another video</a><span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; line-height: 150%;"> was screened showcasing the achievements of the
Ministry. The core mission of police is to protect citizens
who express their political views, says the video. It heralds the “return of the state
of institutions” after “millions” of citizens demonstrated on June 30. To show
the bond between police and people, images of police officers assisting elderly
people in everyday life alternate with scenes from the June 30 protests of
police officers demonstrating, handing out bottled water to protesters, and
posing for photos with adoring crowds.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; line-height: 150%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; line-height: 150%;">A long interval then lists in
great detail the kinds and quantities of weapons confiscated by hardworking
police officials. The finale emphasizes the new challenge now facing the police
force, “confronting terrorism while respecting the rule of law.” The narrator
confidently notes that Egyptian police are no strangers to counter-terrorism,
and will succeed in snuffing it out this time just as they had in the past. “The
dawn of the Egyptian police radiates with the sun of June 30 and will continue
to spread out over Egypt and its security.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; line-height: 150%;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; line-height: 150%;">The important thing to note
about police propaganda is not how obscenely it distorts <a href="https://www.facebook.com/aidaseif/posts/10153068622330497" target="_blank">reality</a>, for that’s a
given. It’s the particular doctrine it seeks to promote. The coercive
core of the ruling caste, police and military, have seized upon the June 30
protests to upgrade their longstanding ideology that they are the nation’s <a href="http://baheyya.blogspot.com/2013/07/military-tutelage-egyptian-style_16.html" target="_blank">uncontested guardians</a>. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; line-height: 150%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; line-height: 150%;"><span style="font-size: small;">Like kindly grandfathers, they teach, admonish, forbid, and permit, at
their pleasure. “The people” is an undifferentiated mass that acts at the
behest of its guardians, filling streets when the </span><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/25/world/middleeast/egypt.html" target="_blank">guardian-in-chief</a><span style="font-size: small;"> snaps his
fingers and </span><a href="http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/1929736" target="_blank">parroting his claims</a> like they’re scripture. Political pluralism,
intense conflict, and difference are not allowed. Order,
discipline and conformity are sanctified. Anyone who steps out of the mass line
isn’t just a dissenter, but an enemy of the nation. He is to be marked a
terrorist and killed.<span style="font-size: small;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
</div>
Baheyyahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10880400752452388877noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11543224.post-88581674104991860532013-07-27T06:15:00.002-04:002013-07-27T06:20:43.675-04:00A Litany of State Violence<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEioO41-cmf3qz84cUG5OjwFFkHKGPu-YkSghJoZd3XYHg_f4XHBHYsYo5LvmHU0r5Ecfyx9o7Ix_0gU_3caSe3rdPbocErwl-6GfZ3OyrGyPo1cOIQsmjwlOPRuyJ2Sl_T7qnuL/s1600/AP823395531958.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="256" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEioO41-cmf3qz84cUG5OjwFFkHKGPu-YkSghJoZd3XYHg_f4XHBHYsYo5LvmHU0r5Ecfyx9o7Ix_0gU_3caSe3rdPbocErwl-6GfZ3OyrGyPo1cOIQsmjwlOPRuyJ2Sl_T7qnuL/s400/AP823395531958.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: Trebuchet MS, sans-serif;"><b>Rabaa Sit-in Mass Shootings, July 27 2013 (AP Photo)</b></span></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; line-height: 150%;">A non-exhaustive list of organized
violence by military and/or police forces against unarmed citizens since the January
25</span><sup style="font-family: Georgia, serif; line-height: 150%;">th</sup><span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; line-height: 150%;"> revolution. The list doesn’t include countless episodes of deliberate
police inaction in the face of deadly citizen-on-citizen violence, most notably
the March 2011 Manshiyyat Nasser Christian-Muslim clashes (15 dead, 114
injured), the February 2012 Port Said soccer deaths (74 dead, 1,000 injured), the
December 5, 2012 Muslim Brothers’ break-up of the Ittehadeyya Palace sit-in (10
deaths), and the June 2013 lynching of four Shi’a Muslims and injury of eight.</span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; line-height: 115%;">The 18 days, 25 January-11 February 2011: 848 dead, 1,000+ disappeared<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; line-height: 115%;">Balloon Theater clashes, June 2011: 1,114 injured<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; line-height: 115%;">Maspero massacre, October 2011: 28 dead, hundreds injured<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; line-height: 115%;">Mohamed Mahmoud St. clashes, November 2011: 45 dead, 60 eye
injuries<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; line-height: 115%;">Cabinet Offices sit-in, December 2011: 17 dead, 928 injured<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; line-height: 115%;">Mohamed Mahmoud St. clashes, February 2012: 15 dead<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; line-height: 115%;">Defense Ministry sit-in, April-May 2012: 12 deaths<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; line-height: 115%;">Ramlet Boulaq clashes, August 2012: 75 arrests<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; line-height: 115%;">Qursaya Island clashes, November 2012: 3 dead, 5 injured<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; line-height: 115%;">Port Said protests, January 2013: 42 dead, 874 injured<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; line-height: 115%;">Presidential Guard massacre, July 2013: <a href="http://fdep-egypt.org/?p=1981" target="_blank">92 dead</a><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; line-height: 115%;">Rabaa Sit-in mass shootings, July 2013: <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/27/us-egypt-protests-idUSBRE96O11Z20130727" target="_blank">70 dead, scores wounded</a><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br />
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<span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-size: small;">Sources: </span><a href="http://www.eipr.org/programs/8" target="_blank">Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights</a><span style="font-size: small;">, </span><a href="http://fdep-egypt.org/?p=1981" target="_blank">Front to Defend Egypt Protesters</a><span style="font-size: small;">, </span><a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE12/017/2012/ar/a6fbc51f-a151-4b74-8c93-7b625d5cdb75/mde120172012en.pdf" target="_blank">Amnesty International</a><span style="font-size: small;">, </span><a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/10/egypt-army-torture-killings-revolution" target="_blank">The Guardian</a>.<span style="font-size: small;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
</div>
Baheyyahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10880400752452388877noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11543224.post-58171830894783064532013-07-20T15:37:00.000-04:002013-07-23T18:26:47.775-04:00The Middling Muslim Brothers<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgUTmS36rxtlvhKZgrZpGiOZWP83-CQmsDpCgdfDTo-F5Zw0pygQrmcopdfPRh2zSB036CG1KmxCCM_7dD6iFaNRF9Er7A1hhCoObeCP6QNWoHLNk1FKHX6leu90IbxUDEpb6yu/s1600/Maktab+al-Irshad.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="224" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgUTmS36rxtlvhKZgrZpGiOZWP83-CQmsDpCgdfDTo-F5Zw0pygQrmcopdfPRh2zSB036CG1KmxCCM_7dD6iFaNRF9Er7A1hhCoObeCP6QNWoHLNk1FKHX6leu90IbxUDEpb6yu/s400/Maktab+al-Irshad.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: Trebuchet MS, sans-serif;"><b>Muslim Brothers' Guidance Bureau</b></span></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Trebuchet MS, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">It’s a small
detail of great consequence. On July 3, members of the presidential guard <a href="http://bigstory.ap.org/article/his-final-days-morsi-was-isolated-defiant" target="_blank">stepped away</a><span style="font-size: small;"> and let Dr. Mohamed Morsi and his aides be arrested by army commandos.
If men with guns and tanks can simply arrest an elected president, then what’s
to keep them from doing it again and again?<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">The horrible precedent this sets is buried under the partisan fury for and against the
Muslim Brothers. Haters of the MB apparently see nothing wrong with the
military summarily detaining the first elected national leader in Egyptian
history. Boosters of the MB are so caught up in their own injury that they’re
not pausing to wonder why a great many people feel relief and even satisfaction
at the demise of the Morsi presidency.</span><br />
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<br />
<a name='more'></a><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Trebuchet MS, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">I don’t want
to belabor here the <a href="http://inanities.org/2013/07/on-sheep-and-infidels/" target="_blank">polarization</a> that so many others have written about. I want
to reflect on what Dr. Morsi did to hasten his ignominious ouster. As a
seasoned politician with long experience dealing with the Mubarak state, surely
Mohamed Morsi and his inner circle realized the unbelievable obstacles they were up
against. <span style="font-size: small;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">Dangers
lurked everywhere—resistance and intrigue from the mukhabarat state; corruption
and obstruction from top to bottom of the bureaucracy; a rogue police force intent
on facilitating rather than containing violence; fulul networks in every
province ever-ready to block any change; a hostile media establishment hellbent
on demonizing the MB; and considerable public mistrust of the Brothers well
before Morsi set foot in the presidential palace.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">Stubbornness,
stupidity, incompetence, myopia, dictatorial intent – all have been breezily
thrown about in an ugly carnival of Morsi-blame and schadenfreude that may
emotionally satisfy some people. But it doesn’t begin to get at a real
understanding of the perils of governance in a revolutionary situation. Dr.
Morsi’s challenges and failings are sure to re-appear in future presidents. That’s
assuming we’ll get future presidents who come to power through credible
elections, not stage-managed pageants.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">Here I want
to flesh out a <a href="http://baheyya.blogspot.com/2012/06/democracy-v-oligarchy-round-2.html" target="_blank">remark I made</a> about Mohamed Morsi when he was first elected. I
want to argue that Dr. Morsi’s core mistake is that he underestimated and
neglected the very public that his enemies were cynically and ceaselessly courting.
He and his advisers chose to govern behind closed doors, without first girding
themselves in protective public support. When the problems piled up and the
mukhabarat state tightened the noose, Morsi found no succor from anyone outside
his trust network. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">This isn’t an
issue of the former president’s stubbornness or blindness or whatever. It’s his
embodiment of a <a href="http://nisralnasr.blogspot.com/2013/07/where-nile-flows-into-rubicon.html" target="_blank">mode of leadership</a> that’s common in the world of politics but very
inadequate for the treacherous terrain of post-revolutionary politics. Dr.
Morsi’s fatal weakness is that he’s a prototypical party <a href="http://baheyya.blogspot.com/2012/06/democracy-v-oligarchy-round-2.html" target="_blank">oligarch</a>, and this
made him distinctly unsuited for the extraordinary responsibility he took on.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><span style="color: blue;"><b>A Janus-Faced Movement</b></span><span style="color: #4f81bd;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">The Muslim
Brothers have always been an essentially middling movement, not in the sense of
‘mediocre’ but in the sense of straddling two worlds. Their base is rooted in
the middle and lower classes, with a real interest in transformative
socio-economic change. But their leadership has always had its eye on <a href="http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/07/12/the-struggle-for-egypt/" target="_blank">joining,not destroying, the system</a>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Over the
years, the MB leadership crystallized into a counter-elite of well-to-do,
urban, upwardly-mobile professionals and <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/17/us-egypt-economy-brotherhood-idUSBRE89G10L20121017" target="_blank">businessmen</a> eager to enter the exclusive
ranks of the establishment. The Brothers are still second to none in their
public outreach during elections, knowing how to woo rather than spurn ordinary
citizens. But as with all large organizations, the leadership has developed
interests of its own, principally self-preservation. </span><span style="font-family: Trebuchet MS, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiNUL6B3bmB8BTkU5ont81ORmrKzZtMSBcxv_hOg1e06AHP78fYIbueqfFGLEU0at0JLQB8LvB-St9MZbk3fxR4cgzMk93lQgpw-ksIfDnndg4qfxWh-wfbhN0ioTrzIHg0I3QM/s1600/MB+Guidance+Bureau.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiNUL6B3bmB8BTkU5ont81ORmrKzZtMSBcxv_hOg1e06AHP78fYIbueqfFGLEU0at0JLQB8LvB-St9MZbk3fxR4cgzMk93lQgpw-ksIfDnndg4qfxWh-wfbhN0ioTrzIHg0I3QM/s400/MB+Guidance+Bureau.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">The leaders’
hold over the organization is reinforced by decades of state repression and the
kind of insular decision-making that it breeds. Such an environment encourages a
conception of politics as the art of machination and intrigue, of deal-making
behind closed doors with both allies and adversaries. <span style="font-size: small;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;"><br /></span>
<span style="line-height: 115%;">The
contrasting conception of politics as the painstaking, transparent, messy work
of coalition-building between large, cacophonous groups has less purchase. Why
invest time in cultivating horizontal ties with other groups when there are
greater (and quicker) payoffs from bargaining with those at the top?<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">T</span><span style="line-height: 115%;">he MB’s
now-notorious practitioner of politics-as-elite-intrigue is financier and
strategist <a href="http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/37993.aspx" target="_blank">Khairat El-Shater</a>, invariably referred to as the group’s
“strongman.” Shater is emblematic of the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/12/world/middleeast/muslim-brotherhood-leader-rises-as-egypts-decisive-voice.html?pagewanted=all" target="_blank">rising Islamist counter-elite</a> aspiring
for a share of national power, only to be rebuffed every time by the Mubarakist
entrenched elite.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">After being
blocked from an academic appointment in 1981, Shater turned to the family
business and became a millionaire, in spite of the Mubarak regime’s repeated crackdown
on his businesses, starting with the 1992 shutdown of his computer company
(<a href="http://www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=%D9%82%D8%B6%D9%8A%D8%A9_%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%84" target="_blank">Salsabeel</a>) that he co-owned with businessman Hasan Malek. Incidentally, the prosecutor
on that case was none other than Abdel Meguid Mahmoud. Beginning in 2004,
Shater’s star began to rise in the MB and was cemented with the January 2010
internal elections that put Mohamed Badie at the helm and re-arranged the
politburo to push out Shater’s rivals, Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh and Mohamed
Habib.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="color: blue; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>A
Party Leader Becomes President</b></span><span style="color: #002060; font-size: 12pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhQbCxXZ7508MA30iwBjQfymVePkS9vjxBm1_9Vo-SKU239olN-mJunlZnWwAuVto3JuFe0TciTweVvtyaJCoxOk-oSLRwLPjaMuRTMyL_X1nbnDo0o3YCiz9SwZQ_fPHCNuwen/s1600/Morsi+Podium.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="227" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhQbCxXZ7508MA30iwBjQfymVePkS9vjxBm1_9Vo-SKU239olN-mJunlZnWwAuVto3JuFe0TciTweVvtyaJCoxOk-oSLRwLPjaMuRTMyL_X1nbnDo0o3YCiz9SwZQ_fPHCNuwen/s400/Morsi+Podium.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">The first handicap
that afflicted Morsi’s presidency is that he is a Shater loyalist, which is
not the same as being the best man the MB could put forward for such a critical
position. Morsi as stand-in for Shater may have been passable to the party
faithful, but not to Egyptians at large. It left an undying impression among
both the general public and Morsi’s opponents that he was the wrong man in the
wrong place. And this is before he made a single executive decision. <span style="font-size: small;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">Morsi’s
personal attributes reinforced the image of an unconvincing president. The whip
of the Ikhwan’s bloc in the 2000 parliament, he was the quintessential party
manager. His manner was rote, risk-averse, a tad pallid. He didn’t do outreach,
like MB leaders Mohamed El-Beltagui and Helmi al-Gazzar, both comfortable
around and popular with non-Ikhwan politicians and the media. Morsi’s natural
habitat is the executive committee meeting of the party, flanked by fellow
party elders and deferential to the towering figure of Shater.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">Typical of party
leaders, the MB and Morsi did court non-MB voters, but purely for electoral purposes.
They changed their campaign slogan for the second round of elections to the
glib “Our Power is in Our Unity.” And the Morsi campaign courted a group of activist
luminaries who pledged to support Morsi over Ahmed Shafiq at the famous <a href="http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/74485.aspx" target="_blank">“Fairmont Meeting.”</a> In return, the group asked for an inclusive national unity government
and presidential advisers from outside the Ikhwan. Morsi balked at the former
and acceded to the latter, but after the November 21 decrees, all of his
advisers resigned, refusing to serve as ornaments in an essentially Ikhwan
presidential administration.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><b><span style="color: blue;">Rocky Beginnings</span><span style="color: #1f497d;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">Morsi began
his short-lived tenure in office with a <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/07/201372143550404912.html" target="_blank">lot of baggage</a>. He didn’t ride into the
presidency on a wave of popular enthusiasm, as one would expect of the first ever
free presidential elections after a heroic popular uprising. Aside from the
brief, celebratory day of June 29, 2012 when Morsi took his <a href="http://youtu.be/0WGTWi8c004" target="_blank">oath in Tahrir Square</a>, the general mood was sober. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">Shafiq had
secured a stunning 48% of the vote, a clear sign that the forces of the old order
succeeded in molding a sizeable public opinion against change. And the Muslim
Brothers’ <a href="http://www.shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?cdate=10052012&id=3eeb2630-27b0-4d51-9725-07a1038edb96" target="_blank">subpar performance in parliament</a> and their hogging of the constituent
assembly throughout the spring of 2012 left an indelible feeling that they
wanted to “take over” the whole state.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">Morsi’s
enemies in the deep state <a href="http://baheyya.blogspot.com/2013/07/fashioning-coup.html" target="_blank">started working on the public</a> from day one. Ironically,
they read the election returns better than the Brothers did, recognizing in
major metropolitan centers a significant anti-Ikhwan sentiment that they worked
to stoke. Within a week of Morsi taking office, they had their chance. On July
8, Morsi issued his first decree re-seating the parliament dissolved by SCAF
based on a Supreme Court ruling. The civilian president looked like he was
intent on using his executive powers, not merely being a figurehead. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">Alarm bells
went off in the military and intelligence apparatus. The ever-useful Mohamed
Abu Hamed <a href="http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-07-08/world/35488975_1_morsi-islamists-supreme-constitutional-court" target="_blank">called on the military</a> to act against the president. Thus began the
campaign to cast Mohamed Morsi as the MB’s cat’s paw to take over the state. Significantly,
the military’s <a href="http://youtu.be/h7chOWL3Ldw" target="_blank">propaganda video</a> justifying its coup cites the July 8 decree as
the beginning of Morsi’s supposedly irresponsible actions that precipitated his
own downfall.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">But let’s not
be lulled into parroting the <a href="http://baheyya.blogspot.com/2013/07/military-tutelage-egyptian-style_16.html" target="_blank">military’s storyline</a>. The generals’ goal is to
demonize any effort to create an independent power base within the Egyptian
state, especially if that power inheres in an elected institution. So they use
the discourse of failure, autocratic usurpation, and incompetence to smear Morsi and reinforce
their exclusive hold on power. We have to come up with our own independent
assessment of Morsi’s performance.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><span style="color: blue;"><b>Hemmed
In</b></span><span style="color: #002060;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">Morsi’s performance
oscillated between acting with resolve to push back against obstruction and
going slow so as not to antagonize powerful entrenched fiefdoms. Morsi used the
first strategy against the Mubarakist judiciary, thus transferring to the
presidency the Muslim Brothers’ intensifying conflict with the courts that they
had started while in parliament. The <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/22/mohamed-morsi-mubarak-retrial-egypt" target="_blank">November 21 decrees</a> are the case in point
here. Morsi tried to protect the constituent assembly and Shura Council from
judicial dissolution, but did so by touching a nerve with Egyptians: increasing
presidential powers.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">The second strategy
of placation was used with the police. As an outsider president, Morsi’s
dilemma was that if he moved to purge the police, he would face a mutiny that
would bring down his rule. If he chose <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/03/opinion/ayoob-egypt-military" target="_blank">accommodation</a>, he would be <a href="http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/21/police-brutality-catalyst-for-egypts-revolution-continues-under-morsi/?gwh=3A1867C8272E5657C5049843F78DADE8" target="_blank">held accountable</a> for the continuing torture and abuses of a rogue police force
intent only on maintaining its untouchable status. Morsi repeatedly
<a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/14/egypt-leaked-report-blames-police-900-deaths-2011" target="_blank">accommodated the police</a>, only to get the worst of all worlds. Citizens were <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/22/world/middleeast/police-under-new-scrutiny-after-activist-dies-in-egypt.html?pagewanted=all" target="_blank">outraged</a>by continued police impunity, while <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/world/middleeast/angry-at-public-and-officials-police-strike-in-egypt.html?_r=0&gwh=6073C8E833BC9ABE86E2685F31F8E471" target="_blank">police strikes</a> and passive resistance intensified
the collective violence and chaos that destabilized Morsi’s rule.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">In ordinary
times and places, a dual strategy of confrontation and appeasement is the stuff
of presidential politics. In the power struggle of post-revolutionary Egypt, presidential
politics is an existential gamble. Morsi became trapped in a cycle where he was
accused of dictatorship if he moved aggressively and accused of betrayal if he pursued
accommodation.</span><span style="font-family: Trebuchet MS, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;"> <span style="font-size: small;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
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<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjSv6JOYiSfBXemHwNklpfn2QchJO-xe6VSwZ-mLMGxgeYEVkDPxuViFc9pqaxQEcHWr8r5Bq3uq3DEp3IrV9G4ZdfkyKpe6pesKL3HlbublKqiqTazpCpm2ce1ZjYpGot9cz9g/s1600/Morsi+Head+of+State.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="227" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjSv6JOYiSfBXemHwNklpfn2QchJO-xe6VSwZ-mLMGxgeYEVkDPxuViFc9pqaxQEcHWr8r5Bq3uq3DEp3IrV9G4ZdfkyKpe6pesKL3HlbublKqiqTazpCpm2ce1ZjYpGot9cz9g/s400/Morsi+Head+of+State.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">The wider
public tuned out this grand drama, seeing no stake in the epic battles playing out at the top. Morsi’s
sense of besiegement and <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/08/world/middleeast/egypt-islamists-dialogue-secular-opponents-clashes.html?_r=0" target="_blank">retreat</a> into his Ikhwan trust network was a huge disincentive
for the public to even try and sympathize with the embattled president. <span style="font-size: small;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">Most Egyptians
could be forgiven for feeling that the whole thing didn’t concern them, that it
was just a new round of the perennial conflict between the Muslim Brothers and
the state. It wasn’t a battle between the first elected president and the
corrupt deep state, but a fight between the president of the Muslim Brothers and
his group and everyone else.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">The
anti-Morsi media drove home this framing every day and night. If an alien had
parachuted into Egypt in spring 2013 and turned on the television, the
impression he’d get is that the state had been hijacked by a lunatic tribe that
was running the country into the ground. The insular,
preaching-to-the-converted media of the Muslim Brothers stood no chance against
this juggernaut.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">The best
that can be said about the president’s attempts to reach out to the public at
this juncture is that they were perfunctory. His speeches were bland status updates,
boring balance sheets of what the government had achieved and still needed to
do. As crises mounted, the underworld of deep conflict between the president
and the security services began to <a href="http://youtu.be/0gjUYJ7N-yM" target="_blank">bubble up</a>, but in <a href="http://youtu.be/n4z9nsxl51o" target="_blank">a way</a> that made the
president appear even weaker.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">By April,
Morsi seemed completely encircled. Repeatedly, he reasonably protested that he
was protecting democratic legitimacy. But he seemed to be the only one invoking
the rules of the democratic game. All other players had moved on. An EU
delegation was <a href="http://news.yahoo.com/exclusive-egypts-road-not-taken-could-saved-mursi-172715980.html" target="_blank">pressuring Morsi</a> to accept the demands of Morsi’s opponents in
the National Salvation Front, in return for the IMF signing off on its $4.8
billion loan to Egypt. And on April 24, General El-Sisi had a long meeting in
Cairo with US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel. Afterwards, “Mr. Hagel told
associates that he <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324425204578597981624524800.html" target="_blank">believed Gen. Sisi</a> was someone Washington could—and should—work
more closely with.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><span style="color: blue;"><b>Beyond
the Muslim Brothers</b></span><span style="color: #002060;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">Had Morsi
pursued a different tack and built a robust popular front to help him take on
the Mubarakist ruling caste, would he still be president today? I don’t know. My
argument suggests that even if he wanted to, Morsi wouldn’t have been able
to build firm bridges. He was too imprisoned by the MB leadership’s strategic
decision to go it alone. For them, ‘real’ politics is the interaction between competing
elites. The politics of coalition-building and public persuasion is small
potatoes compared to the high politics of elite machination. Tragically, this
age-old conception of power cost them a lot more than their short-lived
exercise of power. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">For me,
there’s nothing to celebrate in the rout of the Muslim Brothers. Warts and all,
they were the only civilian counterweight to absolute military supremacy, the
only organization big enough to stand up to the self-preserving generals and
their partners in the civilian bureaucracy. But their leaders’ strategies led to
their undoing by the far more powerful, vicious ruling caste. The consequences of
their defeat go far beyond simply injury to their organization. </span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif; font-size: small;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi3DZJCrU7zpUrsaCVxRuNrJHKY9WRDISvsLRDa4uqJuHdGiBFqw6cVsSG9SpeHdm-QLfP9Sg1sAf71DkreEOtC8wWSYXO25ktPOLLoFQn4M-dQb3zF90rjdH48t71yO00r8QJS/s1600/Cartoon+Counterrevolution.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="258" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi3DZJCrU7zpUrsaCVxRuNrJHKY9WRDISvsLRDa4uqJuHdGiBFqw6cVsSG9SpeHdm-QLfP9Sg1sAf71DkreEOtC8wWSYXO25ktPOLLoFQn4M-dQb3zF90rjdH48t71yO00r8QJS/s320/Cartoon+Counterrevolution.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">The downfall
of the Morsi presidency will also be cast as the futility of the hope that
outsiders can govern. The Brothers proved to be excellent tools in the
counter-revolution’s master operation of regaining exclusive control over the
state. The Morsi episode is already being framed as a cautionary tale of the
bad things that happen when unqualified outsiders dare to enter the hallowed
precincts of state power. <span style="font-size: small;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">Millions entrusted
Dr. Morsi with making the state work for <a href="http://www.incendiaryimage.com/sketchbook/who-still-supports-morsy/" target="_blank">its people</a>, of ending decades upon
miserable decades of state theft, violence, and neglect. He did not, could not,
fulfill the trust. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">If the
largest, best organized, and most politically experienced mass movement can be
so handily slain by the forces of the old order, what hope is there for the
weaker segments of the opposition, many of whom have already proved their
willingness to pact with the dominant elite out of hatred for the Islamist
counter-elite?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">In my
political dream world, this defeat will catalyze an internal revolution in the
Muslim Brothers and the rise of a new leadership more committed to far-reaching
change, and skilled in the politics of coalition-building. A historic entente
will ensue between the new and improved MB and new and improved factions of the
secular opposition, who will have learned their own hard lesson to never, ever
trust the military, and to respect ordinary citizens more. This powerful
alliance will contest and win parliamentary and presidential elections, firing
up public enthusiasm for a decisive showdown with the old order and its foreign
backers.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">Would that
the next round of the Egyptian revolution follow my playbook. For there will be
a next round, but nobody knows whose playbook it’ll come from.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br />
</span><br />
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<br /></div>
</div>
</div>
Baheyyahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10880400752452388877noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11543224.post-14268356852862294382013-07-16T01:37:00.001-04:002013-07-24T14:08:41.410-04:00Military Tutelage, Egyptian-Style<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="344" src="//www.youtube.com/embed/h7chOWL3Ldw" width="459"></iframe><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">If there
were lingering doubts that the military pounced on the June 30 protests to
re-establish its political supremacy, Gen. El-Sisi’s Sunday <a href="http://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=14072013&id=ef66f6f0-af8a-45a2-8992-7b6095f0cd9d" target="_blank">address</a> removed a
lot of them. Using convoluted language and tortured logic, the speech’s
organizing premise is that the “people summoned the armed forces for the
mission of balancing the tipped scale and restoring diverted goals.” </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">“The
people” are mentioned 28 times, but their sovereignty is not once affirmed. What’s
emphasized is that the armed forces are the unmoved mover, guarding the
country’s politics, not just its borders.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span>
<a name='more'></a><span style="font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 115%;">In tandem
with the speech, the armed forces released a </span><a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h7chOWL3Ldw&feature=share&list=UUyfaSfy9W91hrwCXNMNuN9Q" style="font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 115%;" target="_blank">30-minute video</a><span style="font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 115%;"> presenting their narrative
of the Morsi presidency and the July 3 coup. After introductory scenes glorifying
military exercises, the narrator launches into a story of an irresponsible,
inept president who picked fights with every significant institution and repeatedly
ignored the sage advice of the generals, threatening a slide to “civil war.”</span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">Set to
ominous music, scenes of collapsing buildings, wrecked trains, long petrol queues,
and parched fields are strung together as evidence of mounting social crisis. A
scene of a voter queue from the December referendum on the “non-consensual” constitution
shows a close-up of “No” spraypainted on a wall, though the referendum was
approved by 63% of the 33% of voters who turned out.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">Gen. El-Sisi
is shown addressing a worshipful gathering of actors and performers, arrayed
like schoolchildren and holding a large Egyptian flag. They cheer him wildly as
he proclaims, “And Egypt will remain Egypt.” The dramatic denouement of the
video is General Sisi’s July 3 coup announcement, described by the narrator as
“a historic moment the likes of which rarely occur in our time.” The video ends
with party music set to scenes of the pyramids and other Pharaonic antiquities.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">The speech
is far more important than the constitutional declaration emitted by the
figurehead interim president last week. It doesn’t only justify the coup, it
sets the conceptual framework of the new political order, with the military as
its lynchpin. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">Throughout
the speech, the armed forces are presented as an Olympian figure above the
fray, watching worriedly as a pathetic presidency fumbles and missteps, ignoring
time and again the military’s “reservations about many policies and actions.” The
Muslim Brothers are referred to as “a political faction” that placed their
representative in the presidency via elections “that the armed forces sincerely
accepted as the will of the people.” But alas, the speech laments, the
presidency presided over societal decline and disorder, as well as a regress “in
the intellectual, cultural, and artistic” domains that have always made Egypt a
model in the region.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">In this
telling of a failed civilian leadership leading the country headlong into ruin,
the military emerges as the corrector and savior. Here is where the speech’s
language becomes both mystifying and mystical. The military doesn’t intervene. It
“affirms the legitimacy of the people and assists it in regaining its right to
choose and act.” And lest anyone use clear language to point out that this is
military tutelage, plain and simple, the speech preempts that by asserting that
the military is not entering “the political arena” but rather “the national
arena.” <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">Tortured logic
and perplexing rhetoric aside, the speech’s points are clear. The presidency is
subordinate to the military. The military has a special communion with the will
of the people. Whenever it is summoned by the will of the people, the military acts.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">The crucial
sleight of hand in the speech, the core deception, is substituting the meaningless phrase “legitimacy
of the people” for the meaningful doctrine of “sovereignty of the people.” Not once
is sovereignty of the people even hinted at in a document that mentions “the
people” in every other sentence. The praxis and the promise of the Egyptian
revolution, that the citizenry constitutes its political order, is here terminated
by a group of generals backed by a world power and aided by its regional
clients.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">It’s not the
first time they’ve done this. Last year, SCAF issued a <a href="http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-06-17/world/35461842_1_military-aid-constitutional-decree-declaration" target="_blank">‘constitutional decree’</a> minutes
after polls closed in the presidential election, downgrading the presidency and reserving all its powers for SCAF. The next day, three SCAF generals held a
press conference to justify their decree, and Gen. Mamdouh Shahin <a href="http://youtu.be/R6eYRfmfm9Y" target="_blank">openly said</a> that
the armed forces are the constituent power, that is, the foundational entity that
has the right to construct a political order.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">The main
take-away from Sisi’s address is that steering the country is not a matter to
be left to regular mortals and their representatives. The state must be in the
hands of permanent guardians. It can’t be shared with emergent forces, who will
inevitably run the country into the ground.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">The speech
is the intellectual gloss on the July 3 coup. Its point is that Egypt is too
important to be ruled by its people. Too many regional and world powers are
vested in the direction this country takes and how it gets there. Its population
will be </span><span style="line-height: 17.77777862548828px;">corralled</span><span style="line-height: 115%;"> to the side and left to practice their charming folkloric
political rituals, with parliamentary elections and even presidential elections
and what have you. An arena of electoral democracy will be constructed, but
many matters of grave national import will be outside its purview. And anyway, its
outcomes can always be reversed. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">What about protests
in Tahrir, you ask? Certainly, the generals will generously provide the
paraphernalia of protest and drop flags on the cheering throngs (while <a href="http://rassd.com/1-66919_%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA_%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9_%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4_%D9%81%D9%8A_%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A9" target="_blank">dropping leaflets</a> on those other people), then beam with paternal pride about how their cute
people <a href="http://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=14072013&id=ef66f6f0-af8a-45a2-8992-7b6095f0cd9d" target="_blank">“impress the world.”</a><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Keeping the
public in a condition of permanent political infantilism; walling off the state
from democratic control; and above all, terminating the necessary political
struggles that societies must engage in to build their institutions and control
their destinies. This is the military’s roadmap. </span><span style="font-size: small;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
Baheyyahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10880400752452388877noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11543224.post-13579667605311784732013-07-12T19:32:00.000-04:002013-07-23T18:02:42.483-04:00Fashioning a Coup<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg2Trmpoj5nOE5mGGv5JKn-UNn3-Ub5HNc06kDtCOVWPRJXagj-JvX2mq42wCaXESQb7apzfCGna9l4GURJDFsKtBVbnmRqZX1X23a7cQpbpeZj7wl4wm8hEhvia9ERJG9L3rQv/s1600/Sisi.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="233" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg2Trmpoj5nOE5mGGv5JKn-UNn3-Ub5HNc06kDtCOVWPRJXagj-JvX2mq42wCaXESQb7apzfCGna9l4GURJDFsKtBVbnmRqZX1X23a7cQpbpeZj7wl4wm8hEhvia9ERJG9L3rQv/s400/Sisi.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">I understand
the outrage of honest citizens who went out to protest against Mohamed Morsi on
June 30 only to have their efforts branded a coup. When you’re in the middle of
a crowd of boisterous humanity that stretches farther than the eye can see, nothing
exists outside of that overwhelming reality. The feeling of mutual recognition
and collective empowerment erases all context and constraints. As well it
should. You don’t go to a protest to think carefully or make necessary
distinctions. But when you exit the protest and survey the big picture, you do
have to face inconvenient facts. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">One such
fact is that the protests were unscrupulously appropriated and packaged for
ends I’m pretty sure many protesters find abhorrent. A genuine popular protest
and a military coup aren’t mutually exclusive. The massive protests of June 30
came in conjunction with a much larger scheme that began very soon after Morsi
took office. This long term project by entrenched state elites seeks more than
simply ejecting the Muslim Brothers from power, although that’s a highly prized
outcome.</span><br />
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Trebuchet MS, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span>
<br />
<a name='more'></a><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Trebuchet MS, sans-serif;"> <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">The overarching
goal is to systematically reverse each halting step toward subjecting the state
to popular control. As Leon Trotsky wrote<a href="http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1936/revbet/" target="_blank"> long ago</a>, in the aftermath of an uprising
state managers will gradually push away the masses from participation in the
leadership of the country. Popular depoliticization is the grand strategy.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">The amazing
breakthrough that was the mass mobilization of January-February 2011 shook the grip
of the ruling caste on the Egyptian state and toppled its chief, Hosni Mubarak.
But, alas, it did not smash that grip. The web of top military & police officers
and their foreign patrons, the managers of the civil bureaucracy, cultural
& media elites, and crony businessmen firmly believe that ruling over Egypt
is their birthright, and its state is their possession. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">The frightful
specter conjured up by January 25 of power-rotation at the top had
to be exorcised once and for all, principally by habituating Egyptians into
thinking that regular political competition over the state is tantamount to
civil war. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">It’s
soothing to believe that a popular uprising ejected an incompetent Islamist
president. It’s not comforting to point out that a popular uprising was on the <i>cusp</i>
of doing so, until the generals stepped in, aborted a vital political process,
arrested the president, and proclaimed their own “roadmap” for how things will
be from now on.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">The constant
equating of democracy with disorder and the positioning of the military as the
stabilizer and guarantor, this is the stuff of the resurgent Egyptian
counter-revolution.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><span style="color: blue;">Four Vignettes</span><span style="color: #1f497d;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">I</span><span style="line-height: 115%;">n thinking
through the trauma of Morsi’s ouster by military coup, I want to focus on four
vignettes from the last year that complicate the too-neat story of a heroic popular
uprising against an unpopular president. These are the August 24 anti-Morsi demonstrations;
the broadening of the anti-Ikhwan coalition in October; the theatrical foray by
General El-Sisi into the political arena in December; and the military’s
Machiavellian appropriation of the June 30 protests to activate their coup d’état
on July 3</span><span style="line-height: 115%;">.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">Together,
the four snapshots show not a plot spun by a mastermind but an alignment of disparate interests to
oust a common enemy: the first outsider president elected from below, not
handpicked from above. The fact that this man belongs to the historically excluded
counter-elite of Muslim Brothers was an excellent bonus. This made it easy for the
ruling caste to draw on a deep reservoir of societal antipathy to the Ikhwan,
gleefully casting Morsi as the crazy-theocrat-dictator-in-cahoots-with-the-Americans-and-Qatar-who-will-steal-your-secularism-and-ban-your-whisky.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">Had it been
Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh or Hamdeen Sabahy or any other <a href="http://baheyya.blogspot.com/2012/05/egypts-extraordinary-elections.html" target="_blank">outsider president</a>,
executing the ouster would’ve been a lot harder but the objective would’ve been
the same. Outsider presidents with no loyalty to the ruling bureaucracy will
fail. Insider presidents can stay, provided that they protect the purity of the
ruling caste and secure its privileges.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="color: blue; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">August: Revanchism on the Fringes</span><span style="color: #1f497d; font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhqCFS9KQY53XUdogBrvEpg3xiCCiAeeOQE37rsmXeT8gkel3xK-heQUDOaE5cJDbkpJ2HPtLEzYG2pjNlL7y2tLgB56xk-xVLUhMbbtaLR_z435nO69CLGNZ2dpkYafPkn-zg0/s1600/Morsi+&+Sisi.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="231" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhqCFS9KQY53XUdogBrvEpg3xiCCiAeeOQE37rsmXeT8gkel3xK-heQUDOaE5cJDbkpJ2HPtLEzYG2pjNlL7y2tLgB56xk-xVLUhMbbtaLR_z435nO69CLGNZ2dpkYafPkn-zg0/s400/Morsi+&+Sisi.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">At the time,
these manufactured protests against Mohamed Morsi and fronted by <a href="http://bigstory.ap.org/article/sneer-egypt-tv-host-challenges-islamists" target="_blank">Tawfiq Okasha</a><span style="font-size: small;">
and former MP Mohamed Abu Hamed were</span><a href="http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=765994" target="_blank"> laughed off</a><span style="font-size: small;"> as the ravings of unhinged
lunatics working for the security services. In hindsight, the event was the
deep state’s first revenge thrust against Morsi for activating his presidential
powers and wading into the farthest reaches of the deep state, firing
intelligence chief Mourad Mowafi and other officials, and a few days later
retiring the senior SCAF generals and fatefully promoting Gen. Abdel Fattah
El-Sisi to Defense Minister.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">The protests
launched the campaign to depict Morsi and the Ikhwan as a sinister cult bent on “infiltrating the state.” This of course is an upgraded version of the
Mubarak-era canard of the Ikhwan “takeover” of any institution where they won
seats in fair-and-square elections, especially in professional unions.
<a href="http://bigstory.ap.org/article/hundreds-rally-against-egypts-islamist-president" target="_blank">“Brotherhoodization of the State”</a> also made its first appearance in August,
quickly migrating to the center of political discourse and becoming a main
battle cry of the June 30 mobilization. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">Simply run your eyes down these <a href="http://elbadil.com/egypt-news/2012/08/21/60297" target="_blank">15demands</a> of the August protests mouthed by Abu Hamed to see the origins of the
<a href="https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.383506965049437.88651.317933368273464&type=3" target="_blank">claims hurled</a> against Morsi and the Ikhwan even now after his removal.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">The protests
ultimately drew a small turnout and were quickly forgotten, but they planted
the seed that Mohamed Morsi was <a href="https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.383506965049437.88651.317933368273464&type=3" target="_blank">unpopular</a> and not to be trusted with steering
the Egyptian state. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="color: blue; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">October: Mainstreaming anti-Ikhwanism</span><span style="color: #1f497d; font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://www.corbisimages.com/images/Corbis-42-37277890.jpg?size=67&uid=fa9c717a-09b4-4b9f-a253-39bb8f54b29a" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="267" src="http://www.corbisimages.com/images/Corbis-42-37277890.jpg?size=67&uid=fa9c717a-09b4-4b9f-a253-39bb8f54b29a" width="400" /></a></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">Conventional
wisdom has it that Morsi antagonized everyone with his Nov. 21 decrees that
revealed dictatorial intentions. In fact, the anti-Morsi mobilization decrying
his “monopoly on power” and <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/12/egypt-protests_n_1961078.html" target="_blank">“Islamization of the state”</a><span style="font-size: small;"> started a full month
earlier in October. A large protest on </span><a href="http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/political-parties-call-demonstrations-12-october" target="_blank">October 12</a><span style="font-size: small;"> dubbed “Accountability
Friday” was organized in Tahrir to decry presidential performance after the
first 100 days and demand a different constituent assembly. Panicked Ikhwan leaders bussed in their supporters for a
counter-demonstration in the square. The sight of pro- and anti-Morsi
protesters clashing violently that has become so routine now made its first
shocking appearance on that Friday. Islamists tore down the Tahrir stage of
Morsi critics, and the FJP headquarters in Mahalla were stormed and torched. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">Once
political conflict took on this street depth, the anti-Morsi coalition grew
from a risible revanchist fringe to virtually the entire secular political
class and its constituents. Hamdeen Sabahy, Mohamed ElBaradie, and Amr Moussa,
who were left in the lurch after the presidential elections now found their
footing as figureheads of facile opposition, indulging in reflexive criticism
of Morsi rather than the hard work of scrutinizing his policies.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">Another
crucial player joined the bandwagon of the president’s adversaries in October:
lots of judges. Morsi’s first attempt to remove Prosecutor-General Abdel Meguid
Mahmoud (a constant revolutionary demand) threatened deeply entrenched
Mubarakist judges and catapulted Ahmed al-Zend to loudly lead this faction. And
the <a href="http://news.yahoo.com/egypts-top-court-criticizes-draft-constitution-153807603.html" target="_blank">Supreme Constitutional Court</a> as an institution objected to its place in the
draft constitution, reprising its never-ending conflict with the Islamists
since Mubarak’s ouster.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">Media
covered the political conflict in alarmist tones, and was a conduit for deep
state messages. A major daily “leaked” a supposedly <a href="http://today.almasryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=358045&IssueID=2664" target="_blank">top-secret intelligence document </a>reporting widespread discontent at worsening economic conditions “that
threatens national security.” The language of “endangering national security” is
a recurrent trope in all of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s speeches this year, including
his 48-hour ultimatum of July 1. The October <a href="http://today.almasryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=358045&IssueID=2664" target="_blank">report warned</a> that “citizens are
eager for political participation, but fear single-party dominance of the
political process.” Read: the Ikhwan are taking over.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><span style="color: blue;">December: The Military Speaks</span><span style="color: #1f497d;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">Instead of
containing the widening anti-Ikhwan coalition, Mohamed Morsi either
underestimated or belittled the gathering opposition to his rule and chose to
forge ahead. On November 21 he promulgated a decree that blocked the courts
from dissolving the constituent assembly and the upper house of parliament. But
rather than spend time persuading the public that he was confronting entrenched
interests threatened by the set-up of new institutions, Morsi essentially dumped
the decrees on us as you’d drop leaflets from an airplane on a bewildered
civilian population. This left the arena wide open for his now diehard and
empowered opponents to spin a narrative of a dangerous power grab by a
dictatorial theocratic president.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">The massive
street demonstrations against Morsi in November & December crystallized the
trends that surfaced in October and revealed a new element: serious friction in
the police-president relationship. Police were ineffectual or absent when more
FJP headquarters were attacked across the country. Morsi and Ikhwan powerbroker
Khairat al-Shater suspected that police were making themselves scarce around
the presidential palace to allow protesters to storm it. Feeling double crossed
by Ahmed Gamaleddin, the Mubarakist Interior Minister that Morsi had appointed as
a peace offering to the police fiefdom, Morsi and Shater panicked. In a
disastrous decision, they sent their cadres to violently break up the
protesters’ sit-in outside Ittehadeyya Palace on<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-20605134" target="_blank"> December 5. </a><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">At that
moment, the deed was done. The security apparatus had the Ikhwan right where it
wanted them: a sinister cabal that had hijacked the Egyptian state and sicced
its ruthless private militia on anyone who dared protest.<span style="font-size: small;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Trebuchet MS, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh48PIe_-YY3NBOkDjG6Z2Em3KD4_rm7wSAOnbCreK9t0gZl9NzfqbNu_DH9388tdda5nxHg3gBC3zdj6m0QitHNM5dnhyUFXjuAFS3VZSLUSaB5MX0O9hE2nQdAfGZ6Hb-iNGK/s1600/Eid+Wahda.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="262" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh48PIe_-YY3NBOkDjG6Z2Em3KD4_rm7wSAOnbCreK9t0gZl9NzfqbNu_DH9388tdda5nxHg3gBC3zdj6m0QitHNM5dnhyUFXjuAFS3VZSLUSaB5MX0O9hE2nQdAfGZ6Hb-iNGK/s400/Eid+Wahda.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">In what has
to be one of the more surreal scenes in the Egyptian revolutionary saga,
leaders of the state’s coercive apparatus held a press conference in which
General El-Sisi extended a formal invitation to all parties, including the
president, to gather round the general’s magnanimous table for a healing
national dialogue. Flanked by Gamaleddin, El-Sisi acted the sage monarch, calling
his fractious flock to order. <span style="font-size: small;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">The dialogue
never took place because the presidency sputtered its objections, but the blunt
message got through: the president was not in full control. Between December
and June, El-Sisi struck out on his own, periodically issuing portentous
warnings about the impending <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/30/world/middleeast/egypt-protest-updates.html?_r=1&" target="_blank">collapse of the state</a>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><span style="color: blue;">June: The Pageantry of a Coup</span><span style="color: #1f497d;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></span></span>
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;">Another
surreal scene was the military’s use of the June 30 protests to put on a grotesque
display of military prowess. Fighter jets flew above Tahrir Square, not to
intimidate the massed citizens into going home as in 2011 but to package their mobilization
as an assent to military rule. The planes streaked colors of the Egyptian flag
in the sky and drew giant high schoolish hearts (never underestimate the
mawkishness of military PR). </span><a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23115821" target="_blank">Helicopters dropped flags</a><span style="font-size: small;"> on the masses, lending a
martial visual uniformity to an essentially diverse populace. Posters of
General El-Sisi were held aloft. </span><a href="http://www1.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=1141662&SecID=12" target="_blank">Police officers</a><span style="font-size: small;"> in their summer whites
gleefully </span><a href="http://youtu.be/OWrGzRsm8hE" target="_blank">engaged in protest</a>, some theatrically revealing Tamarrod T-shirts
beneath their uniforms. </span><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif; font-size: small;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhnm0rTcsBoMlRB4kzbchK9u5WdAyvZM0-VpeSQ-DjWCCss9riaTqoGMMb5NGQ0-hODDPKzkf0jdk01EMIpG-xyWcaDdXVlU76ZWS4Gw8P0u082Zk2v9dCyo1hqv6zeF_u_ewhG/s1600/Sisi+&+Flags.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="262" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhnm0rTcsBoMlRB4kzbchK9u5WdAyvZM0-VpeSQ-DjWCCss9riaTqoGMMb5NGQ0-hODDPKzkf0jdk01EMIpG-xyWcaDdXVlU76ZWS4Gw8P0u082Zk2v9dCyo1hqv6zeF_u_ewhG/s400/Sisi+&+Flags.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><a href="http://youtu.be/Vux_-vJvHww" target="_blank">Aerial footage</a><span style="font-size: small;">
(only of the anti-Morsi crowds, of course) was sent to anti-Morsi television
channels, which broadcast it to the tunes of triumphal cinematic music. Naturally,
the <a href="https://www.facebook.com/notes/ahmed-galal/full-documentation-of-the-demonstrations-against-military-coup-in-egypt/503513719717641" target="_blank">protests of those icky other people</a> didn’t exist. A military plane was put
at the </span><a href="http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/218121" target="_blank">disposal of a film director</a><span style="font-size: small;"> who’s a fixture of the anti-Morsi cultural
elite, presumably to make a movie about “Egypt’s second revolution,” as State
TV swiftly christened the June 30 protests. The equally massive January 25 2012
protests against military rule are conveniently dropped from this emerging
canonization.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">The revolutionary
invention of the Tahrir Square protest as an authentic political performance was
recast as state-sanctioned spectacle.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">The next act
of the pageant was to control the message. Officials enlisted media personalities
to banish the term “coup” and hound anyone who used it. A few hours before
General El-Sisi’s declaration of the coup on July 3, Egyptian media luminaries were contacting
foreign media outlets to insist that they not call his imminent announcement a
coup. Military spokesmen and anti-Morsi activists repeatedly and defensively asserted
that “15 million protesters” and “30 million protesters” had come out on June
30, not citing the source of their numbers. A <a href="http://youtu.be/HN0NhoT2wL0" target="_blank">former police chief</a> called the numbers "unprecedented in Egyptian history." A giant message saying
“It is not a coup” was reflected with green laser on the front of the Mugamma
building in Tahrir on July 5. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-size: small;">It was quite
the bizarre display of hysterical chauvinism. Government officials and
establishment elites huffily insisted that the whole world acquiesce in their
construction of reality. Foreign ministry officials rounded up <a href="http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/1926106" target="_blank">ambassadors fromthe Americas</a> to “explain” to them that it’s not a coup. Unnamed government
officials were tasked with <a href="http://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=11072013&id=672b58bc-2bca-4cf2-91be-a5404f53ac3b" target="_blank">intensifying contact</a> with US Congressmen in Washington for
the same purpose. The Ministry of Defense in Cairo invited foreign journalists for
more slideshows of the June 30 protests. And now youth activists are being sent
on an <a href="http://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=12072013&id=3097013c-830d-4f6d-9d7d-aff09ed07246" target="_blank">official mission to London and Washington</a> to “clarify for Western nations
and the whole world that the June 30 revolution is an extension of
the January 25</span>, <span style="font-size: small;">2011 revolution.”<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">Rarely has a
tenacious establishment been so keen to proclaim its own alleged overthrow. What
that establishment wants, of course, is to turn the practice of the Egyptian
revolution into a folkloric carnival of people filling Tahrir Square to wave
flags and chant “Egypt! Egypt!”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="color: blue; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Anti-Politics</span><span style="color: #1f497d; font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiVo_GdRjcZwb1RpaNxxCO_8isfEWFY9f1zObORhEyP86PIVpXzFitmc0FIuG8Bar21gDS0W1WmVglpCTfU-6el1qGlqv8CKCWhJt9RnwqEqg9Fz5rIVJCDYxoNV_KzYG1Yx7MG/s1600/Sisi+Hagel.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="265" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiVo_GdRjcZwb1RpaNxxCO_8isfEWFY9f1zObORhEyP86PIVpXzFitmc0FIuG8Bar21gDS0W1WmVglpCTfU-6el1qGlqv8CKCWhJt9RnwqEqg9Fz5rIVJCDYxoNV_KzYG1Yx7MG/s400/Sisi+Hagel.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-size: small;">With their
July 3</span> <span style="font-size: small;">coup, Egypt’s new military overlords and their staunch
American backers are playing an age-old game, the game of turning the
public against the ineluctable bickering, inefficiency, gridlock, and intense conflict that
is part and parcel of a free political life, so that a disillusioned, fatigued
people will pine for the stability and order that the military then swoops in
to provide. </span><b><span style="color: #1f497d;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">The acute
but generative political conflict during Morsi’s blink-of-an-eye presidency was
constantly amplified and then pathologized by the jealous custodians of the
Egyptian state, with their repeated invocations of civil war and mass chaos to
<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/world/middleeast/egypt-sentences-2012-soccer-riot.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&" target="_blank">frighten people</a> away from the vagaries of self-rule. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">Like
clockwork every few months, state agents facilitated the conditions for
collective violence, dispatching provocateurs to demonstrations, removing
police from the streets, standing back as communal violence broke out, resisting
civilian oversight, and then ominously forecasting an impending <a href="http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/2007/17/V-for-vendetta.aspx" target="_blank">breakdown of social order</a>. The message is clear: left to your own devices, you will kill
each other. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">The ethos of
collective self-confidence, cross-class cooperation, religious co-existence, and
creative problem-solving on such magnificent display in the January 25 uprising spells the beginning of the end for the ruling military and civilian
bureaucracy. So it had to be replaced with a manufactured mood of resignation
and “realism,” the false realism that says: accept tutelage or face chaos.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 115%;">As the
recently self-designated “eminence grise” Mohamed ElBaradie <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-egyptian-politician-mohamed-elbaradei-a-909976.html" target="_blank">summed it up</a>,
“Without Morsi’s removal from office, we would have been headed toward a
fascist state, or there would have been a civil war.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;"><br /></span>
<span style="line-height: 115%;">And that is the
essence of the anti-political doctrine that worships order, fears political
struggle, mistrusts popular striving, and kowtows to force majeure.</span></span></div>
Baheyyahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10880400752452388877noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11543224.post-25842597806600514602012-12-13T15:08:00.002-05:002012-12-25T17:02:38.846-05:00On Morsi's Opponents<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjtDOkefbmYOU0wQhKyXpm58heRBm9u7mc-kqjrMw5YZeKXsWzl9uDY1URL6GYYkwGEMivpKWEHaiVG3dfljsSW366Z2oMvRZVn1rlDwEU5vLy9meJzqpB8QXl7bO21n1aiSQN6/s1600/NSF.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjtDOkefbmYOU0wQhKyXpm58heRBm9u7mc-kqjrMw5YZeKXsWzl9uDY1URL6GYYkwGEMivpKWEHaiVG3dfljsSW366Z2oMvRZVn1rlDwEU5vLy9meJzqpB8QXl7bO21n1aiSQN6/s400/NSF.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">Morsi’s
opponents in the “National Salvation Front” have garnered plenty of criticism
for being obstructionists, sore losers, or bad faith interlocutors, depending
on who’s leveling the charge. My own view is that their fault is more basic
than that, having to do with their half-baked idea of what a political
opposition is. Effective opposition doesn’t mean stomping one’s foot like a
toddler and rejecting everything that comes from the government. It means keeping
tabs on officials and informing citizens of their misdeeds. Above all, it means
persuading the public that the opposition can do better at running things than
the government.</span><br />
<a name='more'></a><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">
</span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">First
it has to be said that the Egyptian opposition faced a very long, uphill battle
after Mohamed Morsi’s election. Not only did a true opposition figure come
<a href="http://www.dw.de/egypt-electoral-commission-confirms-first-round-results/a-15981858" target="_blank">tantalizingly close</a> to entering the run-off, only to be edged aside by the <a href="http://baheyya.blogspot.com/2012/06/democracy-v-oligarchy-round-2.html" target="_blank">two oligarchies</a> dominating Egyptian politics. But the post-revolutionary political
arena is still under construction. There’s no parliament, no party system, and
no independent institutions to oversee government performance. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">
</span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">The
opposition thus started from sub-zero conditions, with very little resources
and lots of horrible diseases courtesy of Sadat and Mubarak. Crippling internal
divisions, holdover pseudo-opposition figures, and not the faintest notion of
how to build broad constituencies are just three of the legacies left by
Egypt’s autocrats that made it extra hard for the emergent democratic
opposition.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">
</span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">Still,
I’m stunned at Morsi’s opponents’ failure to act like a credible opposition
ever since his November 21 decrees. They could barely contain their glee at his
cascading failures, outdoing each other in branding him a dictator and
clambering atop the rising tide of popular protest (any notion that the
National Salvation Front is leading the street protests is false, as its <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kN5qvjIQCXI&feature=share&list=UUB6sc84dcg6VQGB_d89sx2g" target="_blank">most honorable member has pointed out</a>). Instead of acting like the responsible statesmen
they claim to be, Morsi’s critics turned into shrill Cassandras, prophesying
<a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-former-arab-league-head-amr-moussa-about-egypt-a-869597.html" target="_blank">doom</a> and <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-speaks-with-elbaradei-on-the-situation-in-egypt-a-869309.html" target="_blank">impending civil war</a>. Most significant, they resolutely refused to meet
with the president when the crisis worsened, treating him like an enemy who
must be brought down.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">
</span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">This
is very different from their behavior several months ago, when they began
<a href="http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/civil-powers-unite-form-conference-party" target="_blank">branding</a> themselves and organizing for parliamentary elections. Their committed
cadres fully appreciated the challenge of <a href="http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/constitution-party-does-not-lack-enthusiasm-0" target="_blank">building real parties</a>, not just
clumps of followers. The three principals (Mohamed ElBaradie, Amr Moussa, and
Hamdeen Sabahy) then banded together to <a href="http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/new-liberal-coalition-plans-pressure-morsy" target="_blank">monitor Morsi’s delivery</a> on election
promises, exactly what an opposition should do. When conflict over the
constitution escalated, they all accepted <a href="http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/update-morsy-moussa-discuss-constitution-during-meeting" target="_blank">Morsi’s invitation to dialogue</a> and
relayed to him their parties’ demands.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">I take
the point made by the unassailable Abdel Ghaffar Shukr, <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YoUVd1KDQV8&feature=share&list=UUB6sc84dcg6VQGB_d89sx2g" target="_blank">who explained that the NSF refused to meet</a> Morsi because they felt betrayed by his November decrees. Let’s
put aside the incongruous personalization of such grave issues. During an
exceptional crisis when lives have been lost and a weakened president calls for
dialogue, why not push your demands at the negotiating table and walk out if
the president doesn’t budge? Why set as preconditions the very matters up for
negotiation, namely canceling the decree and postponing the referendum? <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">
</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">Instead
of seeing themselves as part of a fledgling political system with stakes in its
survival, the NSF politicians reverted to the old template of battling autocracy.
Morsi became another dictator with whom you never negotiate, not a fumbling
elected president who can and must be checked. Egyptian politics became a
zero-sum battle between a moral, valiant opposition and a sinister power-hungry
theocracy. Morsi is Mubarak redux. The opposition must be uncompromising,
because compromise is defeat.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">Each
of the three politicians has different motivations for this absolutist
thinking. Amr Moussa is the ancien regime politician who thinks the presidency
is his birthright, by virtue of his social class and lifelong government
service. He’ll never accept any new group controlling the state, especially a
group that represents a broader segment of the Egyptian people. Ever the opportunist,
Moussa sensed an opening in Morsi’s failure and suddenly became the <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-former-arab-league-head-amr-moussa-about-egypt-a-869597.html" target="_blank">jealous defender of democracy and women’s rights</a>. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">Mohamed
ElBaradei seems to espouse a managerial view of politics, where there’s a right
way (his own) and a wrong way (everyone else’s) and Egypt has been on the wrong
track since February 11, 2011. ElBaradei has taken up a role as the resident
scold of Egyptian politics, repeatedly decrying the dysfunctions of the process
in his Twitter aphorisms and international <a href="http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/247950f0-3b2f-11e2-b111-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2ExpUYR5d" target="_blank">Op-Eds</a>. His devotees paint him as
some sort of visionary, but his perpetual disgust at the rough and tumble of
politics and <a href="http://youtu.be/WTnygIlJ10I" target="_blank">his self-righteous mien</a> raise serious doubts about his capacity
for democratic leadership.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">
</span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">Hamdeen
Sabahy is the biggest puzzle of all. The only gifted politician on the NSF and
the only one in that group who took real risks under Mubarak, it’s baffling why
he’d choose to play second fiddle to Moussa and Baradei. It seems as if he’ll
never get over being the dark horse in the maiden presidential election,
securing 4.8 million votes in the first round (Mohamed Morsi got 5.7). In struggling
to maintain his relevance in the post-election landscape, Sabahy has wavered
between <a href="http://youtu.be/nvaK42XDnGI" target="_blank">effective criticism of Morsi’s</a> socio-economic policies and the reflexive,
ugly Ikhwanophobia of Sabahy’s followers. Morsi’s decrees seem to have pushed
Sabahy to the latter impulse, and he enthusiastically began proclaiming Morsi’s
loss of legitimacy until criticism made him backtrack and say he meant <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/opposition-blames-morsi-for-violence-1.1436222#.UMo0wG_AepY" target="_blank">Morsi’s “moral legitimacy.”</a> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">
</span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">My
point about the NSF isn’t that it’s infiltrated by feloul or that it’s an
alliance of convenience. It’s that its notion of opposition is sophomoric at best
and putschist at worst. The sight of politicians refusing to negotiate with an
elected president but then agreeing to the military’s “we’re all family” shindig
is beyond pitiful. How much more effective to have negotiated with Morsi a
cancellation of his decree and a postponement of the referendum. If he refused
the latter, the NSF could’ve called his bluff and walked out triumphant,
revealing the MB’s bullying to the public while proving themselves to be responsible
problem-solvers. Instead, by acting militant in a situation that required hard
bargaining, the NSF is left to accept the fact of the referendum while saving
face by grandstanding about conditions already in place.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">
</span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">In
this moment of profound disenchantment with both government and opposition, a
detached historical perspective is for me the only <span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">solace.
<a href="http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1936/revbet/index.htm" target="_blank">Leon Trotsky</a> has a brilliant observation about the French Revolution that works nicely for our Egyptian saga. "A revolution is a mighty devourer of human energy, both individual and collective. The nerves give way. Consciousness is shaken and characters are worn out. Events unfold too swiftly for the flow of fresh forces to replace the loss."</span></span></div>
</div>
Baheyyahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10880400752452388877noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11543224.post-63391726125561301292012-12-08T18:21:00.000-05:002012-12-25T17:01:11.212-05:00Death Knell for an Old Political Style<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjBL0iHDEVbEUr0M7vKbSjT7xRSNcpejuhPYz1h79uTDDUJhg5Lm5RxnVTbqbwwaE8yXprRPnCwTMIa7LkkpO21Xgr5PAIBBDXV7_KGHbCQqTM0ayoNvOggmmXOuOML4zFr0hk6/s1600/Morsi+December+6.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="287" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjBL0iHDEVbEUr0M7vKbSjT7xRSNcpejuhPYz1h79uTDDUJhg5Lm5RxnVTbqbwwaE8yXprRPnCwTMIa7LkkpO21Xgr5PAIBBDXV7_KGHbCQqTM0ayoNvOggmmXOuOML4zFr0hk6/s400/Morsi+December+6.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif;">In
his fatally belated public address on Thursday, Mohamed Morsi was a man
reduced, reading awkwardly from an underwhelming script, mouthing stale words
without energy or conviction. He looked very much like a party elder preaching
to the faithful, not a president reaching out to a divided nation. What a sharp
contrast from the president-elect taking the oath of office before jubilant
crowds in Tahrir Square, or the responsible leader who addressed the nation
hours after the tragic Asyut train crash.</span><br />
<a name='more'></a><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif;">In the most acute crisis of his
presidency, Mohamed Morsi didn’t rise to the occasion, and couldn’t even
deliver the bare minimum of an effective narrative. This isn’t because he’s a
dictator or a stupid man or a stubborn man, but a captive of a defunct
political style.</span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Trebuchet MS, sans-serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Trebuchet MS, sans-serif;">From
unpromising beginnings, Morsi began to craft a credible presidential persona. Banishing
SCAF from politics in August earned him huge political capital, making people
like me rethink our initial conviction that he’s just a front for the mastermind,
Khairat al-Shater. I started to see Morsi as a man who may be able to grow into
the job of president and out of the straitjacket of a conservative party
leader.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Trebuchet MS, sans-serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Trebuchet MS, sans-serif;">Positive
evidence started to rack up. His outreach to China, Iran, and the Nile Basin
states showed some creative thinking, promising to fulfill the aspiration of many
that Egypt regain its regional prominence after decades of kowtowing to American
diktat. Obviously Morsi is no radical, and he coordinated closely with the Americans
on every new move in foreign policy. But he seemed to aspire to some sort of
parity rather than the servile clientelism of Sadat and Mubarak.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Trebuchet MS, sans-serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Trebuchet MS, sans-serif;">His
advisers were a pretty diverse group of both FJP members and non-MB professors,
media people, and legal experts. They certainly surpassed in professionalism
and expertise any of past Egyptian presidents’ circle of sycophantic viziers.
Morsi’s team was conscious of the contrast and played it up. <a href="http://youtu.be/0L9dXKaXOcU" target="_blank">One of his advisers</a> made a convincing case that they were creating new practices of
collective deliberation and decision-making within the executive. <span style="font-size: small;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="font-family: Trebuchet MS, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjI0LQ3g0Zr10c2hw1ZgVjaRe4d3wojjW61dGcXPP8DTfi3sS38NrEd5jayUfMcylkjb_DE_UajozyUPISbt24G4r9ZnbbDZBQzbKkrMGN9o3z0fFP2b6YmSzQW9PWwNGIf9tQ0/s1600/morsi+baradei.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="217" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjI0LQ3g0Zr10c2hw1ZgVjaRe4d3wojjW61dGcXPP8DTfi3sS38NrEd5jayUfMcylkjb_DE_UajozyUPISbt24G4r9ZnbbDZBQzbKkrMGN9o3z0fFP2b6YmSzQW9PWwNGIf9tQ0/s320/morsi+baradei.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<span style="font-family: Trebuchet MS, sans-serif;">When
discontent with Morsi’s policies and especially the constituent assembly could
no longer be ignored, he held <a href="http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/57018.aspx" target="_blank">one-on-one meetings</a> with former presidential
candidates and Mohamed ElBaradei, containing opposition before it could
coalesce and appearing magnanimous and presidential.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Trebuchet MS, sans-serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Trebuchet MS, sans-serif;">It’s
a mystery then why Morsi abandoned his budding presidential leadership style when
dealing with the crisis created by his November 21 decrees. First of all, the
decrees were revealed suddenly and without explanation by the presidential
spokesman, leaving the field wide open for critics and challengers to spin
Morsi as worse than Mubarak. Second, Morsi’s address the next day before supporters
outside al-Ittehadeyya was a pitiful production that didn’t even try to appeal
to a wider public. A grave event such as a constitutional declaration requires
a dignified, televised address to the nation, with a full explanation of the
threats the president said compelled him to issue the decree. This should be
pretty basic for a president who’s in power by the grace of millions of voters.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Trebuchet MS, sans-serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Trebuchet MS, sans-serif;">Instead,
<a href="http://youtu.be/QkEtIKfbJ1k" target="_blank">in a surreal scene</a>, Morsi looked like he was at an election rally, yelling into
a microphone about conspiracies, his bodyguards and chief of staff hovering uncomfortably.
Soon after, members of his party appeared on talk shows parroting the same line,
<a href="http://youtu.be/DdwGbX1xNtM" target="_blank">alluding to shadowy conspiracies and armed thugs</a>, expecting us all to fall in
line as if we’re the party rank-and-file.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Trebuchet MS, sans-serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Trebuchet MS, sans-serif;">From
that moment, Morsi ceased acting like a president and reverted to the smaller
profile of the conservative party leader. His mode of crisis management was to
entrench himself within the MB tribe rather than surround himself with a
critical mass of broad public opinion supportive of his efforts to take on the
last vestiges of the deep state.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif;">Instead
of broadening his support base, Morsi narrowed his horizons and <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/08/world/middleeast/egypt-islamists-dialogue-secular-opponents-clashes.html?ref=middleeast" target="_blank">fired up the fervor of true believers</a>, turning this into some sort of culture war between
self-professed authentic Islamists and self-appointed enlightened secularists. Instead
of promoting his role as steward of compromise on the constitution, he
tragically undermined the painstaking work of the constituent assembly, overlooking
its sovereign status and unilaterally granting it a two-month extension without
consultation. Instead of taking fledgling opposition seriously, he belittled it
until it metastasized into a real threat not just to his tenure, but to one of
the most precious gains of the revolution: the first real elected presidency in
modern Egyptian history.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Trebuchet MS, sans-serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Trebuchet MS, sans-serif;">It’s
easy for armchair analysts like me to sit and list all the wrong things that Mohamed
Morsi did, but I don’t mean this piece in the spirit of vitriol and hatred that
has swept all quarters in Egypt since November 21. My point is simply that it’s
no longer possible to run the country without chronic popular participation. Since
November 21, Morsi’s instincts have reverted to the old politics of elite machinations,
excluding the little people from “high politics” by throwing them some economic
crumbs, or trying to <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bZrCZVo2OYg&feature=share&list=UUz3BkhdJSP7l8CiZNG1RKeQ" target="_blank">shush them with talk of threats and conspiracies</a>. <span style="font-size: small;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="font-family: Trebuchet MS, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiLD91GZFauaGXiY9fC_hHjLap-m63xU_Zej1VB48aARjZYJIxnZpjSV_JhIAjGOe94MahxvbdWYAfZAoM3YFc2Yn1scEJ9szoOoLxnu5tqw3IrLFi-e0zM0doDGYQJ4NKOV6zP/s1600/palace.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="204" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiLD91GZFauaGXiY9fC_hHjLap-m63xU_Zej1VB48aARjZYJIxnZpjSV_JhIAjGOe94MahxvbdWYAfZAoM3YFc2Yn1scEJ9szoOoLxnu5tqw3IrLFi-e0zM0doDGYQJ4NKOV6zP/s320/palace.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<span style="font-family: Trebuchet MS, sans-serif;">That
notion of limited democracy, of kissing up to the people until you have their
vote and then ignoring them completely for four years, is expired for Egypt. Already
under Mubarak’s vicious autocracy, Egyptians were crafting the most ingenious
means of having their say on public matters, even when their say “didn’t change
anything.” Now that everything’s changed, they’re punishing every official who dares
overreach. No Egyptian president now can afford to act like a boss who knows
best. Consent must be secured not just at the ballot box, but at every critical
juncture.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Trebuchet MS, sans-serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Trebuchet MS, sans-serif;">Mohamed
Morsi’s greatest mistake is not that he tried to be a dictator, but that he
thought he could act first and explain much later. Aspiring future presidents should
take note.</span><span style="font-size: small;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
Baheyyahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10880400752452388877noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11543224.post-70920766880125358172012-06-24T13:27:00.000-04:002013-07-23T22:37:53.796-04:00Democracy v. Oligarchy, Round 2<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg6PmY6Re6MGM8cXIjo4qvQdvpU9lHkijo-xr4WqJ_s8DnckCQU4F2Tkk1eHou8rFDOhwC7fhLKBbPblL0mtfH29pjxCciSUar61RhEJmj9DsL2pjjPousfLnfRnNjQqFVsu8gl/s1600/DSCN0789.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="296" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg6PmY6Re6MGM8cXIjo4qvQdvpU9lHkijo-xr4WqJ_s8DnckCQU4F2Tkk1eHou8rFDOhwC7fhLKBbPblL0mtfH29pjxCciSUar61RhEJmj9DsL2pjjPousfLnfRnNjQqFVsu8gl/s400/DSCN0789.JPG" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><b>Tahrir Square, June 8 2012</b></span></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif;">It's real cause for celebration that the counter-revolution, with all its might, still failed to capture the presidency via the ballot box. For the first time, an unremarkable civilian will become president of Egypt. True, he's the choice of a slim majority in an imperfect election, but compared to his predecessors, Mohammad Morsi is the most democratically-chosen national leader in Egyptian history. </span><br />
<div>
<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div>
<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif;">Perhaps now we can look forward to the disappearance of the ridiculous nuisance Ahmed Shafiq, though we must think hard about the conditions that compelled 12 million people to vote for him. I also can't help marveling at the discipline and commitment of all those voters who chose Morsi, not because they like him or his organization, but because they know that the grand struggle is to rid Egypt of foreign-backed oligarchic military rule.</span><br />
<div>
<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div>
<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif;">Mohammad Morsi is a very odd figure to spearhead that struggle, not just because he lacks any visible leadership qualities, but because he and his fellow party apparatchiks are themselves oligarchs, although of the civilian kind. Morsi is a stand-in for Khairat al-Shater, the Muslim Brothers' real leader. Shater is the consummate party oligarch, with only a reluctant appreciation for the practice and doctrine of popular sovereignty. That's why the Americans love him so much; he's an <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/12/world/middleeast/muslim-brotherhood-leader-rises-as-egypts-decisive-voice.html?pagewanted=all" target="_blank">"impressive"</a> man they can do business with.</span></div>
<div>
<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div>
<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif;">To add an even greater hurdle, from day one the SCAF knew that it faced the juggernaut of popular sovereignty, so it quickly did an end-run around it. By dissolving parliament and grabbing its power, stipulating that the president swear the oath before unelected judges and keep his hands off the military's fiefdom, and establishing a veto over the constitution-writing process, SCAF effectively stopped the exercise of popular sovereignty before it could begin.</span></div>
<div>
<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div>
<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif;">A <a href="http://baheyya.blogspot.com/2012/05/egypts-extraordinary-elections.html" target="_blank">hamstrung president</a> who hails from a party of oligarchs is hardly the leader many of us wanted to launch the offensive against military rule. That's why this election has the feel of a Pyrrhic victory. But then when I think about the ghastly alternative, of Shafiq winning and SCAF cementing its rule with democratic legitimacy, I'm filled with joy at the election's sub-optimal but not disastrous outcome. </span></div>
<div>
<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div>
<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif;">Limping but proud, the revolution continues its valiant fight against the evils of oligarchy.</span></div>
</div>
</div>
Baheyyahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10880400752452388877noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11543224.post-9788935989257936462012-05-21T14:06:00.000-04:002012-05-21T14:06:00.858-04:00The Striver<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgw3IGZcgZH30miLYO0AeVYAPKpl8Hl_Bkn9fviL8ByWHPydqQTzhULCadAl6imedt2Zq4NUtLW2yd40hZrGtSoQWz1XeAOUpAayzg1I_3rykYyOBGyRQW0HJirVY6reSrUcl28/s1600/Egypt+2012+988.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgw3IGZcgZH30miLYO0AeVYAPKpl8Hl_Bkn9fviL8ByWHPydqQTzhULCadAl6imedt2Zq4NUtLW2yd40hZrGtSoQWz1XeAOUpAayzg1I_3rykYyOBGyRQW0HJirVY6reSrUcl28/s400/Egypt+2012+988.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b><span style="color: blue; font-size: 12.0pt;"></span></b><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS",sans-serif; font-size: small;"><span>In normal times and places,
elections are moments of emotional overdrive. Egypt’s extraordinary elections
take that intensity to a new level, evoking a welter of dizzying emotions.
There’s lots of doubt, a good dose of fatigue, plenty of heart-pounding anticipation,
and an irrepressible sense of hope that things will turn out well. Nowhere is
this bundle of feelings more manifest than on the campaign trail of the
charismatic neo-Nasserist politician Hamdeen Sabahy. </span></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS",sans-serif;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><span>During the final stretch of
presidential campaigning, Sabahy cranked up an already hectic schedule,
visiting dusty hamlets and provincial capitals alike while making sure to
appear on every single TV talk show during the past three weeks. In both his
stump speeches and media appearances, Sabahy casts himself as the
citizen-president who’ll put an end to the aloof, imperial mien of the modern Egyptian
president. “One of us” is his <a href="http://www.hamdeensabahy.com/" target="_blank">campaign's</a> brand, and it resonates with those who
want a peer and not a patrician as their national leader.</span></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS",sans-serif;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><span>Sabahy made his name
contesting rigged elections under Mubarak, turning his seaside hometown of
Balteem into a <a href="http://baheyya.blogspot.com/2010/12/day-in-life-of-egyptian-electoral.html" target="_blank">flashpoint</a> electoral district that witnessed several voter
deaths in 1995 and 2005. After the revolution, he immediately set to work on
cultivating a national political profile, trying to maintain his Nasserist core
while building a broader constituency to launch a credible
presidential bid. </span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS",sans-serif;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS",sans-serif;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><span>In this he faced the same
political and organizational dilemmas as his university mate and competitor
Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, but the latter has had more success in crafting a
broad-based winning coalition. A maverick without the Islamists’ formidable
electoral machine or the national name recognition of Mubarak-era insiders,
Sabahy’s electoral fortunes depend on whether voters are persuaded that he
represents a viable third way. </span></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><b><span style="color: blue;">Presidential
Campaigning, Egyptian-Style</span></b></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS",sans-serif;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><span>On a recent Friday afternoon,
Sabahy’s campaign cavalcade eases into Tamay al-Amdeed, a dusty town in
Daqahliyya province, Egypt’s
third-largest population center. Daqahliyya’s fertile countryside is a stunning
procession of emerald fields, holding cabbage patches, vineyards, drenched rice
paddies, citrus groves, and bushels of freshly harvested golden wheat.</span></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>It’s onion season, and the
main roads were dotted with stands selling just-picked onions in red mesh bags.
A little girl riding next to her father on a huge tractor tugs at his
gallabeyya sleeve and points to the passing campaign cavalcade, laughing in
delight.</span></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS",sans-serif;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><span>Rather than focus only on
strategically important, densely-populated cities, Sabahy’s campaign makes sure
to visit out-of-the-way places like Tamay al-Amdeed, to the delight of the
locals. They gather to watch him go in and out of mosques, churches and other
places of local repute, and old and young alike run alongside his motorcade,
snapping cell phone photos, bantering with him, and shaking his hand heartily. </span></span></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhCa1hLGOPYNDfrv7QZhmyenw6Abvljs8H9gW2WiEmOugljoJ4_dCvi1rkK9DwLQONXNniJ-rXZiRvbxFdX41NgSCnRxAHWb8D8ubFrn7YzviXZ6vDKRfeQoZRrTm1HUAHR-Vw-/s1600/Egypt+2012+1051.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhCa1hLGOPYNDfrv7QZhmyenw6Abvljs8H9gW2WiEmOugljoJ4_dCvi1rkK9DwLQONXNniJ-rXZiRvbxFdX41NgSCnRxAHWb8D8ubFrn7YzviXZ6vDKRfeQoZRrTm1HUAHR-Vw-/s320/Egypt+2012+1051.jpg" width="320" /></a><span style="font-size: small;"><span>On the Daqahliyya trip,
Sabahy was escorted by the district’s MP Mostafa al-Guindi, Sabahy’s fellow opposition
parliamentarian from the Mubarak days and a co-member of the shadow parliament
formed after the rigged 2010 general elections. al-Guindi’s endorsement was an
added attraction, drawing people out on their balconies and into the streets to
watch the ever-smiling Sabahy waving to them as he stood out of the sun-roof
of Guindi’s gigantic black Hummer. </span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>Earlier in the week, at an evening rally in Luxor in the public plaza adjacent to the magnificent Luxor Temple,
Sabahy was accompanied by other local luminaries who were his warm-up acts
before he took the microphone. The charismatic young Saïdi poet Hisham al-Gakh
was by far the most rousing speaker, expressing southerners’ signature mix of
intense regional pride and intense resentment at their marginalization in
national politics. “The rest of the candidates are afraid of us Saïdis,”
al-Gakh bellowed, “Except him!” </span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>The crowd cheered wildly as
Sabahy took the microphone and shouted out his love for this neglected part of
the country. “We love you too ya Rayyyyyyes!” screamed out a middle-aged woman
behind me. A man near the stage called out, “Ya Rayyes, when are you going to
get Saïdi citizenship?!” Sabahy retorted playfully, “But I’ve had the
citizenship min zamaaaaan!” </span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>The crowd went bonkers,
clapping and pumping their arms in pure delight. A turbaned older man to my
left called out to no one in particular, “A second Abdel Nasser walllllahi!” A young
man standing next to me beamed and sucked his teeth appreciatively, “What a
respectable man. He just looks presidential, mesh keda?” Hussein is an army
conscript so he can’t vote, but he’s assigned to secure a voting station in Cairo’s Nasr
City, he told me
excitedly. On his day off, he attended Sabahy’s rally to show support for the
candidate he would’ve voted for.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><b><span style="color: blue;">The Sabahy
Brand</span></b></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>Sabahy is a superior
communicator both on outdoor stumps and in television studios. He’s a magnetic
public speaker, holding listeners’ attention with his unscripted,
conversational style and lucid arrangement of ideas. He never prepares or
practices his speeches in advance, so there’s very high variation in what he
says, depending on audience, context, and TV interlocutor. This makes for an
entertaining listening experience and draws crowds, but it’s not always a good
thing.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>The lack of preparation hurt
him on his television appearance on <a href="http://youtu.be/yV8dR6yM9NA" target="_blank">Hafez al-Mirazi’s show</a>, where he was
grilled on his policy positions by several experts. He passed the political
questions with flying colors, but his answers on economic policy revealed a
lack of interest in crucial details. Sabahy gave the impression that he’s not aware
of the tough economic trade-offs that must be made if he becomes the chief
decision-maker.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>But perhaps more than any
other presidential candidate, he’s a natural politician. He rarely looks tired,
stiff, or uncomfortable, is very quick on his feet, and appears genuinely
sincere in his meet-and-greets, not just glad-handing. He’s the only candidate
who seems to enjoy unstructured physical contact with large crowds, often
riding into his rallies on the shoulders of a supporter surrounded by a huge
human wave. </span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>When his aides and escorts appear
frazzled, sweaty, and short-tempered, Sabahy is the picture of cool poise,
kissing babies, cracking jokes, and engaging in simple gestures that delight
his audiences, like drinking frothy sugar cane juice from local shops and
throwing carnations into the crowd.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>The link between Sabahy and
his supporters tends to be highly personalized. His core devotees who’ve known
him for years are like groupies, brooking no dispassionate discussion of their
man. The new ranks of supporters he’s drawing from the large pool of undecided
voters are attracted by a mix of charismatic and programmatic appeal. </span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>At a huge rally in Mansoura
where people waited two hours for him to appear, a Syrian woman from Der’aa
married to an Egyptian and living in Egypt for 19 years said she decided
on Sabahy because she didn’t like either the Ikhwan or the old regime. “Shafiq
is buying votes and just look at how the Ikhwan behaved in parliament, and
they’re pressuring people to vote for Mursi. When I listened to Sabahy I
believed him, I feel that he’s sincere in what he says.” </span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>Two days later, at Sabahy’s
last public rally, in Cairo’s
densely-populated Matareyya neighborhood, a 23-year-old law school graduate said
she decided to vote for Sabahy two weeks ago after watching his interview on
the <a href="http://youtu.be/RQgCk4Wq6_E" target="_blank">CBC channel</a>. “My vote in 2016 will go to Khaled Ali, but this time I’m
voting for Hamdeen. The reason I’m attracted to him is that he focuses on the
completely neglected strata of society. If he succeeds in bettering their
condition, then the revolution will have succeeded.” </span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>Her friend, a social work
graduate, said that until recently she was an Aboul Fotouh supporter. “I felt
that Sabahy had no chance, but after a negative experience volunteering for a
day with the Aboul Fotouh campaign and watching Hamdeen on CBC, I sensed his
sincerity in defending poor people’s interests.” </span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>Despite his apparent surge in
the last two weeks, Sabahy’s brand of personal appeal and pro-poor policies are
unlikely to match Aboul Fotouh’s bandwagon. The question is whether his vote
share will keep him an underdog or lift him up to third or fourth place. </span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><b><span style="color: blue;">Politics as
Spectacle</span></b></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>In the days of Mubarak, and
by his design, politics was a ridiculous, vacuous spectacle, unconnected to
most people’s real concerns. The political class was intentionally made to look
foolish and venal, to reinforce in people’s minds the notion that politics is
futile, dirty, and dangerous.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>As many commentators have pointed
out, the revolution reversed Egyptians’ forced alienation from politics. It put
politics back in its rightful place, in people’s daily lives where it belongs. And
not just in the form of freer political speech and expression, but more
importantly in the form of political praxis. </span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>On Sabahy’s campaign trail, I
saw regular people enthusiastically partaking of this new field of politics. It
was a different kind of political spectacle, one where people came of their own
volition to engage in a meaningful political performance, not be forced to act out
empty political rituals.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>Both on weeknights and
weekends, entire families came out to listen to Sabahy’s speeches. Enduring the
heat, dust, and stifling crowds, they stood patiently waiting for his arrival,
politely suffering through boring, untalented introductory speakers and
sometimes appalling logistics. </span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>In assembling, they instantly
created a public sphere, an Egyptian agora where they exchanged political views
with strangers, watched other people, drank tea and ate <i>tirmis</i>, and clowned
around to pass the time.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>These little guys were
heroic, waiting quietly for hours until Sabahy finally took the stage at 11:50 pm in
Mansoura. Like me, one of them began to wilt, but the other kept us awake with
his valiant cheer leading. </span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>Not everyone who showed up
did so to support Sabahy. Some were curious, others hostile, and others just looking for laughs. In the town of Belqas,
a group of young men kept parodying the revolutionary slogan Sabahy has
appropriated: “‘Aysh! Hurriya! ‘Adala Igtima’iyya!” turning it into “’Aysh!
Hurriya! Ta’meyya!” </span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>In Tamay al-Amdeed, as the
campaign cars filed out of the town to head for the next stop, a resident
called out from a balcony, “And don’t you come back here again!” </span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>In Matareyya, a woman in the
audience was livid, railing the whole time. “These politicians are doing all
this just for themselves and for fame! They all want the seat! Why doesn’t Hamdeen
Sabahy go visit this kidney hospital right here? Let him go see the conditions
of the people in there. He’s just good at talking.” </span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>After Sabahy left Matareyya,
organizers started swiftly dismantling the stage and putting away chairs. An
elderly resident with a cane took the microphone and started speechifying. No
one lingered to listen; people scattered to pursue the rest of their evening’s
plans. The man gave a moving lecture on the impending danger of a feloul
comeback, instructing everyone to make sure to vote.</span></span></div>
</div>Baheyyahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10880400752452388877noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11543224.post-69315432519498290102012-05-10T13:01:00.000-04:002012-05-11T10:13:47.500-04:00Egypt's Extraordinary Elections<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<br />
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgYXwJjeyBJ8qE4rQIpvFuldhWhlKqzDrahjDBRSkTQzQoQOpAZPZRWoOMSc2ra1WRtDMVp1xV-K9kS1GWVnZk-laGVhWwkR6BIJGHr2PLZHuS5j7YLHEs0aw07TZIJloIsjHTv/s1600/Reuters+March+8+2012.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="296" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgYXwJjeyBJ8qE4rQIpvFuldhWhlKqzDrahjDBRSkTQzQoQOpAZPZRWoOMSc2ra1WRtDMVp1xV-K9kS1GWVnZk-laGVhWwkR6BIJGHr2PLZHuS5j7YLHEs0aw07TZIJloIsjHTv/s400/Reuters+March+8+2012.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">(Reuters)</span></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<span style="font-size: small;">These are no ordinary
presidential elections that we’re about to experience in two weeks, and not just
because they’re the first real competition for the top job. They’re
extraordinary because they’re being held in the shadow of an American-backed
military junta. So instead of delving into exciting, substantive debates about
the presidential candidates’ comparative strengths and weaknesses, or bickering
over their relative electoral fortunes, we first have to deal with the higher-order
problem of presidential elections under military rule.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;">Like any stubborn oligarchy, SCAF
and their foreign patrons won’t simply step aside and allow an elected
president to exercise real power. I think their game plan is to preside over a new
and improved form of elite rule where the president and parliament are
popularly elected with great fanfare, but SCAF retains power over three
reserved domains: foreign policy, economic policy, and domestic policing.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;">It’s a grim prognosis, but it
doesn’t warrant defeatism, or the lazy assumption that SCAF pulls all the
strings and we’re all hapless bit players in a dirty Machiavellian game.
Instead, this is the latest and perhaps most exciting chapter in Egypt’s
revolutionary drama, the struggle to replace rule by the few with rule by the
many. </span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><b><span style="color: blue;">The Big Fight
between Oligarchy and Democracy</span></b></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;">Since February 11, 2011, every
corner of Egypt
has been locked in a <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703300904576178431941090282.html" target="_blank">power struggle </a>between bottom-up self rule and the attempt
to re-impose oligarchic control. In every government department, <a href="http://www.shorouknews.com/ContentData.aspx?ID=398804" target="_blank">university faculty</a>, shop floor, and far-flung <a href="http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/339473" target="_blank">governorate</a>, the forces of the ancien regime
have been desperately trying to reimpose old hierarchies. In some sites, the
revolution <a href="http://www.shorouknews.com/ContentData.aspx?ID=404920" target="_blank">has won</a> and in others the counter-revolution reigns supreme. </span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;">Control over parliament is testament
to this mixed picture. The people delivered a resounding defeat to the noxious
feloul, replacing them with more broadly representative, new social forces that
were locked out of parliament for decades. But the majority Ikhwan and Salafi
deputies poured icy water on revolutionary aspirations, opting for a moderate
approach rather than building creative links with extra-parliamentary groups.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;">Then again, that isn’t so
surprising since parliaments aren’t hospitable places for revolutionary
politics, especially if they operate under the watchful eyes of greedy juntas (and
if the parliamentary leadership shares the oligarchic worldview of the military
overlords). </span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;">For SCAF and its American
enablers, the fifteen months since the uprising have been an object lesson in
the dangers of democracy. In every crucial domain, revolutionary action
threatens sacred hierarchies. Relations with Egypt’s two regional allies
experienced their greatest turbulence in decades when the people stormed the
Israeli embassy, eventually forcing it to relocate, and surrounded the Saudi
embassy, prompting its ambassador to leave in a huff. In the economic domain,
the people have had the temerity to <a href="http://www.shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?cdate=10052012&id=480cc051-ac39-4b86-9d3c-405905618d27" target="_blank">weigh in</a> on <a href="http://www.dropegyptsdebt.org/" target="_blank">matters of high state policy</a>, under
the subversive notion that “individuals should be involved in how the country
is run,” as the great Wael Khalil <a href="http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/drop-%E2%80%98dictator-debt%E2%80%99-activists-and-economists-say" target="_blank">put it</a>. </span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;">As for the vast policing
apparatus that ruled the population for 30 years, the people have simply
refused to let it reconstruct itself again. After its initial devastating
defeat on January 28, 2011 and citizens’ storming of State Security
headquarters in March, the policing apparatus has been out of order. The SCAF
now resorts to military police and the arming of plainclothed muscle boys to
kill and maim peaceful protestors, and has so far evaded popular demands for
<a href="http://www.policeforegypt.org/index.php" target="_blank">civilian control over the police force</a>.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;">If the SCAF continues to rule
directly, it risks a very dangerous escalation of these cascading popular invasions
of all its reserved domains. The <a href="http://www.shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?cdate=08052012&id=91b67ab0-922c-4158-816e-b67d7f7292da" target="_blank">Abbassiyya demonstration</a> and sit-in outside
the Ministry of Defense is simply the tangible physical embodiment of this
unstoppable popular encroachment. </span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;">The presidential elections
are thus a life raft, enabling the SCAF to take all the credit for organizing a
free and fair poll. They can then let the elected president be the fall guy,
and quietly wall off their key policy domains from further democratic meddling.
</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;">This wouldn’t be the first
time that oligarchy retains the levers of power under a veneer of democracy.
Authoritarians have <a href="http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136540/michael-bernhard/the-leadership-secrets-of-bismarck?page=show" target="_blank">always found</a> ways to limit the power of elected
institutions, not by the crude methods of election rigging alone but the trickier
means of <a href="http://81.23.231.81/documents/T/the_menu_of_manipulation-_elections_without_democracy.pdf" target="_blank">removing certain policy areas</a> from their jurisdiction.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><b><span style="color: blue;">Who’s up to the
Challenge?</span></b></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiT6nLykHNKLQ0lmt1pzu4mbwKLiU-2HGq3Qot4uRnZwi657k_mvy4t0Hq0__0niEiTkPA_yx_k1SDXN_I_4evu5elO2LRMTMzWxFJJ32kIh0kD1KzyPievN9cqb4d4y9Dpf195/s1600/Egypt+2012+631.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiT6nLykHNKLQ0lmt1pzu4mbwKLiU-2HGq3Qot4uRnZwi657k_mvy4t0Hq0__0niEiTkPA_yx_k1SDXN_I_4evu5elO2LRMTMzWxFJJ32kIh0kD1KzyPievN9cqb4d4y9Dpf195/s320/Egypt+2012+631.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<span style="font-size: small;">But it’s not a stable formula.
Even if the SCAF and their American friends get their best-case scenario and an
anti-revolution man fills the office, problems abound. This <a href="http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/700c1726-95e1-11e1-9d9d-00144feab49a.html#axzz1uTt54suz" target="_blank">“wise” president</a>
will be left to deal with a messy country and its rambunctious people, while
SCAF gets full control over the sacred policy trio: foreign affairs, key
economic decisions, and the domestic security sector. But does anyone really
believe that the wise man will pacify a populace that now knows its own
strength? </span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;">If a popularly-chosen
renegade captures the most powerful state institution, then a real struggle for
power will begin. An outsider president will be a huge headache for the
oligarchs, because he won’t accept sitting duck status. He may get it into his
head to whip up popular support, purge the bureaucracy, forge an alliance with
parliament, and use this as a launching pad for a big fight with SCAF over
democratic control of the three policy domains.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;">The conditions are there for
such a confrontation. Not only is the public fed up with SCAF’s repeated
killing of peaceful protestors, but there’s growing public awareness that the
generals fancy themselves a caste of mandarins standing <a href="http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2114072,00.html" target="_blank">above the state</a>. They
themselves like to <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/29/world/africa/hosni-mubarak-heads-back-to-court.html?_r=2" target="_blank">remind us</a> of this <a href="http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/41045.aspx" target="_blank">periodically</a>, while simultaneously using a
paternalist-nationalist rhetoric that they’re selfless guardians of the
republic. But thanks to the <a href="http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/822321" target="_blank">vigilance</a> of citizen <a href="http://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=27032012&id=0de8ea0c-136a-4270-9a7c-79b576b91b51" target="_blank">watchdogs</a>, we have a very good
understanding of how they <a href="http://www3.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=638772" target="_blank">hoard</a> public resources for their <a href="http://www.almesryoon.com/permalink/7140.html" target="_blank">exclusive gain</a>.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;">A revolutionary president thus
won’t have to convince the public that SCAF is a bunch of shady characters. He
just has to create the conditions for a viable, sustained confrontation, working
against the military <a href="http://www.shorouknews.com/columns/abd-allah-el-sinawy" target="_blank">myth-making machine</a> that attempts to invoke sanctity around
a caste of kleptocrats.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;">The wise man’s <a href="http://youtu.be/YJId3FIJfPw" target="_blank">campaign ad</a> says “we’re up to the challenge,” but the only challenge he faces is
getting Egyptians to believe his preposterous sales pitch. There are <a href="http://hamdeensabahy.com/" target="_blank">only</a> <a href="http://drabolfotoh.com/index.php" target="_blank">two</a>
candidates up to the real challenge of wresting executive power from the
generals and subjecting them to public accountability. I love the fact that
they both started their political careers on the same day in the same room
(February 2, 1977), by <a href="http://youtu.be/QzxhIeuV5Nw" target="_blank">standing up</a> to a <a href="http://youtu.be/ZNcmcawDUYI" target="_blank">dictator</a>.</span></div>
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<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjDFLomRHzzXZj3UwrWl_QI9Tdr6riXuaUs-RY8vlp4MNC1f6CXggMS7Tj_D_UCRrL35e84Ts5iD2OeqLWVVS7rU8iCMawAVoj3-nI_-EZWm2ea2HYUaaEcJSYwrf7NGWMn8qCs/s1600/Truck.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjDFLomRHzzXZj3UwrWl_QI9Tdr6riXuaUs-RY8vlp4MNC1f6CXggMS7Tj_D_UCRrL35e84Ts5iD2OeqLWVVS7rU8iCMawAVoj3-nI_-EZWm2ea2HYUaaEcJSYwrf7NGWMn8qCs/s320/Truck.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<span style="font-size: small;">I should add that neither
<a href="http://youtu.be/VG2RxToxynA" target="_blank">Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh</a> nor <a href="http://youtu.be/nJ7UvVxLgxE" target="_blank">Hamdeen Sabahy</a> are naïve radicals who will go
after SCAF from day one. I think they’re very fine politicians and real leaders
who will know how and when to pick their battles; what to prioritize; how to
seize opportunities; and how to learn from mistakes. We have no precedent for a
democratically-elected pro-revolution president, but I think either of them is
a very good start, with Aboul Fotouh possessing greater chances of winning than
Sabahy.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><b><span style="color: blue;">A Real Choice</span></b></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;">Even if the new Egyptian presidency
ends up being a <a href="http://www.shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?cdate=06052012&id=d79fea77-0741-44f3-842c-d28ee9c97cd1" target="_blank">hamstrung institution</a>, popularly-elected but unable to do much,
it’s remarkable that these elections do offer a choice between real
alternatives. The alternatives aren’t religious rule and “modernity,” as the
<a href="http://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=09052012&id=b1d925d1-6b83-49d3-a44d-475caa585fc9" target="_blank">wise man</a> would have it, but reconstructed authoritarian rule versus rule by the
people.</span></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgH1ux7r0vVRiJ4xrOROzBTqABcEo-09jHN-Lv6AZqg8q5GGRiu_osgCUyatFHjo8rDkOy1ckX_fW4Qd6drvqIXP2rdvbmGnH5HF3qJqFinR0miMvucghX3y6kbOePvp_5dbqtS/s1600/HS+2.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgH1ux7r0vVRiJ4xrOROzBTqABcEo-09jHN-Lv6AZqg8q5GGRiu_osgCUyatFHjo8rDkOy1ckX_fW4Qd6drvqIXP2rdvbmGnH5HF3qJqFinR0miMvucghX3y6kbOePvp_5dbqtS/s320/HS+2.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<span style="font-size: small;">The first option is
represented by a middling insider trying to sell himself as an exceptional statesman,
and the second is embodied in two talented outsiders propelled by the hopes of
millions of people for a fairer, more democratic society. Each alternative has
a substantial group of adherents on the ground, neither of which can be
dismissed. </span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;">There is a third option: the
Muslim Brothers. They’re neither consummate insiders nor total outsiders, occupying
a hazy middle ground all their own from which they’re mulling their next move
on how to become the new insiders.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;">At a slightly more abstract
level, the presidential elections are a fight between two rival doctrines: the age-old
and still-powerful doctrine of contempt for and fear of the demos, and the
insurgent idea that Egyptians have the right and the capacity to rule themselves,
without elite trusteeship, military guardianship, or foreign domination. </span></div>
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<br /></div>
</div>Baheyyahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10880400752452388877noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11543224.post-55251391388745491462012-05-03T17:04:00.001-04:002012-05-03T17:04:41.592-04:00The Aboul Fotouh Bandwagon<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<div style="text-align: left;">
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<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhFuG9Bh211Fx-xJreXepFmCJiePmSUOzOTMvhOH9kaDgPvrUyLkbY8uli_uFpVbpzWuBKa9652dfR0ndLxJm1-tgZ4HA92GriPy2JYU_BBegEwyVSGUIldvp0OOPiCsoWceCu-/s1600/Aboul+Fotouh+1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhFuG9Bh211Fx-xJreXepFmCJiePmSUOzOTMvhOH9kaDgPvrUyLkbY8uli_uFpVbpzWuBKa9652dfR0ndLxJm1-tgZ4HA92GriPy2JYU_BBegEwyVSGUIldvp0OOPiCsoWceCu-/s400/Aboul+Fotouh+1.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>To kick off the official
start of presidential competition, Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh’s campaign did a
smart thing and showcased the most energetic part of his base: university
students. Bedecked in the cheerful orange color of the campaign, they packed
into dozens of buses from across Egypt and poured into Alexandria’s famed
al-Qaid Ibrahim Square where they put on a marvelous show, pulsating with hope
and jubilation at the imminent prospect of real presidential elections.</span></span></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjgelqtjgAfpuRoYun2G_9dt0GNgpz2wsQ36gnoMlfIMWA-ncqsQECi0jQVljr3DPyVvZNiYZOmcGryf-uzsVKfoQydfPnu4fR8khyphenhyphen8KKyIizB5dpCIZwuhYv9ZMdoq9tObH4z0/s1600/Aboul+Fotouh+2.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjgelqtjgAfpuRoYun2G_9dt0GNgpz2wsQ36gnoMlfIMWA-ncqsQECi0jQVljr3DPyVvZNiYZOmcGryf-uzsVKfoQydfPnu4fR8khyphenhyphen8KKyIizB5dpCIZwuhYv9ZMdoq9tObH4z0/s320/Aboul+Fotouh+2.jpg" width="320" /></a><span style="font-size: small;"><span>It’s impossible to be around
a gaggle of college students and not catch their enthusiasm, especially if
they’re wisecracking the whole time while working like bees. After a march on
the Corniche, they stationed themselves in a nice grassy public space next to the
Ibrahim mosque and set up shop. An instant fairground emerged, with booths
selling campaign commodities and booths to sign up more volunteers; a poet’s
corner; a wall display charting milestones in Aboul Fotouh’s public life; art
stations; two roving guys with a drum; and a huge orange mural constructed and
painted by Alexandria
University students.</span></span></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgKWazQtNPZYzKaHikGWbgstPQyZnUghLq7arzlhGEipqn4Rd_1Ql6ttMoaY9QHUO6MbA4zIK3smyfDwtOrKEuQYYTJdaFjP5lmBk5mQd6XQt4xdhzNQTn2nWv0szXAE7ckEMdD/s1600/Aboul+Fotouh+6.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgKWazQtNPZYzKaHikGWbgstPQyZnUghLq7arzlhGEipqn4Rd_1Ql6ttMoaY9QHUO6MbA4zIK3smyfDwtOrKEuQYYTJdaFjP5lmBk5mQd6XQt4xdhzNQTn2nWv0szXAE7ckEMdD/s320/Aboul+Fotouh+6.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>The poets’ stage hosted a
string of eloquent spoken word performances and one hilarious stand-up routine
where a young man parodied some highly imitable public figures, including Hazem
Salah Abu Ismail and the vulgarian Tawfiq Okasha. </span></span></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhLs4XDlzLQU2axzCRqf6gJzdtaxjia3nXia_gSGeMQz7CPncHVn8-n_p92E1nEqb89dv26-JAIqc1XyIRrL3jAZkTYACuUWQe2V0N8niEeNtcXniU7NKHlfWm0ln4g9VyC9KoP/s1600/Aboul+Fotouh+5.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhLs4XDlzLQU2axzCRqf6gJzdtaxjia3nXia_gSGeMQz7CPncHVn8-n_p92E1nEqb89dv26-JAIqc1XyIRrL3jAZkTYACuUWQe2V0N8niEeNtcXniU7NKHlfWm0ln4g9VyC9KoP/s320/Aboul+Fotouh+5.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>God’s cutest creatures were
also out in full force, showing their support for Aboul Fotouh.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>An energetic, friendly woman was
supervising the students constructing the mural. Dr. Yasmeen Zaki is a
professor in the Engineering faculty at Alexandria
University and was responsible for
securing a permit from the Alexandria
authorities and dealing with their bureaucratic obstructionism. “We’ve been
working like ants for the past six days, almost round the clock,” she said
cheerfully, as students carrying buckets of orange paint darted back and forth.
</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>Zaki defines herself as a
liberal, and began working with the campaign a couple of months ago during the
collection of citizen signatures. She said that what most attracts her about
Aboul Fotouh is his personal honesty and ability to gather together different
currents, which she said secular candidates she respected like Hamdeen Sabahy
and Abul al-Ezz al-Hariri have not been able to do. </span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>The theme of beyond-partisanship
was amplified by a group of recent college graduates from the town of Etay al-Baroud in Beheira
province. Unprompted, they took turns introducing themselves as “I’m
ex-Baradei, I’m ex-Ikhwan, I’m ex-April 6<sup>th</sup>.” </span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>Hailing from one of the
Delta’s hardcore Ikhwan pockets that they said never allowed an NDP member into
parliament in the past 30 years, they delighted in describing how residents
reacted to their door-knocking for Aboul Fotouh. “I had dirty water thrown on
me,” said one with a huge grin. “I had dust and dirt flung at me,” piped in
another. Not to be outdone, a third quipped that he was lucky because he got only
clean sudsy water thrown on him. </span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>Muhammad Abdel Rahman Hamada,
a recent law school graduate from Etay al-Baroud, explained why he’s a fierce
Aboul Fotouh loyalist. “Non-partisanship is good for this juncture, because
partisanship is exclusionary. My problem with the secular candidates like
Hamdeen who’s a Nasserist and Khaled Ali who’s a socialist is that they exclude
Islamists.”</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>Overhearing the Etay
volunteers recount the hostility they faced from Ikhwan supporters in their
district, an Ikhwan supporter interjected to explain why a strong party and
organization were crucial in the presidential elections. A heated argument
erupted over who Ikhwan youth would vote for. “The Ikhwan youth say they’ll
support Mursi but they’re really supporting Aboul Fotouh,” asserted Hamada.
“The problem with the Ikhwan is that their rank-and-file have no say
whatsoever,” yelled a middle-aged man who was listening in. </span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>By this point, the sun had descended
into the Mediterranean and students had packed
up the fair and filled the square outside Ibrahim mosque for the evening’s main
event. Tens of thousands of students and Alexandria
residents filled the streets radiating from the square, where a large stage had
been set up and two giant screens were stationed farther back for crowds far from
the stage.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>Under huge strobe lights, in
strode poet Abdel Rahman Youssef, starting things off with high-energy oratory
that was met with wild cheers from the audience and drumbeats and chants from
the Aboul Fotouh Ultras. </span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>Like a series of warm-up acts
before the entrance of the rock star, a string of luminaries then took the
stage to deliver punchy, rousing endorsements that revved up the audience. AUC
professor and Aboul Fotouh adviser Rabab El-Mahdi said that Aboul Fotouh
represented the promise of true inclusion after decades of Mubarak’s
destructive divide-and-rule policies, leading the crowd with rousing chants of
“Yasqut yasqut hukm al-‘askar!” </span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>A representative of the
association of the deaf and mute announced their backing. A representative of
the Revolution Youth Coalition, the most credible post-revolution youth alliance,
announced his endorsement. A famous athlete, a young parliamentarian, an old
friend of Aboul Fotouh: all tramped on and off stage, stoking the sense of
anticipation.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>The crowd went wild when it
was the turn of Salafi Nour Party spokesman Nader Bakkar, greeting him with throaty
chants of “One hand! One hand!” Khaled Said was there in spirit, as the Ultras invoked
his memory and led the crowd in a haunting chant with heart-pounding drumbeats:
“Fil Ganna! Ya Khaled! Fil Ganna! Ya Khaled!” And when Wael Ghonim came onto
the stage to announce his endorsement, commotion ensued, with young people
standing on chairs and screaming wildly.</span></span></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjmg7tK9jD7wLtPJP5018hyphenhyphend62DtUDaR-RHnxN84dISdejfdvnOG6aVHe-yHpaZHdv3eIOdFvdioOw4nw-K9vGRIBw7Cff1V1Qj2d0LZYsl46AmJgR-45ftmSIaqbCSa9sNd2RI/s1600/Aboul+Fotouh+11.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjmg7tK9jD7wLtPJP5018hyphenhyphend62DtUDaR-RHnxN84dISdejfdvnOG6aVHe-yHpaZHdv3eIOdFvdioOw4nw-K9vGRIBw7Cff1V1Qj2d0LZYsl46AmJgR-45ftmSIaqbCSa9sNd2RI/s400/Aboul+Fotouh+11.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>“And now, the student who
stood up and said no to Sadat….” but before the female MC could finish her
sentence, the crowd erupted, the Ultras set off massive fireworks, a campaign
theme song started blasting, and Aboul Fotouh strode onto the stage in a
cream-colored suit sans tie. Before starting his speech, he had to wait a good
three minutes as this corner of Alexandria
thundered its support for his bid to become one of the world’s most powerful
political leaders. </span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>From his origins as a
charismatic leader of a faction within the Ikhwan, in less than a year Abdel
Moneim Aboul Fotouh has experienced a stunning political transformation, metamorphosing
into a national leader to be reckoned with. Unlike other dissidents who shined
under Mubarak’s debilitating dictatorship only to be eclipsed in the exciting
rough and tumble of Egypt’s
new politics, Aboul Fotouh has augmented and diversified his political capital,
comfortably easing into the role of presidential contender.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>His trajectory is but one vignette
into what this revolution has done, smashing the brick ceiling on Egyptian
politics and giving free rein to a host of political talents and possibilities.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>Looking around me at the Alexandria rally, it
wasn’t the hyperactive students who stunned me, but the middle-aged mothers and
fathers (and a few grandparents) who came out to stand three hours in the open
air on a weeknight to listen to a politician. Aboul Fotouh has tapped into the
Egyptian middle class’s thirst for public engagement, the same middle class
that Mubarak shoved away from politics and steered into parochial
neo-conservative privatized pursuits and corrosive conspicuous consumption. </span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>To this educated middle
class, Aboul Fotouh’s scrambling of the old categories of Egyptian politics is
profoundly attractive. Here are mainstream Islamists piled onto Salafis piled
onto Wasat Islamists piled onto liberals and leftists and feminists and
unaffiliated people and people who still harbor a deep disdain for and mistrust
of politics (one of Mr. Mubarak’s many parting gifts). For this diverse voter
bloc, ideological purity or even ideological co-existence is less important
than finding a trustworthy problem-solver president who isn’t going to fleece
us all over again. </span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>Aboul Fotouh’s programmatic
appeal lies in an effective mix of a bold foreign policy (“strong Egypt” is his
chief slogan), a centrist economic program, and an inclusive, ecumenical stance
on identity issues that plays up Egyptians’ shared benign conservatism, whether
they’re Muslims or Copts, and rubbishes the inward-looking aggressive
conservatism that’s flourished within both communities over the past 15 years.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>Personally, Aboul Fotouh is
an unassailable character. He has plenty of integrity, lacks artifice in his political
speech, possesses a pleasant old-fashioned reserve, and has a strong sense of
dignity that doesn’t come off as imperious or in any way entitled (that’s Amr
Moussa’s territory). He’s one of those rare Islamists who are not embarrassingly
provincial like Muhammad Morsi, or remote, calculating organization men like Khairat
al-Shater, or fence-sitters like Muhammad al-Beltagui, or any of the
yet-untested Salafi upstarts. </span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>It’s an open question whether
Aboul Fotouh’s personal and programmatic qualities can bring his brand to the
lower classes, who are equally intent on political participation but lack the
time and leisure of middle class citizens. Here lies the significance of the
Salafis’ bombshell endorsement of Aboul Fotouh, for it is they who’ll carry his
message to the lower and working classes. However, given the internal diversity
of the Salafi world, it remains to be seen whether Fatehoon Salafis can convince
their communities to switch allegiance from Hazem Abu Ismail and Muhammad Morsi
to Aboul Fotouh.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span>If he does make inroads into
the pious, suffering lower classes and peels off some supporters from the
nervous upper classes, the divided Copts, and the fractious secular left, Aboul
Fotouh’s bandwagon will be hard to beat.</span></span></div>
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</div>Baheyyahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10880400752452388877noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11543224.post-29091778566470777022012-03-14T07:51:00.006-04:002012-03-14T09:15:56.569-04:00On the Trail of an Audacious Presidential Campaign<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiUcrFKbiQ7myewfpYwpoX-uC5cych4L9nhJi59QkxJexttcYxnnG3iPqeoYV9N-1vhhgfKLWRtp2GgnVuAfZobF-Gk58tTa4azvUcKImS6j9VV1GbZlq8oSEdrpmOCXLHudjjV/s1600/Campaign+Poster.jpg"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5719719599893346050" style="FLOAT: left; MARGIN: 0px 10px 10px 0px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 285px" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiUcrFKbiQ7myewfpYwpoX-uC5cych4L9nhJi59QkxJexttcYxnnG3iPqeoYV9N-1vhhgfKLWRtp2GgnVuAfZobF-Gk58tTa4azvUcKImS6j9VV1GbZlq8oSEdrpmOCXLHudjjV/s400/Campaign+Poster.jpg" border="0" /></a><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">As Egyptians are on the cusp of choosing their chief executive for the first time ever, the idea of popular participation is under attack. Revolution-fatigue is manufactured and promoted by the </span><a href="http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/1087/op4.htm"><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">same intellectual peddlers </span></a><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">who served Mubarak. </span><a href="http://www.elshaab.org/thread.php?ID=18036"><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">Bookstalls</span></a><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;"> and air waves are full of </span><a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=85-pj2026hI"><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">ancien regime figures</span></a><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">, holding forth on “the missed opportunities” of the Mubarak era. Old </span><a href="http://www.sis.gov.eg/VR/34/5.htm"><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">myths</span></a><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;"> about the fecklessness and </span><a href="http://digital.ahram.org.eg/Policy.aspx?Serial=818440"><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">gullibility</span></a><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;"> of the people are refurbished and packaged under the respectable labels of “public opinion” and “the general mood.” Mubarak’s old trick of belittling and smearing aspirants to the top job is alive and well in those corners of the media bankrolled by his </span><a href="http://www.emadadeeb.com/ar/index.asp"><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">erstwhile cronies</span></a><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">.<br /><br />In this setting of military rule supported by anti-revolutionary cultural production, enter a group of citizens backing a dynamic activist lawyer for president. Having just turned 40 last month, the minimum age required to run for the office, </span><a href="http://khaledali.net/"><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">Khaled Ali </span></a><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">is the youngest presidential hopeful, but age is not his most striking asset. It’s his disarming sincerity and fierce dedication to his core constituency, the downtrodden who he belongs to and doesn’t just talk about.<br /><br />In this maiden presidential race, electability is hard to gauge. But if credibility is a criterion, then Khaled Ali has it in spades.<br /><br /><br /><span style="color:#3333ff;"><strong>Banking on the Black Box</strong><br /></span>Like any campaign headquarters, Ali’s is a den of chain-smoking, sleep-deprived organizers, fresh-faced college student volunteers, and the odd journalist or visitor roaming the halls. A good chunk of Baradei supporters gravitated to Ali’s campaign after their guru pulled out of the race, bringing with them a fondness for political marketing gimmicks. What’s unique about the Ali campaign are the legion of laborers backing his candidacy, real flesh-and-blood workers determined to claim their share of the new Egyptian state (under construction).<br /><br />Different subcultures coexist in the campaign office, operating on parallel tracks. In one room, a group of burly local labor leaders sit around a large table planning outreach and canvassing strategies, led by a vivacious middle-aged Mahalla woman who was arrested during the April 6, 2008 protests in the town.<br /><br />In a corner of an adjacent room, a handful of intellectuals are smoking up a storm and heatedly debating something. The next two rooms are occupied by young organizers staring intently into their laptops or pacing back and forth talking on their cell phones, a whiteboard listing the details of Ali’s campaign visits above their heads.<br /><br />Amr al-Qadi is a third-year engineering student at Ain Shams who became a campaign volunteer shortly after Ali declared his candidacy. Al-Qadi had initially supported </span><a href="http://drabolfotoh.com/Index/index.html"><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">Abdel Moneim Abul Fotouh</span></a><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">, considering him the most viable pro-revolution candidate to compete against Mubarak holdover Amr Moussa. Then he met Khaled Ali by chance and was impressed by how modest he is.<br /><br />“It felt as if I was sitting with one of my friends. He’s not arrogant at all and he doesn’t insist that we call him Ustaz and stuff like that. I could imagine how if he became president, he’d treat everyone equally. He’s also the only candidate who’s serious about social justice, and something he said stuck with me: we need to translate social justice slogans into public policies.”<br /><br />An Egyptian academic who lives in Europe said she was a big Baradei supporter but transferred her loyalties to Ali when Ali joined the race. She was drawn to the Ali campaign’s responsiveness and solicitation of citizen proposals, volunteering her expertise on cultural resource management. “It’s an individual initiative of many individuals,” she said, capturing the campaign’s micro-organizational ethos.<br /><br />That ethos worries Ali’s core group of advisers. Veteran human rights defender </span><a href="http://ahmedseif.wordpress.com/"><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">Ahmed Seif al-Islam </span></a><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">is Ali’s mentor and fellow traveler in the fields of law and politics. He identified the influx of volunteers as one of the campaign’s two main challenges. An asset in terms of raking in fresh ideas and embodying participatory politics, managing the volunteers is a daunting organizational task, especially for a grassroots campaign high on enthusiasm but short on funds. </span><br /><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;"></span><br /><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">But Seif harbors no worries about the utility of what they’re doing. “We’re running a different kind of campaign. We’re not in this to sell our candidate, but to mobilize voters, that’s the whole point.”<br /></span><br /><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">He brushed aside all the ambient theories purporting to map out the preferences of Egypt’s electorate based on the parliamentary election results. “What people don’t understand is that Egyptians didn’t vote for the Muslim Brothers and the Salafis because they’re religious parties, they voted for them as a reward for opposing Mubarak. The logic is, ‘we’ll reward you and let’s see how you make out now.’”<br /><br />Out of the 30 million voters expected to take part in the presidential poll, Seif thinks maybe five million will vote with fixed preferences, including the bloc of religious voters, based on his reading of the Shura Council elections. “That leaves 25 million voters that we don’t know anything about! They’re a black box.”<br /><br />He believes four elements will structure the vote: region, ideology, age, and occupation. Each voter’s calculus will be some alchemy of these four, he says, but we can’t know it in advance, especially since there’s no precedent of electing an Egyptian president.<br /><br /><br /><span style="color:#3333ff;"><strong>Native Son</strong><br /></span>On a balmy moonlit evening, the campaign bus rolled into Khaled Ali’s home village of Mit Yaeesh in Markaz Mit Ghamr, Daqahliyya. Before it could stop, the bus was encircled by athe crowd and a boisterous band of musicians playing the mizmar and drums. The scene could’ve been out of a film: the native son gets a rousing hero’s welcome for doing his people proud.<br /><br />Ali’s family and supporters hugged and kissed him as he was serenaded by the troupe, then he ducked into the front seat of a car that was part of a large cavalcade of cars and pick-up trucks slowly making its way to the rally site, snarling traffic something awful but no one complained.<br /><br />Two huge amplifiers on the back of a pick-up truck blasted music, and carefree girls in hijab hung out of car windows, drumming on the car roofs and swaying to the music. Every few minutes, a tractor headed in the opposite direction squeezed by the procession, its driver raising both arms in celebratory greeting, and one local notable with a mighty turban passed by on his horse, raising his cane high up in the air to salute the procession as his mare clop-clopped on its merry way.<br /><br />On either side of the narrow streets, residents leaned out of their balconies and stood outside shops to watch the spectacle. A young storekeeper cradling an infant swaddled in a pink blanket gently gathered the blanket around her ears. A toddler sat on a stoop, clapping delightedly to the music. A baqqal stood on a stool with his back to the street, fussing over the already artfully-arranged wares on his shelves, never once turning around to see the commotion.<br /><br />Ali got out of the car to greet a gathering of women standing in a bend in the road, their joyful ululations rising to the moon and rippling its surface.<br /><br /></span><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhQHsYFkir7BazxpSdkKOuuTsSTl4-rY_RcKJb37UMUcF3MhaFgFMYTn61lEN0k3KoSVFrZ_bpsHqUMQBcxs8xTtWoBChcvJ5nvRXH6wpddvUpKXcErAQlGpTxbeVkV68B8eCBO/s1600/Boyz.jpg"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5719736514070687682" style="FLOAT: right; MARGIN: 0px 0px 10px 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 300px" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhQHsYFkir7BazxpSdkKOuuTsSTl4-rY_RcKJb37UMUcF3MhaFgFMYTn61lEN0k3KoSVFrZ_bpsHqUMQBcxs8xTtWoBChcvJ5nvRXH6wpddvUpKXcErAQlGpTxbeVkV68B8eCBO/s400/Boyz.jpg" border="0" /></a><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">There’s a negative stereotype of the Egyptian human rights lawyer jet-setting from conference to conference and spending more time on television than in the courtroom. Although he’s very much a part of the Cairo human rights crowd, Ali is an outlier.<br /><br />Unlike many professionals from poor backgrounds, he speaks unashamedly about his past. His father’s salary as a coast guard wasn’t enough to support a family of five girls and three boys. So as the second oldest child, Khaled worked odd jobs before and after Law School to help meet his own and his siblings’ expenses, insisting on helping his sisters marry first before he married in 2002.<br /><br />In an interview with talk show host Hala Sarhan, Ali poignantly recalled his experiences as a worker at a rice-hulling plant and a machine operator at a biscuit factory. For a year after Law School he worked as a waiter at a coffee shop, eventually leaving the job for the humiliation inflicted on him by the boss.<br /><br />In 1996, he began his human rights career by joining the revered leftist lawyers Ahmed Seif al-Islam and the late Hisham Mubarak, heirs to the Egyptian tradition of cause lawyering pioneered by </span><a href="http://baheyya.blogspot.com/2006/06/requiem.html"><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">Nabil al-Hilali</span></a><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">. Ali developed a reputation for defending the rights of laid-off workers and arrested protesters. In 2009, he started his own NGO, the </span><a href="http://ecesr.com/"><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights</span></a><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">, where he honed his strategy of filing lawsuits before the administrative courts to challenge the corrupt privatization of state-owned factories under Mubarak.<br /><br />A handful of high-profile court rulings in his favor in 2009 and 2010 brought Ali to national prominence. He began appearing on television, especially after he succeeded in persuading Magles al-Dawla to rule in favor of a national minimum wage in March 2010. Inspired by the court ruling, a minimum wage was one of the four core demands of the January 25, 2011 protest action, and has since become a key item in the revolution’s political economy agenda. </span><br /><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;"></span><br /><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">After the revolution, Ali’s NGO was a key facilitator for the independent trade unions supplanting the defunct state labor federation, and he went after SCAF’s March decree criminalizing protests. His most recent legal success is a court ruling stipulating a special monthly pension for those injured during the revolution.<br /><br />Ali received and refused an offer to join Essam Sharaf’s cabinet as Minister of Labour, and later he also turned down an offer to become an appointed member of parliament. He insists on the bottom-up route to presidential candidacy, vowing to collect the required 30,000 citizen endorsements and to drop out of the race if he can’t meet the threshold.<br /><br /><br /><span style="color:#3333ff;"><strong>The Dignity of Work</strong><br /></span>At an ahwa in Boulaq al-Dakrour after Friday prayers, under a flimsy plastic tarpaulin rustling in the spring breeze, Khaled Ali has the attention of around 70 neighborhood men who’ve gathered to hear him out. They listen intently as Ali reels off the ill-gotten gains of Mubarak’s cronies. “They carved up the country between them like a cake!”<br /><br /><br /></span><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;"><br /><p></span><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjYGFfyWOfDTBQls8xcBAG_bk0bfMkMxaXidVEEXBAJkMHqPhOwIFJ5up29N7-izvB9qWYyIvQEHre-8rDlIIYk7isG2yNeuvyz-XZ0g8BHiS9sajDNsLQVfTheFvV3g5lUG54W/s1600/Smile.jpg"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5719733666342444242" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 300px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjYGFfyWOfDTBQls8xcBAG_bk0bfMkMxaXidVEEXBAJkMHqPhOwIFJ5up29N7-izvB9qWYyIvQEHre-8rDlIIYk7isG2yNeuvyz-XZ0g8BHiS9sajDNsLQVfTheFvV3g5lUG54W/s400/Smile.jpg" border="0" /></a><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">Ali isn’t a smooth talking politician or a natural performer. His speaking style is very much that of a lawyer making his case before the bench, piling up facts and figures in a dizzying succession of details than can tax his listeners. But he shines in interactive question-and-answer sessions, engaging meaningfully with the audience, cracking jokes, and capturing the essence of his message in pithy one-liners.<br /><br /></span><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">The ahwa audience particularly appreciated his phrase, “We import even pencils from the UAE, while our country has become a display case for Chinese goods.”<br /><br /></span><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj6tH6juT5LMZIsgHR2A_d8aula0QUPmN54GFdjEnwUWNBZFof0UMkDsLtBsEwUoQPLUDVk3dkQXBcHyb5agQz8f_gX9VX7UElsC6kGxJDYg9W8Nyvq6QTf1iNr5pCmvdQXms6o/s1600/Crutch.jpg"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5719732124293799026" style="FLOAT: left; MARGIN: 0px 10px 10px 0px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 300px" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj6tH6juT5LMZIsgHR2A_d8aula0QUPmN54GFdjEnwUWNBZFof0UMkDsLtBsEwUoQPLUDVk3dkQXBcHyb5agQz8f_gX9VX7UElsC6kGxJDYg9W8Nyvq6QTf1iNr5pCmvdQXms6o/s400/Crutch.jpg" border="0" /></a><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">All of the presidential hopefuls are making requisite nods to social justice, but Ali relentlessly harps on the imperative of redistribution. His stump speeches are almost exclusively focused on the basic economic conditions that structure Egyptians’ lives: the human fallout of privatization; the extinction of public services; the erosion of local manufacturing; and the misuse and under-use of Egypt’s natural resources.<br /><br />The fact that Ali doesn’t tailor his message to different audiences irks some of his diehard supporters who want him to win, not just be an also-ran.<br /><br />At the campaign headquarters, in a packed room discussing the game plan for collecting the 30,000 citizen endorsements, a seasoned labor activist stood up to plead with Ali that he needs to broaden his rhetoric to reach a wider range of Egyptians, not only the working classes and the poor. “You need a truly national discourse,” the man said, gesturing with his hands for emphasis.<br /><br />Ali seems reluctant to dilute his trademark message. The emphasis on redistribution is what makes him different from the carefully calibrated, intentionally vague speeches of the typical vote-seeking politician. And he’s gifted at translating the clunky terms of political economy into the lived experience of regular Egyptians.<br /><br />Speaking from his own experience, he’s especially effective at rendering the material and emotional toll of unemployment.<br /><br />At a town hall meeting in a middle-class social club in 10th of Ramadan City, in front of a crowd of businessmen and professionals for whom redistribution is a scary word, Ali’s description of work as constitutive of human dignity drew appreciative nods and murmurs from a skeptical audience.<br /><br />“Egypt is not poor,” he said. “It has resources and brains, but it has policies that keep poverty in place. I know what it’s like to be a laborer, because I was one. I know what it means to work hard all month to finally get your wages that are sorely needed for the family’s expenses. And I know what it means for a family’s breadwinner to lose his job. Millions of Egyptians have these same stories, and even more difficult than mine.”<br /><br />But his advocacy of a partial return to the public sector got heated pushback. “Have you ever worked in the public sector?” An older man prodded him. Ali said no. “I didn’t think so. The public sector was our worst experience and we don’t want to go backward. There is no role for the public sector.”<br /><br />A few minutes later, he won over the audience when he passionately delivered one of his best lines, “Mubarak is not a person. It’s a system and a network of interests that refuses to leave and will not leave.”<br /><br />An older man went up to the microphone and said, “What I like about you is that you’re unaffected, <em>mafeesh takleef</em>. I fear that this presidential race is going to be dominated by the big people with the puny brains. You’re a fida’i among the dinosaurs. <em>Rabbena yawfaqak</em>.”<br /><br />“Please stop or you’re going to make me cry now,” quipped Ali from the podium, flashing a boyish smile as the hall filled with laughter.<br /><br /><br /><strong><span style="color:#3333ff;">"فلاح! فقير! رئيس من التحري</span><span style="color:#3333ff;">ر"</span></strong><span style="color:#3333ff;"><br /></span>Ali’s message of taking back a stolen country resurrects the ethos of popular empowerment that made the revolution but has been under attack ever since.<br /><br />Popular participation isn’t being threatened just by the SCAF’s decrees and use of violence, but in the reproduction of conservative ideas about the futility and danger of bottom-up action. Already, the presidential elections are being sold as a matter that will be decided by the big people striking deals behind closed doors, and the little people will go out on voting day in a folkloric pageant simply to certify the elite pact.<br /><br />Trial balloons about a “consensus candidate” between SCAF and the Ikhwan are met with a </span><a href="http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=614259"><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">counter-elite argument </span></a><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">to forget about choice and competition and </span><a href="http://www.facebook.com/AboelFtooh.R2ees?v=wall"><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">anoint</span></a><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;"> Abdel Moneim Abul Fotouh as the only viable alternative to the man chosen by the powers that be.<br /><br />How ironic. Even after Egyptians stunned themselves and the world by overturning a vile and immovable structure of domination, they’re now being goaded to forget all that and “be realistic,” i.e. to please cooperate in rebuilding the foundations of their exclusion.<br /><br /></span><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgixU6VrgEeSZbU-_2GHyc-AYN8UT4U3zgEueaTeyojhCtdWXm47i9qlztMyk2sA-SxFhVcm61Zs9rSPh0jYybx5U9QnpeqGRS43nq9yOPm1lHexSd9H_3eFinbsNWqf4QY-o7N/s1600/Women.jpg"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5719730720540911378" style="FLOAT: right; MARGIN: 0px 0px 10px 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 300px" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgixU6VrgEeSZbU-_2GHyc-AYN8UT4U3zgEueaTeyojhCtdWXm47i9qlztMyk2sA-SxFhVcm61Zs9rSPh0jYybx5U9QnpeqGRS43nq9yOPm1lHexSd9H_3eFinbsNWqf4QY-o7N/s400/Women.jpg" border="0" /></a><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">Thankfully, Khaled Ali’s campaign and the campaigns of other honorable candidates are fighting tooth and nail to defeat the loathsome doctrine of politics as elite pacts. “The people have to protect the elections,” Ali told the huge crowd in Mit Yaeesh. “They want to force someone down our throat, but if all Egyptians go out to vote, they can’t do that.”<br /><br />The audience roared back with the most popular chant of the evening: </span></p><br /><p><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">"فلاح! فقير! رئيس من التحرير"<br /></span></p>Baheyyahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10880400752452388877noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11543224.post-13732508033860483872011-03-19T10:07:00.007-04:002011-03-19T11:23:59.301-04:00Public Choice<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi-xjNKyZVFh5bgCEJNKddomhD631WDlml_WFdwexmSbXoXOct1v24CX3hbsSlLQJGgMJdkwFOHIw_9ulHnkG2oyLfIIWM21bDVR81rM-jrFXZo3VTD9qTM-iMH94CXMfT7DeL5/s1600/Referendum+1+AP.jpg"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5585793288644380290" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 266px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi-xjNKyZVFh5bgCEJNKddomhD631WDlml_WFdwexmSbXoXOct1v24CX3hbsSlLQJGgMJdkwFOHIw_9ulHnkG2oyLfIIWM21bDVR81rM-jrFXZo3VTD9qTM-iMH94CXMfT7DeL5/s400/Referendum+1+AP.jpg" border="0" /></a><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg78JgrY6VpPHENFSLmPhT28znJ_QS-AYic2QwxaNamA4pjEgEwn2gMgAavcNJ_5jtSTsJbLAq_R1EjJtm_qD8L1BgbNcFdyBtM5dM8M1S3wniEEUzRzMQidsU_s6aCN-JayF5s/s1600/Referendum+2.jpg"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5585793282641624178" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 266px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg78JgrY6VpPHENFSLmPhT28znJ_QS-AYic2QwxaNamA4pjEgEwn2gMgAavcNJ_5jtSTsJbLAq_R1EjJtm_qD8L1BgbNcFdyBtM5dM8M1S3wniEEUzRzMQidsU_s6aCN-JayF5s/s400/Referendum+2.jpg" border="0" /></a><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEisi-GXcDSFvkRXzS48b5-1K4Oyy2QupsytKDykZFdOEgn1VPh2AHRme9Cd_vN-TM5o43goU9gpsxGG8cI8tLIn4q8ZIUZGLA3wNjPq7W0bOebI4qD0CTGC1pEg64bcGuTPprJ2/s1600/Referendum+3.jpg"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5585792884645128290" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 286px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEisi-GXcDSFvkRXzS48b5-1K4Oyy2QupsytKDykZFdOEgn1VPh2AHRme9Cd_vN-TM5o43goU9gpsxGG8cI8tLIn4q8ZIUZGLA3wNjPq7W0bOebI4qD0CTGC1pEg64bcGuTPprJ2/s400/Referendum+3.jpg" border="0" /></a><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">It is an incredible thing to see an Egyptian election with queues of unmolested, smiling voters instead of lines of riot police. There are no knife-wielding thugs, no smug State Security officers scurrying about gaming things. The sky is clear, there’s no tear gas clouding vision. Voters aren’t scuffling with police outside, banging on the doors to get in, chanting slogans of woe and injustice.<br /></span><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjasFNoCqOcAiAPp2Ey_NAXUfXMmdSBPdW-n-JLTgWamPoU61ardAAo9fEXRGHlwZYngr9Km3ibaUYoW9Fl5mbi0yn2euKPDYSageGYFsAvZeQVZgzl2MPjMqEPr5iO-Y_a_K7c/s1600/Referendum+4.jpg"><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5585793687810151506" style="FLOAT: right; MARGIN: 0px 0px 10px 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 266px" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjasFNoCqOcAiAPp2Ey_NAXUfXMmdSBPdW-n-JLTgWamPoU61ardAAo9fEXRGHlwZYngr9Km3ibaUYoW9Fl5mbi0yn2euKPDYSageGYFsAvZeQVZgzl2MPjMqEPr5iO-Y_a_K7c/s400/Referendum+4.jpg" border="0" /></span></a><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">Inside, there are no poll workers huddling to stuff ballot boxes.<br /><br /></span><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjhTWaAZ5q4Jk5aUrVg_KNWuIaEvV9BfRQSSXnbDmeW9QbVFLzRhN9GdaGsUzI-I2u3tsWc3INktrhBSHv7rvfVS1CmBLyqoF13ZORLg89B8uFACxO3jc2uTguawe1FlCCdPUHC/s1600/Referendum+5.jpg"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5585794174519685970" style="FLOAT: left; MARGIN: 0px 10px 10px 0px; WIDTH: 232px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 351px" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjhTWaAZ5q4Jk5aUrVg_KNWuIaEvV9BfRQSSXnbDmeW9QbVFLzRhN9GdaGsUzI-I2u3tsWc3INktrhBSHv7rvfVS1CmBLyqoF13ZORLg89B8uFACxO3jc2uTguawe1FlCCdPUHC/s400/Referendum+5.jpg" border="0" /></a><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">For the first time ever, people are voting with their national ID card, no complicated voting cards needed. Nobody is obstructing volunteer poll monitors, gruffly asking them what they think they’re doing or kicking them out. Judges are back, in their unusual but essential role as the best election supervisors Egypt can have. Photographers are free to snap shots inside the stations, there’s nothing to hide. And yes, voters are young and old, men and women, religious and not, rich and not, literate and unlettered. Egypt today held a real referendum that looks like its people, not a fake acclamation staged by an absolute ruler.<br /></span><br /><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">Does it say anywhere in the books that revolutions make the unreal happen? </span><br /><span style="font-family:Trebuchet MS;"></span><br /><span style="font-family:Trebuchet MS;">*AP Photos</span>Baheyyahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10880400752452388877noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11543224.post-78090111699912762822011-02-11T19:31:00.003-05:002011-02-11T19:37:48.661-05:00Fin du Régime<a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj4cyURLkgX4xcOQKg1CaEPxB_LLH07qq-LGS1jzi-MbEGeC18yvSFVQq1zzL1Hb0AjDAn1A7KaxvV2aGhTdaCGtQbPOVO74asxvDIW_gqAEN-RGbGFjj7iiGJuZittTORxQYS4/s1600/Feb+11+2011+AP.jpg"><img style="float: left; margin: 0pt 10px 10px 0pt; cursor: pointer; width: 400px; height: 268px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj4cyURLkgX4xcOQKg1CaEPxB_LLH07qq-LGS1jzi-MbEGeC18yvSFVQq1zzL1Hb0AjDAn1A7KaxvV2aGhTdaCGtQbPOVO74asxvDIW_gqAEN-RGbGFjj7iiGJuZittTORxQYS4/s400/Feb+11+2011+AP.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5572595136218631954" border="0" /></a><span style="font-family: trebuchet ms; color: rgb(0, 0, 153);">In the end, they leave, with hollow eyes and a few plain words. Stripped of their ill-gotten power, they are miserable, ashen, and base. All of the rhetoric they spewed lingers like a bad smell, soon to evaporate in the fresh air of freedom. "The Egyptian people still need to develop a culture of democracy. Their grievances are economic, not political. The ruling party won a sweeping victory. The extremists are going to take over. The government supports limited income groups. Police torture is just a few individual cases. The constitutional amendments strengthen democracy." Today, all of that is over.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: trebuchet ms; color: rgb(0, 0, 153);">How are the mighty fallen, and the weapons of war perished.</span><br /><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 153);font-size:85%;" ><br /><span style="font-family: trebuchet ms;">(AP Photo)</span></span>Baheyyahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10880400752452388877noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11543224.post-75706368596206091972011-02-10T14:22:00.001-05:002011-02-10T14:25:23.017-05:00Popular Sovereignty<div style="text-align: center;"><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhtcHAVEG9GqItVWY2LB9hmBpzUVG2xbjl-M1Po5Cz4Pd06uRxvNG8sfXHjWOk2F-M_LbNxCya7-cJB3Gvpgd3H3FE51qV8LONpTaMwVGI9WC3WChgOwxLqd403Q5DbMKzIO6cg/s1600/x610.jpg"><img style="display: block; margin: 0px auto 10px; text-align: center; cursor: pointer; width: 271px; height: 400px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhtcHAVEG9GqItVWY2LB9hmBpzUVG2xbjl-M1Po5Cz4Pd06uRxvNG8sfXHjWOk2F-M_LbNxCya7-cJB3Gvpgd3H3FE51qV8LONpTaMwVGI9WC3WChgOwxLqd403Q5DbMKzIO6cg/s400/x610.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5572142845495004946" border="0" /></a><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;"><span style="font-size:85%;">A citizen outside the gates of parliament, 9 February 2011.</span><br /><span style="font-size:85%;">(AP Photo)</span></span><br /></div>Baheyyahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10880400752452388877noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11543224.post-47735648502870951562011-02-04T13:30:00.006-05:002011-02-04T13:44:51.431-05:00To Egypt, with love<div style="text-align: center;"><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjR2OARiYdUPzewgZIAzyMA9aNrPcpp_ON7wLdBzn-W4qZ4fI2Q5VsrbCYIzGBf0W0TVpL_bs-q6Lh0aWyE-aSRC_SY8MR14O3LYIB30_Hth6Ex8WL6tw2KesxEio8tyxB_vTbr/s1600/Aswan+Feb+1.jpg"><img style="display: block; margin: 0px auto 10px; text-align: center; cursor: pointer; width: 400px; height: 299px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjR2OARiYdUPzewgZIAzyMA9aNrPcpp_ON7wLdBzn-W4qZ4fI2Q5VsrbCYIzGBf0W0TVpL_bs-q6Lh0aWyE-aSRC_SY8MR14O3LYIB30_Hth6Ex8WL6tw2KesxEio8tyxB_vTbr/s400/Aswan+Feb+1.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5569905401363734194" border="0" /></a><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 153);font-family:trebuchet ms;" >Tahrir Square, February 1, 2011; "We've come from Aswan; neither Mubarak nor Soliman." Photo: <a href="http://twitpic.com/3vuueq">Tamer El-Ghobashy</a></span><br /></div><br /><span style="font-family:trebuchet ms;">Before we enter the phase of intense politicking to <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/04/world/middleeast/04diplomacy.html?hp">game a post-Mubarak order</a>, the deals being made to contain the public’s unequivocal demand to choose their leaders, I want to express love and awe of all those average people who said enough. Enough repression. Enough thievery. Enough rotten ideas about the apathy and inaction of the people. I have no doubt that the grim realities of elite politics will soon overtake events, as they always do. But I’ll never forget how ordinary citizens completely upended the best laid plans of the rulers in Cairo, Washington, and Tel Aviv. They forced Hosni Mubarak to ditch his dynastic project, posthaste, and to openly express his hatred of the Egyptian people. They forced the Americans to yet again confront the folly of building alliances with loathed dictators. And they reminded Israelis that Arabs want to rule themselves, whether Israel likes it or not. No amount of muddled theories or elite compromises will ever mask the extraordinary clarity of what happened in Egypt this winter. I'm happy to be alive to see it.</span>Baheyyahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10880400752452388877noreply@blogger.com